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Bourdieu's Linguistic Market and the Spread of French in Protectorate Morocco

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my boys, Peter and Timothy.

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Bourdieu's Linguistic Market and the Spread of French in Protectorate Morocco

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The French colonizer from 1912–1956 brought not only the French language to Morocco but also a colonial administration that reinforced divisions between various indigenous social groups. European, Jewish, Muslim, and Berber communities were segregated into separate schools providing different levels of French-language education. As a result, French linguistic dominance and economic opportunity were assured among some groups more thoroughly than others. Acquisition of the French language for European and Jewish communities through advanced educational opportunities at the European *lycées* and Jewish *Alliance Israélite Universelle* granted certain higher educational, economic, and administrative privileges within the colonial administration and workforce. Meanwhile, those attending schools created for Muslim and Berber Moroccans where curricula insisted on rudimentary French skills were unable to seek advanced educational or economic opportunity.

This research describes the different types of access to the French language that were intended for the diverse European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab speech

communities through the various educational institutions created by the French government during the French protectorate in Morocco. Through the application of Bourdieu's language market theory, this dissertation examines the ways that access became linked to the job market and the attainment of symbolic, economic, and cultural capital. This research offers explanations of how language shift occurred among European and Jews in Morocco and how French continued to confer socioeconomic value long after independence, despite efforts to oust the "colonizer's language" for all Moroccans. Furthermore, in contradiction to Bourdieu's language market theory, this research exposes how multiple language markets in Morocco emerged for Muslim and Berber communities as a result of access to different kinds of instruction and how both French and Arabic became legitimate languages with very different social functions.

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CHAPTER 1: THE SPREAD OF FRENCH IN MOROCCO

Morocco has historically offered a rich heritage of language options for many speakers: Moroccan Arabic (MA), Classical Arabic (CA), Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Berber languages, Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, and more recently Spanish and French. Yet after the departure of the colonizer in 1956, the linguistic policies of the newly independent nation tended to focus attention on establishing a unified language through the process of Arabization. Despite efforts to increase the use of Arabic after independence from France, the number of French speakers throughout the Maghreb, paradoxically in the eyes of many, increased from the number of French speakers under the French protectorate (Grandguillaume, 1983). Much research to date in explaining this phenomenon has focused on determining language preference or language attitudes and has neglected the sociohistorical context that over time produced those current attitudes and preference. What is missing in the linguistic research of Morocco is an understanding of the historical events among the different speech communities present in Morocco, which produced the results witnessed today (Dakhilia, 2004).

Before the installation of the French Protectorate in 1912, the influence of the French language was minimal in Morocco (Heath, 1989). However, after independence in 1956, French became the most widely spoken foreign language throughout unified Morocco, especially among minority communities. National statistics for unified, independent Morocco in 1960 indicated that an overwhelming

60.9% of Jewish Moroccans and 70% of Europeans from different nationalities spoke French, though combined, these groups only comprised 10% of the population. In comparison, of the remaining 90% of Moroccan Arabs and Berbers, only 7% spoke French. These statistics demonstrate that during the protectorate, the Jewish and European minority populations of Morocco underwent French language acquisition at very different rates than other Moroccans, exposing the existence of other kinds of social disparities between these communities.

More recently, as of 2007, the total number of French speakers increased in Morocco, with an estimated 41.5% of all Moroccans speaking French, out of an entire population of over 33 million, a considerable growth since 1956 (France Diplomatie, 2012). In contrast to the statistics in 1960, where virtually the entire number of French speakers in Morocco were European or Jewish, nearly all the French speakers are Muslim Moroccans, since the combined population of Jews and Europeans account for less than 1% of all Moroccans today (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Based on the increased number of French speakers during the protectorate and after independence, the importance of learning French had become recognized by all communities before the departure of the French and accelerated after 1956. However, each of the various speech communities of Morocco, those identified in colonial records as European, Jewish, Berber and Arab, sought this language at very different rates because of differences in access to colonial institutions, most especially the French school system.

1.1 French Colonial Influence: Educational Institutions and Social Divisions

To understand how the French language gained status and why different communities acquired French earlier and more thoroughly than others, this research investigates the origins of the French language in Morocco through one of the most powerful institutions to inculcate language and language preferences during the Moroccan protectorate, the colonial education system, using the sociolinguistic theory developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Such scholarship on linguistic markets has demonstrated that schools selectively indoctrinate and reproduce dominant, or legitimate, languages. Those who master this linguistic resource acquire cultural, economic, and symbolic capital that accompanies this legitimate language and, consequently, gain access to positions of power, social prestige, cultural legitimacy, and other forms of social distinction. French protectorate officials segregated European, Jewish, Arab, Berber, and elite Arab and Berber Moroccan communities into different colonial schools, and socioeconomic opportunity was determined by access to these institutions. Thus, this investigation identifies which social group had optimal access to this language, which group was most able to assimilate French, and which speech community was able to profit most from its acquisition and distinction during the protectorate, 1912–1956.

French as a dominant language in Morocco was assured by the linking of the job market with the French instruction disseminated at the best colonial schools. Acquisition of the French language among a minority through selective enrollment at

the schools for European, Jewish, and elite Moroccan communities granted certain higher educational, economic, and administrative privileges within the colonial administration and workforce. French schools simultaneously recruited highly deserving students from less privileged groups by rewarding them with entry to the competitive schools in an effort to induce cooperation among other segments of the Moroccan population. Only those educated in the dominant language at these best French schools were able to become part of the future Francophone elite. In contrast, the schools created for the majority of Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans from lower socioeconomic backgrounds presented only rudimentary linguistic skills, limiting opportunities to find suitable employment so that they did not seek jobs outside of their social milieu. By restricting who was able to attend the schools with the highest degree of French instruction, French colonial schools reinstated, or reproduced, privilege among the already privileged, as predicted by the principles of Bourdieu's (1991/2001) language market theory.

1.2 French Dominance After the Protectorate in Morocco

As the statistics from 2007 demonstrated, French continued to rise in significance in Morocco after independence among Muslim Moroccans. Explanations for this are generally seen as pragmatic, largely due to a greater increase in access to schools that still employed French teachers and pedagogical materials and the need to fill modernizing posts, which continued to require French. French had to be maintained for decades after independence while a new generation was also

educated in MSA, the language of education in Morocco after the 1960 creation of the Bureau of Coordination of Arabisation (Ennaji, 2005). Yet, after introducing MSA into the school system at the earliest levels of primary education, French was still required the further one pursued studies, producing a generation of French-speaking professionals minimally educated in MSA.

> French had to be maintained alongside Arabic as a medium of instruction … [and] bilingualism would be necessary for some time in the interests of modernization, economic development and generalization of education. … As for higher education, French would remain indispensable. (Bentahila, 1983, p. 12)

After Morocco gained independence, French remained necessary for those seeking to advance professionally, especially in the most lucrative administrative or commercial positions, jobs vacated by French-speaking Europeans. As late as 1968, Gallagher noted,

> The non-French speaking candidate has no chance of getting a good government job or advancing himself in … Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Planning, Public Health, Defense, and Agriculture, … offices dealing with production and technical matters … [and] important commercial or industrial enterprises in private business. (p. 143)

French remained the language of administration and economy after 1956 and even achieved greater widespread acceptance and prestige than had been the case during the protectorate.

> [After 1956] with the increasing number of native Moroccans employed in government bureaucracies, and in clerical and other white-collar jobs, there was a great demand for persons with knowledge of French. … French achieved far greater currency in post-colonial Morocco than it had in the colonial period itself, even though the native French population declined. … The French language gradually lost some of its stigma as a language of colonial oppression and became an avenue for socioeconomic advancement

> … [as well as] an important language among the new Moroccan middle class. (Heath, 1989, pp. 12–13)

As French came to index education, economic success, and social status, it also became the esteemed prestigious language, in contrast to the vernacular languages, receiving some of the highest forms of social capital as a language of the elite in Morocco. Even after Moroccan independence, those who spoke French belonged to the urban elite and advanced to the most privileged careers in the public services and as teachers and scientists (Boukous, 1996). French became highly venerated by most Moroccans as an indispensable language of culture, civilization, education, and access to employment, even among those who were unable to speak it. In this way, French became a preferred language in terms of internalized affect or motivation after independence.

Moroccan students in a study by Bentahila (1983) often reported that their motivation to learn French was due to their desire to access modernity and the West because of its association with higher social status and economic opportunity.[1] Some high-level civil servants stated that they preferred French because, as the language of modernity and science, it "contributes to the development of Morocco" (Ennaji, 2005, p. 194). At the same time, young, educated Moroccan women preferred French because it symbolized for them "modernity and liberation" (Ennaji, 2005, p. 194). For most Moroccans, French represented modernity, the West, and improved social conditions, and by speaking it, individuals demonstrated a positive association with

[1] Bentahila (1983) asked Moroccan subjects, "What language do you find the most modern/the most useful for studies?" (p. 33). French was the response 70% of the time as the most modern language and 71% as the most useful language for studies.

this language as well as their own personal aspirations to improve their social status. Ennaji (2005) documented,

> For most Moroccans, French is synonymous with the Western way of life and modernity. In fact, as a language of universal culture, modernity and upper/middle class, French continues to attract the attention and interest of most Moroccans. In addition, French allows those who do not belong to a socio-economically rich class to value themselves socially; it can be used to affirm one's socio-cultural status and impress one's interlocutors. … On the whole, the majority of recent studies in the field … confirm the positive attitude generally held by people and officials toward French. (pp. 193–194)

At the same time that French became increasingly important in Morocco, CA and MSA also had gained greater currency after independence, because of their association with religion, traditional disciplines, and notions of national identity and the national independence movement. However, because neither CA nor MSA was unable to guarantee economic opportunities for its speakers, CA and MSA were granted very different kinds of social or cultural prestige and could not easily displace the prestige and influence of French. Although CA and MSA became the official languages of the country after independence, French remained the language of socioeconomic opportunity in business, government, economics, diplomacy, and in many sectors of higher education. Besides evaluating the different types of access to the French language that were intended for the diverse European, Berber, Jewish, and Arab communities through the various educational institutions created by the French government, I will explain how French, CA, and MSA became dominant languages in Morocco but for different reasons, French as an economic language and both CA and

MSA as culturally symbolic ones. I also will analyze how Bourdieu's linguistic market theory fails to predict how these languages became dominant in Morocco.

1.3 Outline of Dissertation

Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent sociolinguistic research that enables an understanding of multilingualism in Morocco. I outline the multilingual communities of Morocco, as discussed in the French archives as Jewish, European, Muslim, and Berber, and the difficulties of defining these communities as diglossic. I present the theoretical framework developed by Bourdieu to show how language as social practice was indoctrinated inequitably by the school system among different linguistic communities. I include definitions of applicable terms used by Bourdieu; the role schools play in determining legitimate language; and how schools then reproduce legitimate language as economic, cultural, and symbolic capital. This section also includes a brief history of the research on language in Morocco from the beginning of the protectorate into independence. Finally, I present an overview of various competing discourses to influence the development of the colonial school system, including the Arabization policy, and the most important prior research from sociological, historical, political, and ethnographic disciplines regarding education, languages, and the diverse communities of Morocco.

Chapter 3 discusses the real and imagined social, ethnic, and religious divisions in Morocco that influenced colonial policy. I begin with historical evidence preceding the arrival of the French in Morocco and how different kinds of beliefs

about Moroccan communities laid the groundwork for colonial divisions in Morocco on the basis of religious differences. Next, I examine the legacy of previous colonial ideologies regarding Berbers that originated in Algeria and how these beliefs led to real-world, institutionalized differences in protectorate Morocco. Moroccan Berbers were considered by the French to be similar to the Algerian Kabyles and a chosen people who would be the most receptive and deserving of French civilization, adding an additional layer to the already ideologically segregated society based on religious divisions. As a result, differences between Moroccan communities became institutionalized in terms of differences in legal status under colonial policy. Therefore, Chapter 3 outlines the specific historical, social, and regional factors that contributed to ideologies about divisions between Moroccan communities and how the segregation of those speech communities became institutionalized under the divide-and-rule strategy.

Chapter 4 presents the different scholastic systems created for the various imagined communities—schools for Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers—and how such differences led to socioeconomic disparity and differential access to elite opportunities. This chapter begins the discussion on divisions in the colonial education system with the review of the *mission civilisatrice*, the idea that the French were obligated to "civilize" segments of the population. Then, I discuss how the disparate colonial educational system created inequity in the qualifications of the workforce and how the instruction of the French language became acceptable and sought by all within Moroccan society, even if at different rates, thus examining the

relationship between successful French language education and economic potential in the colonial workforce.

After demonstrating how economic capital was assured through French education, in Chapter 5 I investigate how some communities who lacked French education and dominant cultural knowledge, the dispossessed, were distanced from this knowledge. This section also demonstrates how the colonial educational system reproduced these communities' nonparticipation within colonial society. Then, I examine how some Arab and Berber communities chose to resist French education and whether this resistance was merely a form of solidarity, as predicted by Bourdieu's theory, or the beginning of a new form of symbolic domination coinciding with the emerging nationalist movement. This section illustrates how the economic and educational divisions separating Moroccan Arabs and Berbers from Europeans, Jews, and elite Arabs and Berbers led to the expansion of symbolic capital for Arabic speakers alongside the continuation of economic capital for French speakers and how both languages were able to coexist for different markets.

Although the French protectorate lasted less than half a century, the installation of French institutions and the French language had long-lasting repercussions on the Moroccan patrimony. The French colonizer from 1912–1956 brought not only the French language to Morocco but also a colonial administration that reinforced divisions between various indigenous social groups. With the incorporation of a French regime came the implementation of a military and judicial bureaucracy; expansion of economic, administrative, and industrial endeavors; as

well as educational institutions that reinforced social divisions while simultaneously creating newer kinds of divisions. These educational institutions were designed to reproduce public servants for the new French government to fill these crucial administrative posts. In so doing, access to the best French education was reserved for those deemed most capable of serving the French regime. Restricted access to these institutions developed by the French authorities, and thus restricted access to the French language, accelerated social differentiation between speech communities in terms of social, and later linguistic, hierarchies. This restricted access at one level of institutionalization then granted entry into other institutions of higher education and resulted in selective administrative and economic privileges where competence in French ultimately became the barometer of success.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MULTILINGUAL MOROCCO

Chapter 1 explained how French remained a dominant language in Morocco after independence from France and that French language education was associated with greater socioeconomic opportunity. This chapter presents information about which languages coexisted in colonial Morocco before the arrival of French and examines the relationships between these languages. I evaluate each of the linguistic communities in colonial Morocco in terms of two different definitions of diglossia, that of Ferguson and the other of Fishman. Second, I present Bourdieu's theory on the linguistic market, outlining the role of institutions in spreading French, the dominant language in protectorate Morocco. This theory demonstrates how schools foster social division and socioeconomic disparity through mastery of the dominant language. I define the relevant concepts for this theory and show how educational institutions, socioeconomic opportunity, and the spread of French as dominant language became linked in Morocco and, alternatively, how symbolic violence resulted when individuals did not acquire this dominant language. To complement Bourdieu's theory on the linguistic market and social reproduction, I review the notion of resistance and agency as explored by Willis (1977), Scott (1990), and Reed-Danahay (1996) and argue that domination, in this case linguistic domination, can be mitigated by community- or individual-level resistance. Finally, I briefly summarize the previous research on education and French in protectorate Morocco and

summarize the ideologies of both the colonial officials and nationalists who proposed alternate constructions of nationhood through the symbolic representation of language and identity.

2.1 Multilingualism and Diglossia in Morocco

Before the French protectorate, Morocco was home to many diverse speech communities. At least three geographically distinct Berber-speaking languages were distinguishable from each other: Tarafit was spoken in the northern zones in the Rif mountains, Tamazight in the central Atlas Mountains, and Tachelhit in the southern zones. These communities shared a common social and linguistic history but diverged linguistically over the course of several centuries due to geographical isolation. Abassi (1977) confirmed that Berbers were the indigenous population of Morocco and that Arab conquests in the seventh century "pushed the native populations out of the plains of the Gharb, the Sais, the Chaouia, the Doukkala, and the Abda, into the Rif and the Atlas mountains" (p. 13). These first Arab inhabitants in Morocco were from stock that was historically largely sedentary and urban, whereas subsequent arrivals were increasingly nomadic Bedouins who were similar in many cultural respects to Berber communities. Though very little is known about these early inhabitants of Morocco, the presence of Jewish communities before the arrival of Arab populations has been documented by some (Schroeter, 1997, 2003). Later, a third arrival of Andalusian Arabic-speaking Muslims and Jews came to Morocco from Spain in the late 15th century. Whereas the Arab conquest brought

Arabic and Islam to Morocco, the later arrivals brought the Spanish language, Andalusian culture, as well as other Judaic populations. Though the first Arab invasion forced Berbers into geographic isolation, the second facilitated assimilation and, as a result, some Berbers came to adopt Islam and the Arabic language (Abassi, 1977, p. 16). Bentahila (1983) observed that acquisition of Arabic by Moroccans and their conversion to Islam differed according to geographic and historical circumstances: "In the mountains, the only contact between [Arabs and Berbers] was that made by the Muslim Arab missionaries, who converted most of the Berbers" through CA texts of the Qur'an (p. 2). Berbers in other regions became bilingual in the local variety of Berber and colloquial Arabic after commercial interaction with Arabic-speaking Moroccans because they were "obliged to learn Arabic in order to trade" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 2).

However, Islamization did not necessarily entail Arabization, the acquisition of either the dialect or the CA variety, since many Berbers maintained their native language and some did not acquire Arabic at all. Pennell (2003) acknowledged that Arabization proceeded at a slower pace than did Islamization and that neither Arabization nor Islamization was complete among Berber communities. Heterodoxy, in the form of "a Berber rather than an Arab expression of Islam" (Pennell, 2003, p. 30), was not uncommon, in the same way that Judaism was maintained among some Berber communities. By the beginning of the protectorate in 1912, Berber speakers comprised 40–60% of all Moroccans, half of whom were bilingual in colloquial Arabic and half of whom were monolingual Berber speakers. Figure 1 demonstrates

the geographic distribution of both monolingual and bilingual Arabic and Berber speakers in early protectorate Morocco.



Figure 1. Map representing the distribution of Arabic, Berber, and bilingual Berber-Arabic speakers in early 20th-century Morocco. Source: *The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organization*, by R. Montagne, 1973, London, England: Frank Cass.

Before the arrival of the French, a relatively peaceful linguistic cohabitation had existed over a period of several centuries between Berber-speaking and Arabic-speaking communities, despite the fact that the legitimated language of the power source, the *Makhzen*, and Islam, the dominant religion, was CA or *fuSHa*. CA was the written language of the Qur'an and taught in traditional schools through memorization of scripture. Few ever acquired this language because few Moroccans spent more than a couple of years at schools that taught it. Because of the association with learnedness and Islam as "a sacred language used by God to give his message to

the Prophet," CA was considered "so much superior to [colloquial] Moroccan Arabic that some Moroccans claim that not to know Classical Arabic is not to know Arabic at all" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 5). In fact, the association of CA with Islam ensured the supremacy of CA among all communities. In 1912, very few Moroccans were able to speak or write CA, and most were only able to recite a few, select, memorized phrases from the Qur'an. Yet, by 1956, more Moroccans were able to do so, because renovated traditional schools and free schools had reintroduced this language into the curriculum along with modern subjects. After independence in 1956, CA and MSA, the unified and modernized standard variety based on CA that was intended to facilitate communication between Moroccan's Arab-speaking neighbors, were instituted as official languages of the country. Today, CA and MSA are considered by most speakers to be essentially the same language.

Since the time of the protectorate, MA has been the colloquial form of Arabic spoken, or unwritten, language in Morocco used by the majority of Moroccans, that is, the Arabic-speaking Moroccans. It derived from the language of the different Arab groups who settled Morocco, non-Bedouin, Bedouin, and Andalusian (Ennaji, 2005). Though MA had differing urban and rural varieties, it was the language that enabled greater communication between most members of different speech communities. It was a native language for a majority of Moroccans but became a second language to many Berber-speaking Moroccans by the end of the protectorate. Only about half of all Berber speakers spoke MA as a second language by 1956. However, most Moroccan Jews, who before 1912 spoke Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Spanish

(also referred to as Ladino or Hahitia), or any of the Berber varieties as maternal languages, acquired MA before acquiring other foreign languages like French or Spanish.

At the beginning of the protectorate, as many as 110,000 Jewish Moroccans lived throughout northern and southern Morocco, and by 1952, they numbered 240,000, or 210,000 in the French zone alone, in contrast to the only 30,000 Jews inhabiting the much smaller Spanish zone located in the north of Morocco. Jews throughout Morocco spoke one of the Berber varieties, Judeo-Arabic, or Judeo-Spanish as their native language. Judeo-Arabic derived from Arabic and Hebrew (Chouraqui, 1952), whereas Judeo-Spanish derived from Hebrew, Arabic, and Spanish and was the vernacular originating with Castilian-speaking Jews, who were later expelled from Spain. These languages were used to communicate among other Jews within their communities and in semireligious services, whereas Hebrew was maintained for religious matters and as the language of instruction in the Jewish traditional schools. However, the use of Hebrew as a language of education progressively declined after 1862 with the arrival of the French-speaking *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU) schools. At the same time that Jews used MA to communicate with Arab Moroccans, the Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Spanish vernaculars purposefully marked Jews as distinct from Arabic-speaking communities. "The adoption of their own vernacular was a deliberate self-segregation" (Laskier, 1983, p. 13). By 1939, the use of Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Spanish had declined, as did the use of MA, because French had become more prevalent among Jewish Moroccans.

When the French arrived in Morocco in the late 19th century, MA was the lingua franca. Moroccans, therefore, spoke MA, Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, or one of three varieties of Berber as their native language[2] before the arrival of French in Morocco. None of the languages in Morocco was homogeneous, and each variety was used for different social functions. MA heard on the streets varied in form and function from CA utilized in the mosque. CA, the language of the Qur'an not widely understood by Moroccans, remained the legitimate language of religion and power by its association with the legitimacy of the monarchy and Makhzen, the governing elite. However, it was spoken or written only by highly educated Islamic scholars. By contrast, MA was used in daily informal interaction. Berber varieties, predominately unwritten, differed according to region in the same way that Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish languages differentiated Jews based on origin. Therefore, MA was the lingua franca of most speech communities in Morocco and the native language to most Moroccans, whereas Berber, Judeo-Arabic, or Judeo-Spanish were native languages with restricted use.

After 1912, French became an important language associated with European privilege and power in Morocco. French institutions replaced many formerly Arabic-speaking ones as the French implemented French-language schools, modern industry with newer kinds of economic opportunities for French-speakers, and new political and judicial reforms. These changes quickly led to the decline of former, local

[2]I use the term *native language* synonymously with the terms *maternal language* and *first language*, though I acknowledge the differences that Davis and Bentahila (1988) examined in their article, "On Mother and Other Tongues."

political allegiances. French soon dominated political, economic, and social life in French Morocco, more so than other European languages, due to French schools and economic migration of local populations into the cities. By the 1930s, numerous Berber speakers had increasingly become bilingual in MA and a few were bilingual in French, due to both increased contacts with Arabophones or Francophones in rural French-Berber schools and economic migration to the urban zones in the 1920s. Among Jewish communities, Judeo-Spanish, Judeo-Arabic, and MA were receding in favor of French, since nearly all urban and a number of rural Moroccan Jewish youth had been successfully educated in French at the AIU. Lastly, for those who were able to master it, French offered better access to education, social privilege, and the world outside Morocco. French became a language of importance in education, industry, finance, technology, commerce, and access to modernity. The use of MA, like Berber and Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, was restricted to employment in customary craftsmanship and agriculture, in addition to communicating with other Moroccans. CA remained important in the traditional scholarly disciplines of jurisprudence, religion, and Qur'anic education. Though each of these languages existed within many of the same communities, each maintained different social functions in protectorate Morocco.

The multilingual situation in Morocco has been characterized differently based on two different definitions of diglossia, the original version conceived by Ferguson (1959) and the revised version by Fishman (1967). Speakers of Arabic understand the relationship between MA and CA varieties in Morocco in the sense of

Ferguson's definition, whereas others in Morocco have labeled the multilingual context in Morocco diglossic because of the additional presence of French. In 1959, Ferguson first defined *diglossia* as a relatively stable coexistence of two genetically related languages with very different social functions within a single speech community. According to this definition, a diglossic situation contains high and low varieties of a single language (e.g., French, German, or Greek) within a community.

> Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which… there is a very divergent, highly codified, superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1959, p. 336)

Ferguson (1959) demonstrated these properties of language coexistence based on the examples of Romance and Latin, French and Haitian Creole, Swiss and high German, Classical and Modern Greek, and Classical and Arabic dialects. Ferguson identified nine distinguishing traits of diglossia:

1. Each variety must maintain clearly defined social function.
2. One variety has high and the other low social prestige.
3. The high variety is associated with a strong literary heritage but not so with the low variety.
4. There are no native speakers of the high variety.
5. The high variety is standardized and codified, whereas the low variety is distinguished by great variation.
6. Both varieties have been in contact over a long and stable coexistence.

7. The grammar of the high variety is more complex than that of the low variety.
8. Though they share a great deal of similar lexical items, each variety maintains separate lexical items for many similar notions.
9. Similarly, although each shares a similar phonological system, the high variety maintains phonological features that are not present in the low variety.

According to Ferguson's (1959) definition, the different forms of Arabic used in Morocco at the time of the protectorate are considered to be in a diglossic relationship because CA was used for specific social functions, was granted more overt social prestige, and had a literary heritage in contrast to MA. MA was acquired at home before CA, was not standardized, and was less complex grammatically and phonologically. Complexity, in this case, refers to the number of grammatical elements that are present in CA that are not present in MA. For example, CA has a larger inventory of personal pronouns, phonemes, and morphological verb markers than MA. Lexically, CA offers many more terms or phrases to designate items than MA, which borrows many terms from Berber, French, or other languages. Lexically, CA did not come to express matters of daily life that MA, the native language, was able to do. The distinct uses of CA and MA for separate social functions were maintained over a period of several centuries.

Expanding Ferguson's definition of diglossia, Fishman's (1967) distinction between diglossia and bilingualism applied the notion of bilingual speech

communities. Fishman posited that diglossia should include almost any scenario in which more than one language coexists. Fishman's (1999) definition stated that diglossia is "a long-term and widespread complementary distribution of functions between the languages of a speech-and-writing community" (p. 156). This definition differs considerably from that of Ferguson (1959) in that it accepts any linguistic situation where at least two languages coexist within the same community. In other words, Fishman's definition emphasized the set of functional boundaries between language varieties identifiable by community members, regardless of the historical linguistic relationships between the two varieties or the lack thereof. For Fishman, as long as complementarity of linguistic function exists, any genetically unrelated languages within a speech community can lead to diglossia, since it merely emphasizes the social functions that created such linguistic differentiation. Fishman's definition relies on factors of social function of language within a speech community and a continuum of individual linguistic behaviors against widespread institutional ones. Fishman broadened the definition of what constitutes a language so that different registers of the same language could be included in the notion of diglossia. Therefore, this definition obscured the relationship between languages in Morocco since, according to Fishman, any of the languages present in Morocco would be considered in a diglossic relationship: CA and MA; any of the Berber languages and MA or CA; either Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish and Berber languages; Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish and MA or CA; French and MA or CA; and any

differentiation between registers of these same languages and even Spanish and French.

The import of Fishman's (1967, 1999) definition for this dissertation is not the notion of broad diglossia per se but the intersection of bilingualism and diglossia, the idea that bilingualism could be analyzed at both the level of the community and the individual. In other words, diglossia is conceived of in terms of the entire speech community, whereas bilingualism may be viewed as an individual's ability to speak more than one language. Fishman (1967) described a two-by-two matrix examining the possible combinations of bilingualism and diglossia, as demonstrated in Figure 2.

The first scenario Fishman (1967) described is one in which both widespread diglossia and bilingualism are present, as in the case of highly literate, postcolonial societies like Paraguay, where nearly all speech-community members speak both Spanish, the high variety, and Guaraní, the low variety, two genetically unrelated languages. Stable diglossia presupposes "the existence of a fairly large and complex speech community in which the members have available to them both a range of compartmentalized roles as well as ready access to those roles" (Fishman, 1967, p. 32). As long as these roles remain separated, Fishman (1967) argued, diglossia and bilingualism would be maintained.

		Diglossia	
		+	–
Individual bilingualism	+	Both diglossia and bilingualism	Bilingualism without diglossia
	–	Diglossia without bilingualism	Neither diglossia nor bilingualism

Figure 2. Representation of Fishman's bilingualism and diglossia diagram. Based on "Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism," by J. Fishman, 1967, *Journal of Social Issues*, *32*(2), p. 30.

Another scenario is one in which diglossia is present but with few bilinguals, such as in Tsarist Russia, where the nobles spoke French and Russian while the majority only spoke Russian (Calvet, 2005). "Since the majority … never interacted with one another they did not form a single speech community. … Thus, the existence of national diglossia does not imply widespread bilingualism" (Fishman, 1967, pp. 33–34).

An alternative to this scenario is one in which large-scale bilingualism exists without widespread diglossia, as in the case where bilinguals replaced German with French in a previously German-speaking area of Belgium (Calvet, 2005). Fishman (1967) claimed that bilingualism without diglossia was characteristic of "rapid and massive industrialization and urbanization [where] members of the speech community providing productive manpower rapidly abandoned their traditional socio-cultural patterns and learned … the language of the means of production" (p. 35).

Finally, communities may be neither diglossic nor bilingual, or monolingual. These hypothesized or mythical communities are limited to

> only very small, isolated, and undifferentiated speech communities. … Such factors as exogamy, warfare, expansion of the population, economic growth, and contact with others all lead to internal diversification and, consequently, to repertoire diversification. Such diversification is the beginning of bilingualism. Its societal normification is the hallmark of diglossia. (Fishman, 1967, p. 36)

Although the definitions of diglossia by Fishman (1967) and Ferguson (1959) both identify the maintenance of MA and CA in Morocco as diglossic, the import from Fishman's definition to this work is his reference to how individual linguistic abilities are distinct from the linguistic behaviors of the community and how individual bilingualism arises from or impacts societal diglossia.

In this research, the term *diglossia* refers to the distinction between CA and MA according to the definition by Ferguson (1959). Meanwhile, *bilingualism* refers to the acquisition of more than one linguistic variety by an individual. Thus, in the context of protectorate Morocco, bilingualism refers to the acquisition of French, Berber, CA, or any other language by MA speakers; the acquisition of CA, MA, French, or any other language by Berber speakers; and the acquisition of French, Berber, CA, MA, or any other language by Jewish communities not speaking MA or Berber as a native language. With this distinction between diglossia and bilingualism, I now examine why I have chosen to explore language spread in Morocco according to Bourdieu's theory on the linguistic market.

2.2 Applying Bourdieu's Theory to Language Spread in Protectorate Morocco

Like the importance of widespread social norms in perpetuating diglossia, the role of institutions in society is primordial to language change or language maintenance in society. As a theoretical explanation for how the French language spread in Morocco, I will adopt the framework developed by Pierre Bourdieu, who argued that legitimated language, like other forms of cultural knowledge, is an embodied cultural practice inculcated through social institutions where the culture of the dominant class is reproduced. Schools, he claimed, are the sites of language inculcation *par excellence*. The installation of metropolitan French schools in Morocco, which provided the largest exposure for Moroccans to the French language beyond any political measures the colonial authorities enacted, fostered the use of the French language throughout Morocco in unprecedented ways. Bourdieu's (1991/2001) work described how the highly standardized French education system acted as a gatekeeper to opportunity in France, and the educational system developed for Morocco was based on the same French model. Therefore, an understanding of Bourdieu's theory of how schools disseminate dominant cultural knowledge is crucial to uncovering how the French language similarly spread throughout Morocco.

Second, Bourdieu conducted much ethnographic and sociological research in Kabyle Berber Algeria in the 1960s, and his sociological experience among colonial North African cultures offers familiarity and applicability to like ethnological communities and colonial contexts. Apart from his early works, which documented Algerian social history, some of his other contributions to Algerian ethnography

investigated the resettlement of Berber communities from war-torn communities. Bourdieu and Sayad (1964) argued that from the moment the French arrived in Algeria, all Algerians had endured an unprecedented rupture of historical, social, economic, and cultural practices, a notion that laid the groundwork for future work in his social reproduction theory. Such an emphasis on rupture, clash of civilizations[3], and social divisions is characteristic of former colonial societies more generally. In this way, Morocco, shares many similarities with Algeria and offers an interesting case study on the applicability of Bourdieu's theory to non-Westernized societies.

Lastly, Bourdieu proposed that education acts as both a liberator for a few and a machine of constraint for the majority in his theories on social reproduction and linguistic markets. Earlier in his career, he had endorsed the idea that education in Algeria and similar communities has the potential to liberate (Bourdieu & Sayad, 1964). In 1964, he suggested that education was a possible source of optimism and access to new kinds of opportunity after more than a century of colonial domination. Reed-Danahay (2005) noted in her review of Bourdieu's work,

> In … reference to schooling, Bourdieu [along with coauthor Sayad] used an almost utopian-sounding tone in order to stress the important role of education in the future of Algeria. … It seems clear … that Bourdieu was proposing a system of education in Algeria that, if developed from the start in order to avoid the ways it operated in France, could be a liberating and empowering institution rather than a hegemonic force working to reproduce the power of the dominance. (pp. 67–68)

[3] The term *clash of civilizations* was translated by Silverstein and Goodman (2009) from *choc des civilizations* (p. 14) and does not, they argued, refer to Samuel Huntington's use of the term.

Bourdieu viewed civilizations like Kabylia, "pre-industrial, 'traditional' peasant society" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 71), very differently than modern societies like France. He proposed that nonoppressive educational institutions in cases like Algeria should not "arbitrarily propose demands" like the one in France but should instead calibrate "to the aptitudes and desires of those it seeks to nurture and transform" (Bourdieu & Sayad, as cited in Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 67). Yet, inherent in the formulation of all educational policy is the relationship of educational institutions to political institutions that reinforce their power and dominance through mandating educational objectives. A decade after his collaboration with Sayad, Bourdieu and Passeron's (1977/2000) social reproduction theory stressed the hegemonic and structuring nature of the educational institution, where individuals must conform to the dominant culture, with the highest price being paid by the subjugated groups. Individuals from these dominated groups must alienate themselves from their roots in order to advance educationally, economically, and socially. With opposing views of the role of educational institutions in two very different contexts, Bourdieu's perspective remains unclear as to why education functions as a force of constraint in one situation but as a liberator in another. Such conflicting views of educational systems as either a machine of constraint or a force of liberation in Bourdieu's work demand further investigation.

2.3 Language in Bourdieu's Theories

Pierre Bourdieu's work in sociology emphasized the central influence of educational institutions in developing cultural uniformity and how these institutions also reproduce marginalization of difference within society. In *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture,* Bourdieu and Passeron (1977/2000) argued that the role of schools is to reproduce the culture of the dominant class and that those who do not acquire this cultural knowledge are subjected to symbolic violence. Then, in *Language and Symbolic Power,* Bourdieu (1991/2001) contended that language, as the resource through which all other academic subjects are taught, is the instrument by which social institutions reinforce dominance in everyday occurrences. As a result of long-term inculcation of dominant culture through linguistic exchanges in educational settings, language comes to reveal evidence of situated social encounters between interlocutors.

> Everyday linguistic exchanges [are] situated encounters between agents endowed with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce. (Thompson, 2001, p. 2)

Language becomes embedded with cultural knowledge of hierarchical social structure in such a way that speakers within a community intuitively know or think they know correct, preferred, or socially appropriate language in contrast to inappropriate language. In turn, these interlocutors use this knowledge as a basis for evaluating others.

The highest levels of socially appropriate language are taught only in educational institutions, which are also instruments of the dominant political authority. This power structure reproduces and legitimizes domination through the manipulation of curricula and its system of rewards, (i.e., evaluations, promotions, scholarships, and graduations), while distancing from power and privilege those without this knowledge. Every linguistic token distributed through educational institutions and subsequently legitimized through attaining different kinds of economic viability within the labor market can be viewed as evidence of the unequal distribution of power and privilege in society. Since mastery of this standard language indexes educational and economic opportunity, graduates of the highest level of educational institutions with great linguistic competency come to be viewed by others as possessing desirable social characteristics. The internal dispositions, or *habitus*, through which the external characteristics originated "incline agents to act in … certain ways" and are acquired through repetitive practices that "reflect the social condition through which they were acquired" (Thompson, 2001, p. 12).

2.3.1 Primary and Secondary *Habitus*

The relationship among language, education, and power becomes linked through the repetition of everyday learned behaviors, and the differences between Bourdieu's own childhood and adulthood trajectories illustrate how these behaviors become inculcated. He was raised in the provincial town and farming community of Béarn, where the *Béarnais* dialect was spoken. After having attended and then

succeeded in various institutions of higher education, such as the prestigious *École normale supérieure* in Paris, he was granted special privilege within academic circles and, thus, French society. He became aware of the "dispossession" of his own cultural, provincial heritage and the distance between his urban academic pursuits and the rural existence of his family and friends. He became acutely aware of how others from outside his community devalued his local language and culture in preference of the dominant language. He also realized that the choice of one linguistic code over another within a particular context entailed much more than mere linguistic form, but also constraints and censorship.

Whereas he once had been indoctrinated via the primary *habitus*, or the familial set of learned dispositions, practices, and behaviors, a secondary *habitus* encountered at school taught him how to talk, think, and argue "correctly" within institutional environments, where he was made to internalize the appropriate legitimate practice through a structured process of inculcation. This successful inculcation of the secondary *habitus* in which he willingly participated separated him from his community, family, and friends while enabling him to achieve academically, professionally, and economically, ultimately as Chair of Sociology at the *Collège de France*.

This rupture and dislocation from the past has been termed an "internal colonialism … that occurred in France as regional populations with their own languages and local particularisms were brought into the control and under the hegemony of the dominant French society and culture" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 72).

Similarly, external colonialism with its own system of hegemonic institutions invokes among dominated peoples a comparable system of constraints and censorship through the imposed acquisition of the secondary *habitus* associated with the new, powerful regime. This kind of rupture had considerable consequence among successful students, especially Arab and Berber students in colonial Morocco. Once they were educated in modern French curricula, they were unable to return to their social origins without difficulty. This was true for both the individual and the community. For example, a French education altered traditional marriage customs in terms of postponing the age of marriage and consequently the selection of suitable spouses. Meanwhile, Moroccans without this learned *habitus* taught at the French schools, all those educated in the traditional disciplines or those who did not attend school, were incapable of assuming positions of authority and were unable to aspire to any real kinds of upward mobility or social progress.

2.3.2 Dominant Language as Legitimate Language

For Bourdieu, the secondary *habitus* is the result of a long-term process of institutionalization within the educational system that reinforces a process of legitimization of cultural knowledge belonging to the ruling bourgeois class. Those of the socially and politically powerful class then reinforce their domination over time by reproducing this cultural knowledge as legitimate, desirable, and profitable. One such example of this theory noted by Bourdieu (1991/2001) is the evolution of a single, standard French language arising from regional dialects. In this case, the

Parisian dialect became the dominant and legitimate language by the 16th century, coinciding with the growing influence of the courts of Paris. During this period of bilingualism[4] in early France, the educational system accelerated the spread of the language of the court, the Parisian dialect, among the nobility and higher classes. With the rise of centralization and nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries came the expansion of a free but obligatory education in the late 19th century. Once the curricula at these schools became standardized throughout the country, schools became the primary locus for distributing appropriate, dominant cultural knowledge. The teacher, instrumental in this process, "works to build the common consciousness of the nation" (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49). While the teacher teaches the young students how to speak in acceptable ways, he or she, as both "*maitre à parler*" and "*maitre à penser*," simultaneously teaches them how to think, "already inclining [the students] quite naturally to see and feel the things in the same way" (Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 48–49) through the use of the acceptable, legitimate, and dominant language.

2.3.3 The Role of the School and Legitimate Language

The school becomes, then, one of the most important means to create unification within a specific market, under one curriculum, speaking a single

[4] Bourdieu (1991/2001) termed this linguistic situation in France as bilingualism. "A situation of bilingualism tended to arise. Whereas the lower classes, particularly the peasantry, were limited to the local dialect, the aristocracy, the commercial and the business bourgeoisie and particularly the literate petite bourgeoisie had access much more frequently to the use of the official language, written or spoken, while at the same time possessing the dialect" (p. 47). As demonstrated in my earlier discussion of bilingualism and diglossia in this chapter, this situation would be better characterized by the term *diglossia* by both definitions developed by Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967). More specifically, Fishman would call this diglossia with limited bilingualism, at least until the expansion of the obligatory school system.

language already codified and standardized, thereby officialized, through various political and literary agencies. The development of linguistic standardization and regulation throughout state institutions guarantees authoritative supremacy of that language. The language, or "code, in the sense of cipher, that governs written language, which is identified with correct language, as opposed to the implicitly inferior conversational language, acquires the force of law in and through the educational system" (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49).

Language and culture become inexplicably linked through the development and refinement of the educational system to the point where language and culture attainment index educational achievement. Those who control these privileged linguistic resources remain the political, economic, or symbolic prestigious members of society, including teachers, as they are also among those who embody and profit most from this monopoly of cultural knowledge. In fact, teachers are especially critical and ideologically vulnerable to the reproduction in this process, since

> often originating from the lower middle class or from teachers' families, they are all the more attached to the charisma ideology which justifies arbitrary culture privilege, because it is only qua members of the intellectual class that they have some share in the privileges of the bourgeoisie. (Bourdieu, as cited in Reed Danahay, 2005, p. 48)

The intellectuals, influential persons of the community, and more precisely, teachers, are responsible for reproducing dominant or legitimate knowledge because they profit the most from the acquisition of this cultural knowledge.

According to Bourdieu, power is maintained and reproduced by those who are most able to assert its utility, use it most accurately, and profit from such distinction

in the market as a result of the effectively standardized school system, which disseminates language policy. The transition of French from what Bourdieu termed official to national language in France secured positions of authority for the prestigious members of society, teachers, highly educated individuals, and the nobility, through the manipulation of the linguistic resource.

> Promotion of the official language to the status of national language gave … [the local bourgeoisies of priests, doctors, or teachers] that de facto monopoly of politics, and more generally of communication with the central government and its representatives, that has defined local notables under all the French republics. (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 47)

Distinguishing appropriate, official language from popular language via the most influential members of a community and disseminating this resource through educational success and economic potential ensured the survival of the elite, legitimized their power, and increased the value attributed to the dominant language. It is for this reason that French-trained educators and civil servants were among the highest compensated and the most influential members of Moroccan communities during the protectorate, surpassing even the influence of many among the traditionally educated locals.

2.3.4 Legitimate Language as Capital

Standardization of legitimate cultural knowledge through a single, obligatory language is most effective when the economic market becomes unified with the educational market. This is effectively accomplished with the granting of degrees, thereby offering advanced opportunities within the hierarchical workforce so that “the school [comes] to be seen as a principal means of access to the labour market”

(Thompson, 2001, p. 6). In this way, language and cultural knowledge, or *cultural capital*, distributed and reproduced through the educational system, becomes an economic resource, or *economic capital*, through increasing an individual's economic potential in the job market. This cultural capital offers to the few who master it symbolic value, or *symbolic capital,* as over time the possession of linguistic markers becomes a marker of success and prestige obtained through educational attainment and certified authorization of diplomas and degrees.

The mastery of legitimate language is so important to acquiring symbolic, cultural, and economic capital that the negation of the dominant cultural capital through the use of linguistic variants is also granted symbolic prestige, as long as the speaker displays definitive mastery of the legitimate cultural capital. For example, the mayor of Béarn who speaks in his native *Béarnais* dialect while also possessing competence in the official French language

> is praised as [speaking] "good quality Béarnais," [yet] had it been uttered by a peasant who spoke mere fragments of French … [the same expressions] would have been accorded a quite different (and no doubt much lower) value. (Thompson, 2001, p. 19)

This kind of "strategy of condescension" in which an educated person is able to choose among various linguistic codes results in achieving symbolic profit from "negating symbolically the objective relation of power between the two languages which co-exist in this market" (Thompson, 2001, p. 19). Likewise, in colonial Morocco, those Moroccans who were able to author the manifesto for educational rights in highly polished French while also encouraging Moroccans in their native

language to denounce the French colonial government were later empowered as leaders of the nationalist movement. While their mastery of MA increased their appeal among the masses, their mastery of French granted them the opportunity and authority to upset the colonial regime through resisting symbolic domination.

2.3.5 Distinction, Misrecognition, and Symbolic Domination

The official, dominant language often comes to symbolize a certain unity and sense of community, or "an illusion of linguistic communism" (Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 2001, p. 5), after it has been deemed the acceptable standard variety; however, it simultaneously disguises a façade behind which social exclusion is perpetuated among those unable to fully master it. The near-universal existence of linguistic variance from the legitimate language among various members of a single speech community illustrates that language is not "uniformly distributed throughout a society" (Thompson, 2001, p. 18), while the perception of appropriate language and the belief in its legitimacy remain largely uniform. The participation among interlocutors to perpetuate the value of the legitimate language and the devaluation of linguistic variants depends upon the "active complicity" (Thompson, 2001, p. 23) of all participants within a market, even though only a few may obtain advantage from it.

> For the forms of expression which receive the greatest value and secure the greatest profit are those which are the most unequally distributed, both in the sense that the conditions for the acquisition of the capacity to produce them are restricted and … that the expressions themselves are relatively rare on the markets where they appear. (Thompson, 2001, p. 18)

This profit of distinction was especially pronounced in protectorate Morocco, where the acquisition of French as the dominant language was quite rare, given the limited access for Arab and Berber Moroccan students to attend the highest levels of French schools. This rare profit of distinction ensured that French education was among the most desirable options for many Moroccans. The fact that students from all social groups increasingly sought a French education by the end of the protectorate reveals that students came to privilege French language education over traditional education, even if this meant that they would have to acquire French. Furthermore, Moroccans went to great lengths to undergo the most competitive French exams, the *baccalauréat* advanced diplomas, even competing for the highly sought *baccalauréat* in philosophy. Thus, by the end of the protectorate, Moroccans were becoming increasingly complicit (in the way Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 2001, employed the term) in prioritizing French education over traditional education. However, this linguistic cooperation was far from uniform and was more prevalent among Europeans and Jews than Arabs or Berbers, for whom both CA and MSA were simultaneously gaining greater significance.

The search for a profit of distinction stems from an imposed, inculcated notion that all members within a market have the same ideas and beliefs about legitimate language and linguistic unification. However, the search for a profit of distinction results in symbolic domination, or symbolic violence "without consciousness or constraint" (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 51) led by those who master that language at the expense of those who do not. Those who are subjected to this violence do not

recognize it as such, since symbolic power is an invisible power based on shared belief (Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 2001). Members of the speech community are compelled to accept this false ideology as valid and devalue their own linguistic production based on repeated social and historical experiences through the power of the institution. In order to ensure the cooperation of even the most dispossessed of this cultural or linguistic knowledge, "it was necessary for the school system to be perceived as the principal (indeed, the only) means of access to administrative positions which were all the more attractive in areas where industrialization was least developed" (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49).

The legal imposition of a language by itself without the presence of generalized institutions to ensure the diffusion of cultural and linguistic competence, such as the school system and economic field, would not be adequate because "legal or quasi-legal constraints … can at best impose the acquisition, but not the generalized use and therefore the autonomous reproduction, of the legitimate language" (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 50). In lieu of imposing French as an official language of Morocco, the colonial school system created desirable economic opportunities for its graduates and attracted them to study at the best French schools. Professional and economic success for Moroccans meant educational achievement at the best French-speaking schools, making French the *de facto* official language in Morocco. As a consequence, speakers of other local linguistic varieties, Berber or Arabic, endured symbolic domination at least until the last decade of the protectorate.

As colonial schools developed an educated French-speaking clientele and created profitable jobs for Francophones in Morocco, the Arabic and Berber languages were devalued and excluded from economic or social opportunity; however, the process of legitimizing French in Morocco was different from the scenario in which French became the legitimated language of France. First, the Jewish and European communities were undergoing a language shift similar to the process described by Bourdieu, while the Arab and Berber communities were differently positioned. In these communities, both Arabic and French became legitimate languages but came to represent different kinds of capital. Morocco avoided complete French dominance because languages granting symbolic capital in Morocco did not necessarily coincide with those offering economic forms of capital.

2.3.6 Beyond Bourdieu: Resistance

Bourdieu's theories on social reproduction and the linguistic market do not allow for a great deal of agency in the educational pursuits or linguistic production of individuals from the subordinate classes and fail to explain how individuals from these social groups are able to navigate under the determinism of powerful, structured institutions. The majority of his work on schools as sites of domination examined the forces of the dominant classes and how those forces produced constraints by which members of the dominated classes were forced to comply. In her critique of Bourdieu, Reed-Danahay (1996) wrote, "In most of his writings on education, Bourdieu focuses on the educational strategies of the bourgeois families, rather than farmers or other

lower classes, as they use schools to reproduce and assure their own dominant position (p. 29). Interestingly, Bourdieu's theory focused on the educational and professional pursuits of the privileged but did not elaborate on the likely trajectories of the dominated, a social group with the most motivation to show resistance. What is lacking from Bourdieu's linguistic market and social reproduction theories is an understanding of how social groups and individuals choose different outcomes, negotiate domination, and participate in their own linguistic production and professional success or failure when confronted by symbolic violence in school.

In contrast to Bourdieu's overly deterministic theories on the reproductive nature of social institutions, many have argued that social agents from less privileged social groups are able to resist symbolic domination by many different means (Reed-Danahay, 1996; Scott, 1990; Willis, 1977). Since the ability to resist depends on social agents, groups or individuals, to recognize what is in store for them and oppose this "inevitability," a certain amount of agency is also required in theories of resistance. In the same way that the degree of symbolic violence can vary, resistance can take many forms. In this dissertation, I define resistance as any attempt by subordinate groups or individuals to reject the cultural knowledge belonging to the dominant class as the dominant culture. Reed-Danahay (1996) asserted that resistance can occur in several ways:

> Resistance and accommodation have several components, and … may operate along a continuum ranging from total compliance (tacit, overt, and passive), to total rebellion (tacit, overt, and active resistance). Resistance may be overt, tact, and active or passive. … Compliance, similarly, may take tacit, overt, active or passive forms. (p. 40)

As resistance can be characterized in many different ways, various researchers have approached the study of resistance differently. Willis (1977) found in his research of working-class young males that identity differences such as gender and social class impacted how groups of young men at secondary schools in England rejected educational pursuits and resisted social-class mobility. These young men formed a subgroup whose group ideology was contrary to the dominant one encountered at school. This ideology, which privileged social-class bonds at the expense of acquiring dominant culture taught at school, led these boys to reject school and accept working-class jobs. As a result, Willis concluded that individuals are active participants in determining their destiny and are not passively indoctrinated to succeed or fail as predicted in Bourdieu's social reproduction theory. "In different ways, all social agents have a hand collectively in constructing their own destiny, doing so in a way which is not simply determined from outside and which often enjoys the labyrinthine complexity of a 'cultural form'" (Willis, 1977, p. 207).

In *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Scott (1990) sought to reveal the range of forms that resistance can take between both dominant and dominated social groups when relating to each other. Scott (1990) used the term *hidden transcript* to refer to instances where resistance was invisible. "The hidden transcript is typically expressed openly—albeit in disguised form" (Scott, 1990, pp. xii–xiii), in contrast to the public transcript, "the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate" (Scott, 1990, p. 2). He stated that both the dominant and the dominated employ hidden transcripts, and "the more menacing the power, the thicker the mask"

(Scott, 1990, p. 3). In contrast to Bourdieu's notion where only the powerful have invisible agendas, Scott's (1990) approach recognizes that both the dominant and the dominated carry hidden transcripts, but the degree to which this is recognized depends on the kind of subordination and threat. Scott (1990) drew his evidence largely from "studies of slavery, serfdom, and caste subordination on the premise that the relationship of discourse to power would be most sharply etched where the divergence between … the public transcript and the hidden transcripts is greatest" (p. x).

In Reed-Danahay's (1996) examination of rural peasant communities of France, she found that resistance was one part of the answer to how children in the small village of Lavialle were able to resist inculcation of dominant culture at schools in France. She uses the terms "persistence, resistance, and coexistence … for ways of looking at regional or ethnic identity in plural societies" (Reed-Danahay, 1996, p. 206). Cultural persistence was the resiliency of groups to combat cultural domination; resistance "stresse[d] the refusal of groups to change in certain ways" (Reed-Danahay, 1996, p. 206). Coexistence implied multiple forms of cultural identity in nation states. Rural communities were able to forge a Franco-Auvergnat identity so that regional identity was prioritized alongside the socialization to be French in school. In this way, these students remained bicultural or *culturally diglossic*, as Reed-Danahay (1996) termed it.

What these researchers have in common is that they acknowledged the multiple forces at work in obliging social agents to comply, partially comply, or

refuse to comply with the forces of social institutions. Such scholarship questions Bourdieu's overly deterministic reliance on unconsciousness and passivity of social agents undergoing symbolic domination. Like the researchers of resistance theory who have argued that this domination is not unilateral and that many different forces conspire to negotiate, accommodate, or resist domination, I similarly propose that reaction to domination is not predictable or unilateral, and at times may be contradictory. Willis (1977) claimed, "Life systems of oppression do not exist separately. … They coexist and intertwine in surprising and complex ways, that sometimes buttress each other, and at other times contradict each other" (p. 208). Similarly, I argue that reaction to symbolic domination is subject to much variation among different members of a single community, especially among multicultural and multilingual communities of Morocco, and does not elicit uniform responses from the same community or even the same individual. In their reaction to French education in protectorate Morocco, Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers demonstrated different kinds of "transcripts." Whereas some individuals and communities appeared to have endorsed or acquiesced to French education, others refused. Some displayed contradictory attitudes toward French education. Whereas once some protested French education, some later accommodated it and sought coexistence of French and traditional education. This is true sometimes even within the same individual at the same time. This topic of resistance specific to protectorate Morocco will be explored further in Chapter 5.

2.4 Previous Research on the French Language in Protectorate Morocco

Most research on language and education at the beginning of the 20th century investigated Moroccan local languages and was conducted by French officials. In order to better understand the culture and dialects of the speech communities there, French officials created research institutions to house those findings. These research centers, such as the *Institut des hautes études marocaines* in Rabat, were intended to teach local Arabic dialects and Berber varieties and ethnology to colonial administrators. Journals and dictionaries authored by various European ethnographers, scientists, religious missionaries, linguists, and colonial officials were created for this purpose. Over the course of the protectorate, the discussion of language and education in colonial records focused on promoting the expansion of French in certain educational establishments so as to facilitate French hegemony, especially among European, Jewish, and Berber communities.

By the end of the protectorate, discussions on languages in education became more widespread and politicized, as many Arab and Berber Moroccans desired to increase the study of Arabic at the schools specifically created for these communities. Such concern over language instruction became one of the reforms advocated by the future Moroccan nationalists, *Comité d'Action*, in the 1934 *Plan des réformes marocaines*. By the 1950s, widespread discussions on how to make Arabic the official language of the country and how to replace French with Arabic through a policy of Arabization became a common theme in nationalist discourse. From the

protectorate into independence, the selection of French or Arabic instruction became symbolic of national division or unity in Morocco, and research on education and languages reflected these ideologies, from that of the colonial perspective during the protectorate to the nationalist one after independence.

Colonial rhetoric, which stressed differentiation and antiassimilation, nurtured a local nationalistic discourse that sought assimilation through unified Moroccan nationalism by 1956. Both of these perspectives exacerbated social divisions, whether by recognizing and highlighting differences between social groups or erasing difference altogether. Segalla (2009) positioned colonial and nationalist discourses within the historical literature on Morocco and analyzed how each essentialized their stance in opposition to the other.

> The colonial discourse of the French protectorate produced a distorted vision of Moroccan life that was closed off to counterevidence and complicating empiricism and which prevented adroit adaptation of policy to changing circumstances and to the aspirations of Moroccan Muslims. … Nationalists … made use of colonial ideas of ethno-cultural essentialism in the construction of anti-colonial counter hegemony. … Cultural essentialism was a tool for rallying a diverse public, for rescuing personal dignity from the humiliation of imperialism, and for manufacturing and enforcing a consensus that would bring stability to the postcolonial society. (Segalla, 2009, pp. 261–264)

French or Arabic education became the force that ensured social division under the colonial arrangement or unification under the nationalist one. The link between each of these perspectives and education was so significant that nearly all documents on education during the protectorate referenced the nationalist movement in response to colonial policies. Since each perspective was advanced through a discussion of the

use of either French or Arabic, these languages became indexical to each of these discourses, to the exclusion of Berber and other native languages present in Morocco.

2.4.1 Colonial Discourse

Research regarding cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of Morocco attracted considerable scholarly attention after the arrival of French colonists. The majority of research on Morocco for the first half of the 20th century had as its starting point a European, specifically French, perspective. Doctors and religious missionaries reported their experiences in the remote inland regions. Colonial agents sought profit and political opportunity in a similar manner. Later, European-trained scientists sponsored by colonial interests rationalized indigenous customs and ethnic disparity. These reports, many funded by French authorities and produced in French, sought to investigate the social, material, and general conditions of everyday Moroccan; ethnic diversity among Berber tribes; linguistic variation; and religious factions in order to inform colonial authorities about how to penetrate and govern Morocco.

Since research on Morocco was initially driven by colonial motives, the bulk of early work expressed a colonial perspective guided by France's *mission civilisatrice*. In justifying colonial endeavors, this research reflected biased colonial ideologies with discriminatory points of view, laden with the presumption of "the 'European conquerors' ever-present confidence in their ability to define, categorize, and comprehend the colonized society" (Segalla, 2009, p. 115). Segregating

Moroccan communities into schools with different levels of French instruction was condoned on the premise of protecting native populations. Bureaucrats exploited new scientific disciplines like ethnography, linguistics, and psychology to categorize, generalize, stereotype, and rationalize the Moroccan "other." Such discrimination was defended by the overarching objective set by Général Hubert Lyautey, the first *Resident Générale*, who governed the French protectorate from 1912 until 1925, in order to preserve Moroccan culture and to maintain the "charm" (Segalla, 2009, p. 15) of the authentic Moroccan city. This philosophy, or "commit[ment] to the principle of adaptation to ethnic difference" (Segalla, 2009, p. 19) advocating the need for separation between Europeans, Jews, Muslims, and Berbers, was reiterated by French colonial administrators in the Department of Education. These administrators writing on the subject of segregating Moroccans early in the protectorate included Louis Brunot (1920–1939), Georges Hardy (1919–1926), and Paul Marty (1912–1930), as well many other leaders of the Direction of Public Instruction (DIP). This ideology of separating and reinforcing ethnic difference remained in force at least until the 1940s (Segalla, 2009). By the time of Roger Thabault's tenure (1929–1941), the director of primary education and then head of DIP, the emphasis on ethnic limitations had become more subdued, likely due to historical circumstances, but the "emphasis on concrete, practical education" (Segalla, 2009, p. 244) remained.

Some of these perspectives by colonial officials in the DIP encouraged the notion that, in contrast to the Europeans, Moroccans were inherently inferior and

were “lazy, vain, indolent, selfish, liars, and hypocrites” (Segalla, 2009, p. 129), despite evidence to the contrary. Segalla (2009) noted among many French researchers of the period the abundance of references to character or Moroccan psychological flaws.

> The psychological characteristics of “the Moroccan” were invoked even by writers who were generally critical of Hardy-era DIP policy. Gaudefroy-Demombynes recognized that poverty and economic pressure were the main obstacles to recruitment and regular attendance in the professional schools, but he simultaneously blamed Moroccan character flaws. (Segalla, 2009, p. 171)

As a whole, Moroccans during the early protectorate were portrayed as psychologically and morally incapable, and such labels were increasingly validated when Moroccan students encountered difficulties in the foreign school system created by the French.

> When discussing the difficulties associated with the vocational education of Moroccan students, DIP writers invoked the notion that these students were different, not as individuals but as an ethnic group with traits distinguishable from those of European students, traits that were psychological in origin rather than the result of social or economic conditions. (Segalla, 2009, p. 170)

Many bureaucrats of the DIP, the military agents within the *Bureau d’Affaires*, and other administrative officers were prolific researchers during the protectorate. They produced many ideologically positioned works. In nearly all the research developed during this period, the use of simplified labels invoke social groups as fixed categories, as either European, Jewish, Berber or Muslim, as if these categories were permanent, indisputable, and recognizable. “French imaginings of Moroccanness [were presumed] static, natural, and neatly bounded identity” (Segalla,

2009, p. ix). Such terms in the colonial research erroneously contrasted religious categories with those denoting ethnicity, provenance, or language. Differentiating group divisions in reality is much more complex; humans are not easily labeled by ethnicity, religion, social group, language, or other fixed categories.

> The notion that … human beings are distinctly divided into groups with discrete moral, social, and psychological characteristics, groups that are easily identifiable by their language, religion, parentage, social role, or phenotype … is inherently hostile to individual variation. (Segalla, 2009, p. 261)

Because of the categorization of Moroccans, stereotypes and insistence on social divisions pervade much of the colonial research on education and ethnography. Readers often encounter the generalized casual use of terms such as *indigène* to refer to all non-European Moroccans; *juif* or *israëlite* to refer to Jews in Morocco; and *berbère*, a term based on the word *barbarian* originating during the Roman Empire, to refer to Berber populations. For each of these groups, different schools were created to address the particular needs of each community, and the curricula at each of these schools reflected those beliefs. Categorizing Moroccans as Jewish, European, Muslim, or Berber resulted in disrupting the cultural landscape that Lyautey's principle had intended to protect.

Whereas the early French protectorate (1912–1940) was characterized by segregationist policies consistent with the policies set by Général Lyautey, the sources documenting the later periods of the protectorate (1940–1956) demonstrated an evolving pragmatism in educational philosophy and correlate with significant world events that impeded normal research and educational operations in France and

Morocco. These included the Great Depression, World War II, the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy government, the creation of Israel, the decline of colonization, and the rise of global independence movements. After 1940, the limited historical sources available demonstrate that colonial policy had shifted to a perspective of practicality born from historical necessity. But this perspective might also have been a result of a purposeful silence during a very negative time in history when, from 1941–1945, Vichy laws restricted the rights of Jews in German-occupied France and French territories. The majority of writings at this time by French officials restricted discussions to budget limitations and the recognition of an emerging nationalist movement.

> There was little discussion of Muslim education [at this time] … nor do DIP publications from the post-Vichy period offer any information on the subject. … It is possible that [French protectorate officials were] too preoccupied to address educational reform of any kind. However, it is also likely that the DIP's silence regarding the Vichy years reflects the protective amnesia of the "Vichy syndrome" rather than mere inactivity. (Segalla, 2009, p. 241)

From census accounts, the last decade of the 1940s was marked by more entry to French schools for Moroccan Arab students, increased school attendance by Moroccan Arab girls, and urban and international migrations. Since this period also coincided with growing opportunities to attend schools sponsored by nationalist sympathizers, French writings began to advance the notions of expanding education to a greater number of Arab Moroccans than ever before. By that time, colonial rhetoric began to take a back seat to nationalist calls for reform, which, by the late

1940s, increasingly voiced discontent with low literacy rates and inadequate curricula.

2.4.2 Nationalist Discourse

The Moroccan perspective countered this colonial rhetoric and became increasingly hostile toward French colonial policies. The student organizations for former Moroccan students of colonial French schools supported educational reform and advanced the nationalists' *Plan de réformes.* The 1934 *Plan de réformes* called for an increase in the amount of time dedicated to Arabic study at French-sponsored schools, greater educational opportunities for Moroccan girls, teachers from other Arab countries to diversify teaching staff and course content, and opportunities for access to the *baccalauréat* and university-level education. The topic of education, therefore, became a contentious subject in terms of promoting Moroccan independence, reestablishing Moroccan identity, and invigorating nationalistic sentiment.

Contrary to the colonial ideas of categorizing communities, the nationalist discourse called for imagining a single society undifferentiated by ethnic or religious origin. The new perspective of Moroccanness masked real social divisions for the apparent benefit of the new nation. Predictably, the nationalists called for Arabization, a process they claimed would erase the years of French rule and eradicate former social divisions through linguistic unification. Complete Arabization of the school system was advocated on the grounds that foreign

languages like French impeded the spread of education, in contrast to the language of authenticity—Arabic.

In support of this policy, one of the central leaders of the nationalist party, Allal El Fassi (as cited in Boukous, 1996) stated in the 1960s that the genius of a people manifests itself uniquely in the national language. The support for Arabization was based on the assumption that Arabic was the language of Moroccan unity and that this language embodied Moroccans as authentically devout Muslims. Neglected in this policy were the facts that literary Arabic, both MSA and CA, remained foreign to many, especially the 40–60% of Moroccans who spoke Berber as a native language, and that all Moroccans were not Muslim; the largest Jewish populations in the Arab world called Morocco home at that time. The nationalistic policies that ensued from these views were potentially as dangerous as the colonial ones, and the rhetoric that validated such policy was no less venomous. Support for this nationalistic discourse reverberated in statements by King Hassan II (1961–1999), the "commander of the faithful," in which he reinforced Moroccan identity as Arab and Islamic until 1994, when he first gave a speech in Berber, thereby recognizing Berber identity and language as part of Moroccan identity (Ennaji, 2005).

Like the colonial directors who oversaw colonial schools before independence, nationalist leaders "us[ed] schools as a tool of cultural control and to instill a pre-conceived cultural identity … like Hardy-Brunot [who] attempt[ed] to preserve 'the Moroccan'" (Segalla, 2009, p. 249). During the final years of the protectorate, Arabic became increasingly symbolic of Moroccan identity as the

nationalist movement gained momentum. After independence, the new nation adopted Arabization as a language policy; imposed Arabic as the national language in Moroccan education, administration, and commerce; and questioned the preservation of the French language in all national institutions. This policy to Arabize the schools was intended to realize the nationalists' ideal of Arabic as the official language, to redefine Moroccan identity as Arabic speaking and Muslim, and to fill offices of national significance with modern, educated Arabic speakers. A Moroccan nation united by Arabic and Islam, therefore, necessitated the eradication of any trace of the former colonial identity. French was deemed unacceptable despite the fact that the language continued to serve important roles in accessing a better life through enhanced education and employment in independent Morocco.

> The argument for Arabization was based not on financial or pedagogical concerns but on the ideal of the monocultural nation-state and the belief that the Arabic language was an essential part of Moroccan nationhood, and therefore that French-language instruction constituted a betrayal of the Moroccan self. (Segalla, 2009, p. 258)

French was progressively replaced in the national curriculum and government agencies with MSA in the 1960s. Students were taught MSA earlier than French, which was postponed from the 1st year to the 3rd year of primary school curriculum. MSA was taught before the introduction of any other language. Gradually, subjects such as philosophy, history, geography, math, natural sciences, physics, and chemistry were taught in MSA by the late 1980s.[5] However, all university-level

[5] "Dans la décennie 60 au collège et dans la première moitié de la décennie 70 au lycée et à l'université et notamment pendant l'année scolaire 1973/4 pour la philosophie et l'année scolaire 1974/5 pour l'histoire et la géographie … [les] matières scientifiques et [les mathématiques] … étaient arabisées à

instruction remained in French at that time, with the exception of the religious disciplines. Complete Arabization of primary and secondary school curricula continued well into the 1990s. French remained indispensable at least as late as 2000 for most university-level courses because it remained the language of instruction, most notably in the study of the sciences.

> By the 1990s, [Moroccan officials] … achieved the complete Arabization of the public primary and secondary schools, with French taught only as a second language. Science, math, and engineering instruction continued in French only at the university level and at numerous private schools. (Segalla, 2009, p. 255)

Despite the many strides to Arabize primary and secondary education over the course of nearly 50 years, the nationalists' goal of replacing French speakers with an educated Arabic-speaking populous was never completely realized. For one reason, foreign languages, especially French and, today, English, continue to serve social functions that policy makers intended Arabic to fill because of the ongoing role of private schools and bilingualism in Moroccan higher education. Before Arabization, only 7% of Moroccan Arabs, including native speakers of both Berber and Arabic, spoke some French. "Quantitatively, more Moroccan people (at least 25%) speak French today" (Ennaji, 2005, p. 37), with other estimates as high as 41.5% according to French government statistics; however, a consequence of Arabization is that students' qualitative mastery of French is less significant. Ennaji (2005) observed,

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l'école primaire de 1981 à 1983 et au collège de l'année scolaire 1982/3 à l'année scolaire 1985/6 pour les sciences naturelles, la physique et la chimie et à partir de 1984 pour les mathématiques" (Krikez, 2005, p. 49).

"The Arabization process has led to a decrease in the students' command of French" (p. 37).

The increase in the number of French speakers in Morocco is partly due to increased enrollments and higher literacy rates after independence. Natural population growth and increased enrollment partially explains how French became more widespread. Additionally, inherited French pedagogies throughout the school system were maintained and preserved due to practical concerns, budgetary necessity, and the availability of pedagogical resources and teachers after independence. These factors contributed to the spread of French throughout the country in unprecedented ways. Moroccan materials and educated professionals in MSA were few in 1956. Many Moroccan teachers still depended on their pedagogical training received in the French schools before independence. Moreover, French *coopérants*, or foreign government employees, remained employed in influential positions in post-protectorate Morocco, especially in educational fields. A high "number of expatriate French teachers" remained employed in Morocco, for more than 20 years after independence comprising up to "13% of the total number of teachers working in secondary schools" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 12). This was especially true at the university level, where 25% of teachers were French nationals (Bentahila, 1983).

Besides the reasons of pedagogical imperatives, the number of French speakers in independent Morocco continued to increase because French remained essential in accessing higher education, economic opportunity, and improved social status. For decades under Arabization, the French language was maintained

alongside MSA under the bilingual school system, institutionalizing French alongside the new emphasis on MSA, especially at the highest levels of education. Whereas the social sciences were taught in Arabic, the natural sciences were uniquely taught in French. This was because, as Ennaji (2005) remarked, "The general public was conscious of the crucial role of French in education and in socio-economic development. They associated French with modernity and progress and Arabic with literature and Arab-Islamic tradition" (pp. 36–37).

As a result of increased economic potential linked to university study, French remained indispensable to those wishing to better their lot in life. Seckinger (1988) asserted that economic opportunity continued to be associated with French literacy in Morocco even 30 years after independence: "French represents technological, economic, and even 'cultural' development … for many Moroccans, and is frequently flaunted as a badge of 'modernity'" (p. 72). In contrast, Arabic came to be viewed as the language evoking tradition, religion, and Moroccan identity. Over time, the association of each language and social functions came to represent either modernity or authenticity.

> French has gained more prestige and influence in the country because of its utility in economic and technical sectors and its role in social promotion. Thus, modernity, social success, prestige, economic and scientific matters are associated with French, whereas Arabic is associated with identity, roots, cultural authenticity and tradition. (Ennaji, 2005, p. 37)

Consequently, French and Arabic continued to represent real social, academic, and economic divisions that Arabization of school programs after independence alone was unable to eradicate.

The process of Arabizing the curriculum failed to erase social and economic opportunity that those who spoke French were still able to acquire. Once French became more difficult to acquire because of the Arabization of primary and secondary education, French became even more valuable. After independence, French-language education was more desirable than Arabic-language instruction, especially among the elite.

> Many Moroccans, of various classes, continued to see French-language education as the key to economic success. Moroccan's political and economic elite continued to send their children to French mission schools. … The rich thus avoided the difficulties encountered by "arabized" students when entering higher education in science, mathematics, and engineering in Morocco or when pursuing opportunities in Europe. (Segalla, 2009, p. 257)

Students of the higher classes were more able to acquire French through their restricted social networks, within private schools, and their familial networks, with the result of improved employment opportunities. Less fortunate students were far less likely to acquire French because there were fewer resources or opportunities to acquire it, thereby ultimately eliminating these students from higher education and enhanced economic opportunities.

The imposition of Arabic in the curriculum without regard to the requirements of higher education and the job market had serious consequences for the less fortunate students. As French became more difficult to acquire for the majority, thereby securing a profit of distinction, Arabic instruction reinforced tighter academic social selection to the benefit of those who acquired French and impeded the poorest Moroccans from acquiring this crucial skill in an environment that necessitated it.

Seckinger (1988) insisted, "'Arabization,' which advertise[d] itself as a way to equalize opportunity, may in reality act to perpetuate pre-independence elitism institutionalized in exclusive private schools that continue[d] to emphasize French" (p. 85). The linguistic relationship between MSA and MA being similar to the differences between Latin and early modern French, when Moroccans entered school, they were then confronted with great linguistic challenges of having to learn more than one foreign language, both MSA and French. This cost was far greater for the probable majority of Berber students who were forced to learn Arabic as a foreign language alongside French (Segalla, 2009).

Arabization did not reach the goal of complete standardization within all institutions because Morocco had already undergone significant divisions whereby some communities had acquired French and profited from this skill while others were unable to do so. The policy of Arabization did not replace French with Arabic in all areas of Moroccan society. Different opportunities continued to exist for speakers of each language. Presuppositions of a Moroccan culture united by language, religion, and ethnicity accentuated social divisions in Morocco in a similar way to the emphasis on social divisions by colonial schools years earlier. Moreover, the failure to create a monolingual Arabic-speaking state reflected deeper problems inherent in aligning language policy with cultural ones. The discussion on nationalizing language in Morocco reflected rhetoric like that employed by the colonial power decades earlier. Whereas colonial powers justified the emphasis on social divisions as a means to preserve the character and identities of local populations, nationalists

erased regional or ethnic difference in order to advance the notion of a unified Arab and Islamic state. "The equation of decolonization with a rejection of language change might be better understood as a historically developed concept, a legacy of both the colonizers' discourse of cultural preservation and the nationalist inversion thereof" (Segalla, 2009, p. 258).

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed the sociolinguistic theories necessary to the analysis of the spread of French in protectorate Morocco. First, I presented two definitions of diglossia by Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967) and differentiated diglossia from bilingualism. After locating the nature of language coexistence in protectorate Morocco, I introduced the important terms for Bourdieu's linguistic market theory. In accordance with this theory, educational success and the acquisition of French among Europeans, Jews, Moroccan Arabs, and Berbers became linked to economic success. However, this only partially explains the spread of French in Morocco. To complement Bourdieu's overly deterministic theories of social reproduction, I presented research on resistance by Willis (1977), Scott (1990), and Reed-Danahay (1996) and argued that dominance is not necessarily hierarchically imposed, as Bourdieu's theory predicts. Finally, I presented the previous research on the subject of language and education in Morocco, demonstrated how the biases in the research perpetuated both colonial and nationalist discourses, and outlined how languages and schools became symbolic to national or group identity.

CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN PROTECTORATE MOROCCO

Chapter 1 demonstrated how more Moroccans speak French in Morocco since independence than during the protectorate and how social and educational success there corresponded to greater French mastery. Chapter 2 examined the multilingual communities in protectorate Morocco, diglossia and bilingualism according to Ferguson (1959) and Fishman's (1967) definitions, and the sociolinguistic theories of Bourdieu's theory of practice and the language market. This chapter analyzes the process by which four social groups, European, Jewish, Muslim, and Berber communities, came to exist in the research on Moroccans by French authorities and how group differences based on religious, ethnic, and linguistic salient features became institutionalized in the colonial legal and educational systems.

The discussion of how each of the communities came to be designated as separate groups by French authorities is important in understanding why certain communities were able to access different kinds of schools and legal status in Morocco. First, I show how the colonization of Morocco was different from, as well as influenced by, the colonization of Algeria and Tunisia. Then, I demonstrate how French authorities came to view Moroccans as divided between Muslims, Jews, and Christians after the reports from Christian organizations that, before the protectorate, had come to Morocco to spread the Gospel and then reported their findings on the needs of these local communities. In addition to separating Moroccans on the basis of religious identification, I subsequently demonstrate how the Kabyle Berber myth,

imported from the colonial experience in Algeria, influenced the designation of Moroccan Berbers as a separate and privileged social group from Moroccan Arabs. Next, the census information for each of these communities is provided in order to show each group's prevalence and participation at the beginning of the French protectorate. Afterwards, I demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing communities by these designations as well as the consequences of doing so. Finally, I reveal how the divide-and-rule strategy of governance employed these ideologies of socioethnic divisions as the basis for institutionalizing difference within the new colonial legal system.

3.1 Morocco in Contrast to Algeria and Tunisia

Despite many similarities with its North African neighbors, Morocco was the only Maghreb country not conquered by the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the dynasty of the Moroccan Sultan, the commander of the faithful embodying both political and religious authority, had not undergone any serious threat since 1664 (Tessler, 1982). However, because of its proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar, Morocco became desirable to European powers to advance diplomatic and commercial activities and as a strategic possession for colonial expansion. Morocco's prosperous maritime activities through both Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines often rendered it vulnerable to attacks from pirates as well as from expanding European colonial interests. As a result, in 1912, Morocco was partitioned into four protectorate zones: (a) a northern zone under Spanish control, (b) a southern zone

under Spanish control, (c) a central zone governed by the French, and (d) an international zone governed by several European powers in the northern coastal city of Tangier, as demonstrated in Figure 3. This split was the first set of institutionalized divisions by European authorities in Morocco and, therefore, the first effort to govern Moroccan according to a policy of divide and rule.



Figure 3. French and Spanish protectorates in 1912. Source: *Morocco Since 1830: A History,* by C. R. Pennell, 2000, New York: New York University Press.

The foreign influence in neighboring French territories of Algeria and Tunisia, by contrast, was longer lasting than that of the Moroccan protectorate, which endured a mere 44 years. The establishment of the Moroccan protectorate in 1912 occurred 82 years after the annexation of Algeria (1830) and 31 years after the Tunisian protectorate (1881). The colonization of Morocco operated under different historical

pressures at different stages of development. The first of such pressures consisted of regional competition with the other, more established French territorial possessions for resources such as finances, soldiers, public works, settlers, and an educated workforce to assist in the development of the modernization efforts when such assistance was critical.

On the international front, the French authorities in Morocco endured different historical, political, economic and social constraints at an earlier stage of development than officials in Algeria or Tunisia had endured. Some of these important events included World Wars I and II, the rise of fascism in Spain, the international economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the development of the state of Israel, the development of the League of Nations and the United Nations, obligatory and free education in France in the 1880s, and the rise of Zionism and anti-Semitism in France after the 1894 Dreyfus Affair.[6] Therefore, while colonizing concerns should have focused on finding solutions to basic infrastructure problems, such as the construction of buildings, transportation, communication, schools, sanitation projects, and jobs, the French *Résident Général*, the French military appointee to oversee protectorate matters, was forced to manage local affairs under the constant pressure of local, regional, national, and international limitations.

[6] In the late 19th century, a Jewish officer in the French army by the name of Alfred Dreyfus was accused and convicted of having been a spy for the Germans. The Dreyfus affair revealed a rising anti-Semitism in France and Europe. Shortly thereafter, the Zionist movement, which advocated for the large-scale immigration of Jews to Israel, gained great momentum throughout Europe and influenced early colonial policies in the Moroccan protectorate. Early colonial policies sought to protect and improve the condition of the Moroccan Jew in such ways as trying to eliminate Jewish childhood marriages with the installation of AIU schools and secular, Westernized curricula for both Jewish boys and girls. Other communities in Morocco did not receive similar attention.

Meanwhile, all of these pressures and efforts in infrastructure development proceeded simultaneously with the pacification campaign of the Moroccan countryside by the French military, an endeavor that continued as late as 1934, 22 years after the beginning of the protectorate and concurrent with the military campaign of World War I. Therefore, the French government preferred a policy of very little intervention in many areas of the country except in matters that contributed to the pacification and penetration effort. To illustrate this point, I include a map that shows the progress of the French pacification effort by the 1930s (Figure 4). Figure 4 identifies the zones that came under French influence before the protectorate, 1907–1912; the zones that came under French influence early in the protectorate and during World War I; the areas of Morocco that came under French influence after World War I; and the areas that remained dissident in 1927.

Since there were few French researchers in Moroccan history, linguistics, and sociology before the establishment of the protectorate, little was known about the regional and social diversity among Moroccans. The discovery of diverse ethnic groups in Morocco, Jewish, Berber, and Berber-speaking Jewish communities, for instance, hastened the accumulation of research on ways to facilitate pacification, with special emphasis on how to accommodate great religious and ethnolinguistic variation. Institutes were rapidly constructed to research social diversity in Morocco. Initially, however, the documentation provided by the former travelers, European diplomats, French soldiers, Christian missionaries, and Jewish organizations such as the AIU before the creation of the French government proved more essential, as it

was available more quickly than the publications of the institutes. As informative as any of the reports were, each offered only a partial glimpse into the various Moroccan communities and reflected the biases that had prompted their journey or research in the first place.



Figure 4. French pacification of Morocco. Source: *Berbers: Their Social and Political Organization*, by R. Montagne (D. Seddon, Ed.), 1973, London, England: Frank Cass.

3.2 Influence of Religious Organizations

Some of the first informants to report on the social condition of Moroccans were missionaries from various Christian and Jewish organizations dismayed by the desperate conditions plaguing North Africans. Encouraged by reports on destitution, illiteracy, and illnesses, religious missions were created in some areas of northern and

central Morocco in order to provide church-sponsored social and medical welfare programs. They sent missionaries to provide medical care and educational programs by which to spread the Gospel and to convert Moroccans. Although most religious societies had little long-term impact on the lives of Moroccans, these informants spread the image of a nation divided between Jewish, Muslim, and potentially Christian populations and laid the groundwork for the segregation policies of the French protectorate.

In 1862, the AIU, the first modern school for Jews, arrived in Morocco, with the mission to improve the condition of Middle Eastern Jews through education. These schools became highly influential in providing services to Jewish Moroccans and advancing great social change among Jewish communities 50 years before the arrival of the protectorate in 1912. Their success in recruiting students and altering the substandard existence of Moroccan Jews led many other Jewish and Christian groups to follow.

At the height of religious missionary work in Morocco,∂ from the 1880s until just after 1900, there were seven active Protestant organizations with 81 missionaries and 18 locations in Morocco: (a) the British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel Amongst Jews, (b) the British and Foreign Bible Society, (c) the North Africa Mission, (d) the Midmay Mission to the Jews, (e) the England Presbyterian Church Mission (which later merged with the Central Morocco Mission), (f) the Southern Morocco Mission, and (g) the Gospel Union. Despite their efforts to recruit Muslim or Jewish Moroccan converts, their effectiveness was greatest in the realm of medical

assistance. In 1900, there were more than 70,000 consultations among the combined organizations. In contrast, their effectiveness in education was considered mediocre, only enrolling 150–180 students between 1900 and 1904 (Miège, 1955). These efforts were abandoned due to financial difficulties, few students, and few religious conversions. The Spanish of Tetuan and Tangier witnessed the most results, with only 40 or so converted and only 10 Jews from Essaouira; four in Casablanca; three in Rabat; and a few Muslims in Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier (Miège, 1955).

The activities and expenses of these religious organizations in Morocco were very meager compared to what had been spent in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, where such organizations had successfully established schools and hospitals for more than a century (Miège, 1955). Unlike the Catholic Franciscan missions, which largely served the increasing European presence, Protestant missionaries were the first foreigners to live in the interior of Morocco. In addition to social assistance, they brought "religious propaganda" (Miège, 1955, p. 154) to Moroccans and reported back to the European public their findings on the Moroccans' social, linguistic, moral, and religious existence. Because of their great knowledge of local customs and languages in addition to their increased relations with protectorate and local officials, Protestant missionaries were also invaluable sources of information for colonial administrators (Miège, 1955).

Christian organizations failed overwhelmingly to attract much interest among Moroccans. Instead, they heightened awareness among Europeans that Moroccans were divided according to differences in their faith as primarily Muslim or Jewish.

However, thanks to the importation of the Berber Kabyle myth, many missionaries also reported back on the presence of communities of Berbers who appeared to be semi-Islamic practicing and possible Christian converts. The Berber Kabyle myth originating from the French colonization of Algeria intensified rumors that Berber communities practiced traditions that appeared to share similarities with Christianity and were, therefore, more susceptible to the Christian message and conversion (Miège, 1955).

3.3 The Kabyle Myth and Moroccan Berbers

The first noteworthy experience among protectorate officials with Moroccan Berbers occurred after 1912 in the Middle Atlas. "There was only one French officer with any knowledge of the tribes in the region, Maurice LeGlay, and there was no scholarly research on the language, customs, or institutions of any Middle Atlas tribe" (Burke, 1976, p. 188). What the French initially knew about Moroccan Berbers was very limited, and contact with Berbers in rural and mountainous areas often resulted in conflict, so the French were motivated to pacify the rural zones. Institutes like the *Comité d'études berbères* created in Meknes in 1915 and the *Institut des hautes études marocaines* in Rabat intended for French military officers and civil servants in the new French regime were merely in development and were not available to educate protectorate and military officials at a critical period of development. Thus, the prior decades of research of and experience with Algerian Kabyles provided rapid and easy

insight on Moroccan Berbers for French officials at a time when pacification of these tribes was difficult.

For a century before the Moroccan protectorate, the French framed notions of Algerian Berbers through the Kabyle myth, which viewed Berbers as unique and different from Arabs, not only linguistically but also ethnically, culturally, religiously, and politically. These Berber tribes were believed to be more similar to European culture "based on the supposed democratic nature of Kabyle society, its lesser degree of Islamization, the more equal treatment of women, and the supposed assimilability of Kabyles to French culture" (Burke, 1973, p. 189). Intellectuals and ethnologists familiar with Algerian Berbers asserted that Moroccan Berbers were very similar to Kabyles, in particular the Moroccan Tamazight, who were at the time more difficult to subdue due to their political organization, which differed from that of the southern tribes. Their mountainous habitation protected them from invasions and dependence on Moroccan rulers, and they were believed to be only "superficially Islamicized, preserv[ing] the customs, rituals, and superstitions of their earlier faith beneath a veneer of Muslim beliefs and practices" (Burke, 1973, pp. 193–194). The belief that Berbers were culturally separate from Arabs and closer to Europeans led many French officials to the conclusion that Berbers would be easily assimilated into European culture. Therefore, for the French, "the Berber represented the perfect middleman between the Orient and the Occident, Europe and Africa" **(**Silverstein, 2002, p. 7), a middleman whose similarities with the European would allow assimilation of French interests more suitably than the Arab population.

The belief that Berbers would effortlessly assimilate French culture was especially enhanced by the perceived similarities to the French in political organization. Through Berber religious and political assemblies, or *jamaas*, one would find "veritable sovereignty which the chief of the patriarchal family possesses, as in ancient Rome … [with] a kind of democratic spirit which enabled them to resist the makhzan" (Burke, 1973, pp. 194), or the king and his government. Moreover, Moroccan Berbers were perceived to be more similar to the French than were Arabs based on their treatment of women, which was seen as similar to French family codes.

> The customary laws by which the internal life of the group was regulated, as in Kabylia, … [were] often more in harmony with the spirit of ... [French] code than the laws of Islam. … Berber treatment of women was much closer to the European than to the Arab, and Koranic prescriptions relative to women, their place in the family, and their rights were not practiced by Berbers. (Burke, 1973, p. 194)

Besides similarities regarding political organization, many French officials also justified the semblance to European culture on the basis of racial and biological similarities. These arguments linked Berbers to European lineage in racial, moral, and linguistic terms. In fact, prominent disagreements oscillated as to whether their common origin was Germanic or Siberian, because some colonial scholars thought that these groups shared similar language and facial characteristics (Bidwell, 1973).

> Berbers could actually trace their origins to simultaneous movements of people from the European North and the Asian South. Further, they had maintained traits from each of these origins—from the European-type blond hair and blue eyes of certain Kabyles, to their language which resembles that of the Basques. (Silverstein, 2002, pp. 6–7)

From these assertions of similarity to European lineage, others argued that the Berbers were the original inhabitants of North Africa who, not having intermixed with Arabs, continued original, or non-Arab, cultural practices.

> French military ethnographers understood them as the original inhabitants of North Africa who had preserved more than any other people their Mediterranean identity. … Denying any influence from outside cultures, be they Arab, Punic, or Roman … certain colonial linguists and ethnologists argued that the Berbers constituted the true autochthones of the region who had resisted all invaders and cultural influences. (Silverstein, 2002, pp. 5–6)

Such perspectives implied that influences from other cultures that had come in contact with Berbers through time were nonexistent, erasing any cultural, historical, linguistic, religious, and ethnic influences that had uniquely shaped Moroccan Berber culture differently from Arab culture in Morocco. However, by defining Berber traits as closer to those associated with European civilization, authorities found justification to assimilate Berbers as instrumental agents through the divide-and-rule strategy and to seek to accelerate the pacification effort by means of segregating them from other Moroccans.

3.4 Social Divisions in 1912 Morocco

Morocco had the most inhabitants of all of the countries of the Maghreb, comprising nearly half of all North African inhabitants (Le Tourneau, 1962). With the largest population of Jews and Berbers in North Africa, the French administration in Morocco differentiated legal and educational assistance to each community based on its ethnic and religious particularities so as to keep the French presence from disrupting Moroccan society in any drastic way. Le Tourneau (1962), an important

figure in the education system and former director of the *collège de Fès*, confirmed that Morocco was composed of three separate communities, Muslims, Jews, and Europeans. Further, Le Tourneau (1962) explained how religion, in this case Christianity, also became the salient feature among Moroccans to denote Europeans, since European nationality often coincided with Christianity.

Though Berber constituted an ethnic or linguistic distinction and not a religious one, French officials believed that significant cleavages justified the consideration of this population separately from Jewish and Muslim, or Arab, communities. Berbers were perceived to be only superficially Muslim and therefore unlike Arab Moroccans who faithfully preserved Islamic traditions (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928). To the French, Moroccan Berbers maintained different religious and cultural traditions than the Arab Muslims, and these differences validated their distinction from other Moroccan communities, despite evidence of groups that blurred these distinctions, such as the Jewish Berber communities or city-dwelling Berbers who were indistinguishable from urban Arabs.

3.4.1 Europeans

Prior to the French protectorate, a few Europeans from many different countries of origin came to live and work in Morocco. Since these settlers came from all European countries and colonial possessions belonging to various European powers, this group included a heterogeneous group with different nationalities in addition to great linguistic and religious diversity. The designation of European

included not only those born in European countries such as the Spaniards, Portuguese, Germans, British, Italians, and French who came to live in Morocco but also those who had acquired European citizenship, especially those who had originated from other French colonies and territories. Since Algeria by this time had become a full-fledged French territory, some Muslim Algerian inhabitants became French subjects and gained *de facto* French citizenship by the late 19th century. As for Algerian Jews, in 1870 more than 35,000 were granted French citizenship with special religious status under the *Crémieux Decree,* which had granted French citizenship to Jews in Algeria.

Muslim and Jewish Algerians with French citizenship were indistinguishable from Moroccans in that they were similarly either Jewish or Muslim; spoke French as a second language, if at all; and spoke Berber or Arabic as native languages. However, classified as Europeans in the same way as European-born settlers, Jewish and Muslim Algerians were granted privileges and opportunities that most other Moroccans were unable to receive. For example, besides higher salaries and increased job opportunities, Europeans in Morocco often dwelled in the *ville nouvelle* districts, the newer districts of a city, further segregated from the more impoverished parts of the city such as the *madina* (Pennell, 2000), the old part of the city where Moroccans lived, and the *mellah*, the specific quarters near the old city where Jewish Moroccans lived.

Many Algerians with French citizenship entered Morocco, especially in the area near Oujda in northeastern Morocco, and became residents entitled to benefits

similar to those awarded metropolitan-born French citizens. Their presence in some areas of Morocco rivaled the density of indigenous Moroccans, as evidenced by the population of Oujda in 1926, when up to 53% of inhabitants were Algerian (Katan, 2005). These Algerian-born French citizens often occupied higher posts in the protectorate than Moroccans as Indigenous Affairs officers, inspectors, municipal service directors, regional directors, and specialists of Moroccan services for the *Résident Général* because of their European status (Ayache, in Katan, 2005).

Prior to 1912, the number of combined European nationals remained very low. In 1850, records indicated that only 389 Europeans inhabited Morocco. Afterwards, their population grew considerably; by 1921 there was 1 European for every 55 Moroccans, and by 1952 there was 1 European for every 22 Moroccans (Cerych, 1964). In 1927, the European population was just over 90,000, more than 60,000 of whom were French nationals (Benzakour, Gaadi, & Queffélec, 2000). By 1952, out of a total population of 8.085 million in Morocco, there were 367,000 European inhabitants, of whom 75% were French, 60% were adult, and 89% lived in cities (Merrouni, 1983), especially the coastal cities. About 10% of this population was Algerian, estimated in 1956 to number 31,767 (Cerych, 1964).

3.4.2 Jewish Communities

In 1912, the Jewish communities totaled no more than 110,000 people distributed throughout northern and southern Morocco, although inhabiting mostly the southern zones and Marrakech. Even before the arrival of the French, Jewish

communities from rural zones of the South and the High Atlas regions as well as the urban centers like Marrakech were in the process of migrating towards the port cities of Essaouira, Agadir, Tangier, and particularly Casablanca. By 1952, the Jewish population in French Morocco nearly doubled in size to 210,000, though by then many Jews had relocated in the coastal and urban cities (Laskier & Bashan, 2004). In the mid-1950s, the Moroccan Jewish population, at 240,000, was one of the largest in all of the Arab world outside of Israel, more than Tunisia at 100,000 or Algeria with 140,000 (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).

Historically, Moroccan Jewish communities maintained many regional, linguistic, and cultural distinctions. The *toshavim* were the earliest Jewish settlers who most resembled Muslims in customs and spoke Judeo-Arabic or Berber. The *megorashim* were the more economically prosperous Jews expelled from Spain who spoke Judeo-Spanish and primarily lived in the northern Moroccan regions (Laskier & Bashan, 2004). Similarly, differences in places of residence and living conditions separated many of the different communities of Jews. Most Jews before 1912 lived in *mellahs,* walled quarters whose gates were locked at nightfall, hence reaffirming segregated communities, whereas more "affluent Jews lived outside the *mellah*, notably in the neighborhoods of European merchants" (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, pp. 480–481) in the *ville nouvelle* districts.

As more impoverished Jews left the countryside for the urban centers where the more prosperous Jews lived, conditions worsened and "relations between richer Jews and their poorer brethren became more strained" (Pennell, 2000, p. 91).

Socioeconomic differences permeated Moroccan Jewish existence before the arrival of the protectorate. While the overwhelming majority lived in extreme poverty, a few affluent Jews found influential employment in international trade, as agents for foreign firms, independent merchants, translators, protégés, or consular agents (Laskier & Bashan, 2004). Their privileged economic status permitted them to alter their social status: "Some affluent Jews spent time in Europe and acquired foreign nationality, then returned with a different status than their brethren, who remained subordinate to the Makhzan's jurisdiction" (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 477). Otherwise, most Jews were considered *dhimmi* by the Makhzen, the governing council for Morocco, which required Jews to pay a tax for their protection because of their lower social status. Prior to the establishment of the French protectorate and the educational initiatives of the AIU, many Jews manufactured alcohol; some were petty traders, artisans, farmers, or metalworkers; some worked in textiles, leather, carpentry, construction, or pharmacy; and some provided various other services deemed inferior or forbidden by Islam (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).

Regional differences also existed between rural and urban Jews. Few walled *mellahs* were located in the countryside; as a consequence, Jews outside urban areas lived among Muslims and at times were left unprotected. One of the "mellah's responsibilities was to provide refuge for victims of epidemics or abuse" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 114). In areas outside of Makhzen rule, rural Jews fell under the administration of a *pasha*, a local Berber tribal leader, and sought protection from a custom of local patronage in exchange for payment or services (Gottreich, 2007).

Such allegiances rendered rural Jews dependent and vulnerable to different powers of influence and accelerated possible friction between urban and rural Jews. "Accusations of theft [were] exchanged between urban and rural Jews. ... The amorphous 'group feeling' among Moroccan Jews sometimes took a back seat to more tangible interests, particularly when the Jews came from different communities" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 114).

Before and early in the protectorate, Moroccan Jews, especially those in the interior, maintained "extensive transnational economic and social networks" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 7) and were often able to speak many different languages, including Arabic and Berber and various European languages needed for commerce and diplomacy between foreigners and Moroccans. For this reason, many were able to profit from the arrival of the European commercial and diplomatic agents. Jews with such knowledge were able to seek opportunities to become European citizens and *protégés*, a system initiated after the French-Moroccan commercial treaty of 1767 (Gottreich, 2007), until shortly before the establishment of the French protectorate. In the 18th and 19th centuries, becoming a *protégé* offered legal protection through contractual relations with European consuls in exchange for linguistic and cultural skills that many Jews could offer. This was a rare opportunity for Jews to escape their disadvantaged economic condition at a time when Moroccan Jews were unable to improve their condition by obtaining French citizenship like Algerian Jews. Status as this kind of consular agent granted them "immunity from Moroccan government in most tax and judicial matters" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 7) but "wreck[ed] a sense of

existential havoc with their sense of identity" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 9) because of their proximity to Europeans or Westerners.

Because of their socially and economically disadvantaged situation, Moroccan Jews attended French schools more than any other social group throughout the term of the protectorate. Education, specifically a French education, brought greater opportunities to acquire languages and new skills for jobs in the changing economy. As a result of poverty, search for employment, lowered status as *dhimmi*, and the increasing presence of Western ideals fostered by a French education, many Jews by the end of the protectorate sought to immigrate abroad as a means to escape misfortune in Morocco. Within a short period of time, the Moroccan Jewish community was impacted by unprecedented historical events with the rise of Zionism, the creation of Israel, global insecurity as a result of World War II, the Vichy experience, anti-Semitism, and the nationalists' zeal for independence. Between 1947 and 1956, more than 100,000 Jews immigrated to Israel (Laskier & Bashan, 2004), leaving only about half of the original number of Jews residing in Morocco. This trend accelerated after independence due to the increasing pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli sentiment in many Arab countries in the 1960s. Today, only about 5,000–6,000 Jews remain, most of whom reside in Casablanca (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).

3.4.3 Arab Communities

In 1921, the total Arab and Berber Muslim population in Morocco was approximated at 3.372 million.[7] By 1952, this estimate more than doubled to 7.675 million (Merrouni, 1983). At the beginning of the protectorate, Arab Moroccans were primarily rural, living among and often indistinguishable from Jewish and Berber communities. Only 25% of all Moroccans dwelled in the urban centers alongside Europeans. However, over the course of the protectorate, a million inhabitants from the countryside left the rural zones, and more than half of these immigrated to the cities (Merrouni, 1983). As these migrants began their new lives in the cities, they had to integrate with Europeans where French was more important in their daily lives. By 1951, outside of the 19 cities and municipalities throughout Morocco, there were 100 Moroccans for every European. In the urban areas, among the six top cities, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, Meknes, Rabat, and Oujda, that statistic became 5 Moroccans for every European (Cerych, 1964).

Throughout the protectorate, the combined Muslim and Jewish Moroccan population was marked by its youthfulness in comparison to the European population. In 1951, nearly half of all Moroccans, or 48%, were younger than 19 years old (Merrouni, 1983), compared to only 37% of the European population (Cerych, 1964). Throughout the term of the protectorate, these Moroccan communities were generally poor, earning nearly 20 times less than the European population (Merrouni, 1983), an

[7] Although census information was collected for all Jewish, Muslim, and European communities beginning in 1921, 1926, and 1931, it is not until 1936 that data collection became more reliable.

important factor in predicting educational access and their ability to pay school tuition.

3.4.4 Berber Communities

In contemporary Morocco, the proportion of Berber speakers is estimated at 40% (Charrad, 2001), although many sources have found this number difficult to confirm or deny with any certainty, and they inhabit largely rural and mountainous areas. According to Hoffman (2008), today about 80% of Moroccans speak MA, though only half speak it as a first language. Thus nearly 40% of Moroccans speak MA exclusively, another 40% speak MA and a Berber language, and 20% are monolingual Berber speaking. In 1936, according to French protectorate census information, there were over 2.5 million Berber speakers, of whom 1.56 million were monolinguals, whereas 880,918 spoke both some Berber and Arabic (Maroc Secrétariat Général du Protectorat**,** 1936). However, these numbers likely underestimated the situation, as the complete pacification effort was still tenuous in 1936 and accessing rural and mountainous areas remained treacherous. Prior to 1960, the number of French-speaking Moroccans was not calculated, but according to the 1960 census, the proportion of Moroccans bilingual in Berber and French was estimated at 4% (Maroc Service des Statistiques, 1960).

In contrast to the neighboring countries, the Moroccan Berber population, more numerous than in Algeria or Tunisia, was estimated in 1900 to be at least 60% of the total population (Burke, 1976). Moroccan Berbers were also linguistically

heterogeneous, with three recognized varieties of Berber language: Tarafit, Tachelhit, and Tamazight. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tarafit dialect was primarily spoken in the northern Rif mountainous zones; the Tachelhit dialect in the south; and the Tamazight dialect, the most similar to the Algerian Kabyle dialect, in the Atlas Mountains and central zones.

Diversity among Berbers was not limited to only linguistic and geographic differences, but as mentioned previously, some Berbers were discovered to be Jewish and therefore non-Muslim. According to 1936 census figures, Jewish Berber monolinguals were calculated at 24,462, or 15% of Moroccan Jews, and Jewish Arab or Berber bilinguals were calculated at 95,682, or 59% of all Moroccan Jews. Thus, a combined 75% of Moroccan Jews spoke Berber. This situation was even more prevalent in southern Morocco, like in Marrakech, the largest city in the south, where 90% of Jews spoke Berber in the late 19th century and were "deeply rooted in the Arab-Berber milieu" (Gottreich, 2007, p. 6). Though the number of bilinguals does not indicate native language and hence, ethnic origin as Berber or non-Berber, the total proportion of monolinguals, approximately 15%, suggests a significant number of Jewish Berbers. Hence, "the linguistic distinction cuts across both … religious and ethnic lines: There are Berber-speaking Jewish communities" (Gellner, 1969, p. 13) as there are Berber-speaking Muslims and Arabic-speaking Jews, Berbers, Muslims, or Europeans.

The discovery of Jewish Berber populations advanced the notion that Berbers were more similar to European culture and ancestry than Arab culture and ancestry.

Several researchers attempted to explain the existence of Jewish Berbers as the original or "true" Jews with primitive manners and local traditions having descended from Berber tribes (Slouschz, as cited in Schroeter, 1997). Alternatively, some researchers argued that Jews became Berber as a result of commercial activities, since they traveled extensively and later settled amongst Berber towns (Schroeter, 1997). On the contrary, others claimed that all Jews in Morocco, including those expelled from Spain, were of a similar Berber origin who at a later date converted to Judaism (Schroeter, 1997). These myths of ancestry confirmed for some that Berbers shared a common Judeo-Christian heritage with the French and thus shared fewer traditions with Islamic culture (Schroeter, 1997). Such justification advanced the divide-and-rule strategy and further encouraged the institutionalization of segregated communities.

3.5 Difficulty of Dissecting Moroccan Communities

As the various exceptions discussed in the previous section indicate, separating communities using the terms *Jewish*, *Muslim*, *Berber*, and *European* was problematic, since the formulation of these categories was based on inconsistent, unrelated, and overlapping features. Speaking a language, whether MA or Berber, did not necessarily indicate religious or ethnic kinship, just as religious affiliation did not presuppose ethnicity. In the same way that individuals of a single group might display differences among linguistic, ethnic, and religious characteristics, none of these features above reliably predicted group affiliation. However, the French

employed these categories in their divide-and-rule strategy as a means to facilitate colonial hegemony and, in so doing, reinforced the segregation of Moroccan communities.

The use of religion to distinguish Jews from Muslims assumed that Europeans and Berbers were non-Muslim and non-Jewish. Europeans were thus assumed to be largely Christian in a similar way that Berber communities were believed to be non-Muslim and non-Jewish, an assumption originating from the Kabyle myth. Europeans came from diverse countries and spoke multiple languages, so their only communality, according to this view, was that they shared a common religion or culture based on such principles. This was not true of the naturalized French citizens of Moroccan or Algerian origin who spoke Berber or Arabic as a first language, some of whom were Jewish, while others were Muslim. The term *Muslim*, or *musulman* in the French archives, largely designated Arabic-speaking Muslim populations who were of Moroccan origin, not foreign born. This meant that Berbers were not considered to be Muslim, European, or Algerian. However, many Moroccan Muslims were Berber, and, as noted, some Muslims, especially Algerians living in Morocco, had acquired French citizenship. The term *Jew*, or *israëlite* in the literature, denoted Jewish-practicing, non-Muslim, non-Berber, non-European communities, though some Jews were Berber and some had acquired French citizenship. Finally, the term *Berber*, *berbère*, included only those who lived in predominantly rural Berber regions and spoke a Berber language, as long as they were not Jewish. Inconsistencies to these group delineations were forgotten or

ideologically eliminated from official documentation so that these four social groups assigned by French officials became the basis for French administration in Morocco.

3.6 The Strategy of Divide and Rule: Institutionalized Ideologies

In order to subdue rural communities and exert influence in regions far from the cities, French officials reformed the legal system in Morocco by reassigning the power attributed to local officials and courts. Whenever possible, the French assigned a governor or mandated that the tribal chiefs, the powerful leaders exerting regional influence, would rule in the name of the French colonial state in an effort to avoid undue fragmentation of Moroccan tribes (Charrad, 2001). French Native Affairs officers were stationed in every pacified town or region in order to ensure local loyalties by guarding every level of administration: They attended court proceedings, recommended the appointment of local officials, and guaranteed complicity by influencing judicial decisions. Wherever the French ruled, they reformed local control structures by instituting standardized professional exams for local administrators, authorizing lists of auxiliary legal professionals, reducing the number of Moroccan bureaucrats, and assigning legal representatives by means of direct appointment. As a result, such a system of appointing regional (*pasha, qaids*, tribal leaders) and judicial leaders (*qadi*, judge, or *adil*, notary) disrupted the balance of social standing among traditional leaders whose prestige had formerly depended on the recognition granted by local courts. Their eroding social position was further diminished by the loss of jurisdiction within Islamic courts, which were superseded

by modern, secular, colonial courts. The diminished wealth of their clientele, eroding social positions of scholars, and the emergence of new secular courts with more power and prestige meant that the power of the traditional Muslim courts deteriorated.

Because of ongoing pacification efforts in remote areas of the country not previously under the control of the Makhzen, the French government required a "more economical way to rule through the existing tribal institutions" (Charrad, 2001, p. 128). Indirect rule through maintaining traditional tribal institutions meant that segments of the Moroccan population necessitated governance by separate institutions, or a divide-and-rule strategy, that divided legal systems and political allegiance according to distinct segments of the population. Whereas Arab Muslims were to be governed according to Islamic *sha'ria* law, non-Muslims required a very different court system that corresponded to their religious and cultural differences. A legal system demarcating Europeans, Jews, Berbers, and Arabs did little to disrupt daily life and corresponded precisely to colonial perceptions of differentiating social groups by stereotypes.

Separate social groups with different histories, cultures, and religions required different administrative assemblies to represent their individual interests, the French believed. Ideologies regarding these communities became institutionalized when the French established separate court systems for each of the distinct social groups. In the revised legal system instituted by French officials, minority communities were granted legal representation based on religious traditions and customary assemblies.

Separate courts were created for Berbers, Jews, and Arab Muslims on matters of a cultural and religious nature, such as personal affairs, whereas secular offenses were administered in centralized Makhzen courts, or those courts administered under the sultan's control.

> This native law was organized into four separate systems which built on and "reformed" traditional practices: Muslim Law (inheritance, non-registered land, marriage, divorce, etc.) judged by the qadi; Makhzen Law (penal and administrative law for Moroccans) judged by the local makhzen official, the pasha or qaid; Customary Law (local legal matters in certain Berber-speaking tribes) judged by the tribal council or jama'a; and Rabbinical Law (inheritance and other matters for Jews) judged by the Rabbis. (Paul, 1975, p. 160)

As a result, the power of the secular Makhzen and European courts increased while the power of the religious Islamic courts diminished alongside that of the authority of traditional local leaders.

Cases involving Arabs were then "under the jurisdiction of the secular Makhzen courts, created, and supervised by the French" (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 491) and simultaneously under the lesser jurisdiction of a *qadi* in the *sha'ria* courts, those respecting Islamic family law. Though criminal matters were still tried under *sha'ria* law in the Makhzen courts for all Moroccans, application of *sha'ria* law for non-Muslims was reduced in the Makhzen courts. Meanwhile, Jewish and Berber courts were granted more authority than ever before. Rabbinical courts ensured Jews were granted personal and religious rights while still abiding by the Makhzen courts to litigate criminal or administrative matters. Berbers were allowed to exercise "Berber customary law and tribal councils" (Charrad, 2001, p. 140), creating their own courts of appeal. They were able to exercise full jurisdiction over personal

status, family law, inheritance, and commercial matters, exempting them from Islamic family law. After 1930, French tribunals were set up in tribal areas applying French penal law in all cases of criminal matters (Charrad, 2001).

Protectorate legal reforms delineated certain powers to separate courts according to ethnic origin and litigation as either religious or secular on "the assumption that Moroccans differentiated religious and secular law, and … that there was, within the Makhzen, a hierarchy of courts" (Halstead, 1967, p. 64), even though this was in conflict with local custom. Consistent with this hierarchy of courts, European settlers were prosecuted in French courts under French penal codes allowing for defense by lawyer, arrests with warrants, opportunity for appeals, and imprisonment only when charged with a crime (Mannin, 1953). The French court system oversaw all cases of commercial law and any case involving Europeans (Pennell, 2000) and thus exercised great authority. Since Europeans held more capital and political sway, these courts represented interests with greater authority than the Moroccan courts. As a result, "the European capitalist sector everywhere took the upper hand, [and] that portion of the society and the political economy that the Muslim courts presided over lost vitality" (Paul, 1975, p. 228).

Before the implementation of the new courts by the French, Jews in Morocco had not been granted the same legal status as Muslims. They had been required to pay the Muslim *jizya* tax, required to dress in a manner distinguishable from Muslims, prohibited from bearing arms, and prohibited from providing evidence in Muslim court. In exchange, Muslims granted Jews freedom of worship, community

autonomy, and protected Jewish lives and property (Laskier & Bashan, 2004). Jews had been under the jurisdiction of communal rabbinic courts unless it was a matter between Muslim and Jew or applicable under the penal code. After 1912, Jews were granted improved status with the rise of the secular Makhzen courts. "Jews were regarded as equals before the law, and their *dhimmi* status was formally eliminated. … Cases involving all Moroccans … came under the jurisdiction of the secular makhzan courts, created and supervised by the French" (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 491). Even though Jews were still required to present their cases before Muslim courts, the authority of rabbinic courts increased alongside that of the secular courts.

The exceptionality of Berber communities based on assumed religious, linguistic, geographic, and political differences also required different legal rights under the French protectorate. Since Berbers were considered to be less attached to Islam than their Arab neighbors, they were also believed to be less attached to Islamic *sha'ria* law. The more the French were able to separate Berbers from Islam, the more likely they would bond with the colonizer, or so it was believed. As Arabic was inherently linked to Islam and *sha'ria* law, subverting that language became a simultaneous goal. All efforts to de-Arabicize were prioritized as were opportunities to bypass Islamic *sha'ria* law in order to foster a closer relationship with the French.

> If the Berber could be isolated from all Arab influence, then gradually brought under the jurisdiction of French law, the influence of French schools, and the discipline of the Christian religion, all traces of Islamic culture could be eradicated and the Berber would become a European. (Halstead, 1967, p. 70)

The greatest effort among French officials to diminish Arab influence was the introduction of French penal law in Berber regions. This was an overt display of the colonial mission, by providing French privileges to previously neglected communities, in addition to reinforcing ideologies and the political strategy of imposing separate and counterweight communities in Morocco. The first attempt to create this political counterweight was in 1914, and the second was in 1930. The freedom for Berbers to adhere to the customary courts, the *jamaa*, was guaranteed by the dahir of September 11, 1914, and then in the Berber Decree, dahir *berbère*, of May 1930. Both stipulated that Berber communities were to maintain their own judicial system and were permitted different legal and social status from Arab society and Islamic s*ha'ria* law. These decrees were intended to ensure the confidence of tribal leaders that neither the French nor the Makhzen would alter their customary ways by introducing *caids, qaids,* or *sha'ria* law or enforce submission to the Makhzen (Burke, 1973). However, since the first decree did not stipulate "what customary law was, nor designate which tribes were regarded as 'Berber,' these matters were left to administrative judgment, with the result that the larger proportion of tribes which ultimately submitted to the French army were declared 'Berber'" (Halstead, 1967, p. 69).

As the definition of Berber had not yet been imposed on these communities and the pacification effort had only begun in 1914, the first decree did not receive much attention. The second decree in 1930 had much different unintended consequences. The 1930 Berber decree revised the legal status of Berbers in order to

circumvent traditional Islamic practices among the seemingly less devout Muslims and counterbalance the Muslim majority in the rest of the country. This political act shifted secular powers from the Makhzen court to the French courts, thereby legally dividing Berbers from Arabs and drawing them closer to Europeans. Unfortunately, this legal division upset both Arabs and Berbers. Moroccans revolted throughout the country, and the nationalist movement gained momentum. Before the protectorate, the notion of Berber had been amorphous. Separating Berbers from Arabs and defining them as a unique social group worthy of considerable attention in Morocco, in line with the numerous characterizations that had guided French endeavors, had serious consequences. Berber communities became more interested in a unified Moroccan identity based on false French conclusions that the

> Berber was superior to the Arab; the Berber people and civilization had a homogeneous character entitling them to the dignity of "nationhood" denied to the Arab, and finally that the Berber and Arab were in uncompromising opposition. … Such prioritizing of Berber culture and identity led some to suggest that instead of a Berber policy, "if the French had had a "politique arabe," giving them a free rein to exploit the Berbers, they might have been spared some heart-breaking disasters. (Bidwell, 1973, pp. 60–61)

Separating Moroccans by legal status and the numerous ideologies that accompanied the notion of dividing communities exacerbated social and political organization in Morocco (Charrad, 2001) at the same time that such divisions empowered French authority in Morocco. The divisions created by the divide-and-rule strategy during the French protectorate had direct consequences in granting another kind of inequality for Moroccans, that of unequal access to French language and education. Although unequal access to French education brought fewer

objections than legal status had, it brought greater socioeconomic disparity among some communities because language and education were tools for social mobility.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated how French colonial administrators came to identify Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers as four separate communities in Morocco and how these categories were reinforced by and institutionalized in colonial legal policies. To understand how social groups came to be viewed according to these divisions, I investigated the major historical events and demographic singularities that differentiated Morocco from its neighbors. By 1912, after more than 80 years of experience in Algeria and 30 years in Tunisia, the French found these former colonial experiences to be significant examples of how and how not to govern the new colony. Moreover, these previous experiences served as a ready-made template for French authorities to quickly gain understanding about communities for which they originally knew very little.

Besides the influence of previous colonial experiences in Algeria and Tunisia, the Christian and Jewish groups that reported on religious diversity in Morocco led French officials to emphasize the role of religious divisions in Morocco. Identifying communities according to religion permeated most levels of classification to the extent that other markers of identity were neglected. In addition to these reports, the Berber myth imported from Algeria in Morocco corroborated the idea that Berbers were less Muslim and displayed characteristics inherent in Christianity. In this

classification system, however, French officials erased the existence of Jewish Berbers as well as that of Jewish or Muslim Europeans. Therefore, separating Moroccans according to European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber communities was problematic, given that religion, language, and ethnicity were not all pervasive categorizations. Discriminating groups according to salient features neglected the fact that those features were not necessarily stable identifiers in all contexts.

> In sum, then, ethnicity … is a factor of quite differential importance, a factor that varies with situational contexts and the additional affiliations by which each of the participants is characterized. Identity as a Berber or an Arab is not, however, in almost any context all all-pervasive typification in terms of which one views and relates to another person. (Rosen, 1973, p. 171)

Categorizing Moroccans demonstrated to what degree the French authority failed to objectively view the overall system in which Berbers, Arabs, and Jews coexisted in Morocco.

> To approach the question of social relations in Morocco mainly in terms of ethnic differences is to perpetuate the same error of misplaced concreteness of which the French themselves were so guilty: it is to give a reified and primary status to a distinction which … is of more ambiguous and subsidiary importance. (Rosen, 1973, p. 173)

Finally, I illustrated how these ideologies became institutionalized in offering differences in legal status to each community in an effort to further the French strategy of divide and rule. Dividing Morocco on the basis of sociocultural divisions served a greater political need to assimilate populations who would assist the French endeavor and ensure the survival of the French regime in the divide-and-rule strategy. Offering legal advantage to groups important to the colonial endeavor, the Jewish, Berber, and European communities, and fostering that relationship via legal privilege

strengthened French authority. This political strategy, in turn, had consequences in educational and employment opportunities for Moroccans. As Chapter 4 explains, the strategy of dividing communities according to their usefulness to the colonizer also coincided with the implementation of a colonial school system that offered access to French instruction and better employment to only those communities with a privileged relationship with the colonizer.

CHAPTER 4: DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO FRENCH SCHOOLS AND FRENCH INSTRUCTION: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSSESSION

Having demonstrated the importance of French in Morocco decades after independence, the sociolinguistic concepts necessary to the examination of language spread in Morocco, and the various ideological constructs and strategies that impacted the formation of protectorate institutions, I present in this chapter the *mission civilisatrice* philosophy and how it led to the creation of different schools for what the French labeled the European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab communities. Differences in curricula, student selection, and teacher qualification at each of these schools selectively reproduced a French-assimilated minority intended to compose the future leadership of Morocco while purposefully keeping the majority of Moroccans from acquiring the French language and the various kinds of capital that this language offered.

To begin this chapter on colonial education in protectorate Morocco, I define the *mission civilisatrice* ideology and illustrate how education became the institution by which to foster the colonial relationship between Moroccans and French authority in protectorate Morocco. Second, I identify the network of French educational opportunities created for each social group and examine the link between the quality of French education at the best schools and access to higher education and employment. To show how the highest levels of French education remained inaccessible to the majority of Arab and Berber Moroccans and how the schools that

were created for these groups reproduced socioeconomic inequity or dispossession, I discuss the other kinds of schools children from these communities attended—traditional schools, free schools, and their limited enrollment options at the schools for Europeans or the Jewish AIU schools—and the challenges to studying at each. Finally, I illustrate, following Bourdieu and Passeron's (1977/2000) social reproduction theory, how a rigorous selection process at the best colonial schools and how the difference of teachers' qualifications at each of the schools socialized students differently so that some communities were able to master the dominant and legitimate colonial language to a greater degree than others.

4.1 Education and the *Mission Civilisatrice*

Beginning in the 18th century, the French rationalized colonial endeavors throughout the world and in Morocco by advancing the notion of the civilizing mission, or the *mission civilisatrice,* through education. The notion of civilization has a direct relationship with the notion of education in France where the term *éducation* refers to not only institutional learning, or *la formation*, but also upbringing and exposure to culture and the idea of having become civilized. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the French considered it their ideological and moral responsibility as an evolved society to bring progress, peace, and freedom to less fortunate, uncivilized countries and cultures. France, as a more "advanced" society, thus was perceived as possessing a mandate to civilize undeveloped nations and to raise the native population from what French people perceived as these nations'

miserable condition to the level of the evolved, or civilized, nation—that is, to the level of France (Benzakour et al., 2000). Having evolved from the missions of the Catholic Church in spreading Christianity in the Arab world, this supposedly secular, political *mission civilisatrice* was bound by both a desire and obligation to enlighten the less fortunate, which inherently presumed an unproblematic ranking of civilizations, languages, and cultures in terms of inferiority and superiority.

To achieve the goal of the mission at the macro level, French military might, economic systems, and legal systems were introduced in the new colony in order to demonstrate superiority of the more powerful democratic and wealthy nation state. To effect change at the local level, medical practices and education advanced the civilizing cause in a manner similar to the cause of religious organizations prior to and, to a lesser extent, during the protectorate. Although the French authorities made great strides in improving the health and well-being of local populations during the protectorate, healing the body alone did not easily alter the mind. In lieu of military force, this civilizing mission through education was intended to generate new ideas and an appreciation for the gift of French culture. Education would introduce not only "civilized" notions of modern science and rational thinking but also the language of the superior power as a means through which to express those new ideas. Educating segments of the local communities came to be seen as the most assured method that a colonizing nation had to propagate its ideas among these still "primitive" populations and, presumably, to gradually bring them up to the level of a civilized nation (Léon, 1991, p. 24). Colonial administrators, therefore, instituted

methods to teach French as a means to consolidate influence and lead local Moroccan elites to participate alongside the authorities in governing the new colony (Léon, 1991).

Besides the practical applications of disseminating the language, the use of French as a language of power also offered opportunities for those in power to silence or distance those who were unable to speak it (Léon, 1991). Encouraging the acquisition of French in Morocco required caution, because unfettered access to language and modern ideas within traditional society was potentially dangerous. French instruction could open up possibilities for anticolonial discourse, and acquisition of the tool of oppression theoretically could undermine the colonial project. To minimize this risk, the French authorities in Morocco created educational institutions and curricula for social groups divided according to differences in religious, linguistic, geographic, and socioeconomic origin as the colonizers perceived them.

Different schools were created for European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber communities in Morocco according to their utility to the French government. Each school employed a different teaching methodology, selected students differently, and employed teachers with different qualifications. As a general rule, only utilitarian, superficial language instruction was to be taught to the majority of Arab Moroccan children, thereby potentially avoiding the spread of new but dangerous ideas. However, some social groups significant to advancing the French colonial project were introduced to greater French instruction than other groups. Children of

Europeans who, because of their different origins, spoke various other languages and were susceptible to competing political allegiances received the highest levels of French education. French officials intended to prioritize the assimilation of this class culturally and linguistically to the French language and culture (Léon, 1991). Children from the Moroccan Arab elite also benefited from such education, thereby maximizing the likelihood of the success of a colonial partnership among the elite, in contrast to the general public. Similarly, greater French-language education was intended to varying degrees for children from Jewish and Berber communities, two minority groups the French saw as instrumental in consolidating their authority as a means of securing cooperation and success of the civilizing mission. By offering this education according to social origin, the French encouraged the most influential Moroccans to collaborate in the colonial project. In turn, the material, spiritual, and intellectual condition of those who sought this privileged partnership with the French was altered.

4.2 Separate Schools for Separate Communities

European children in Morocco were able to enroll in the French *écoles*, *collèges*, and *lycées*, which taught a very homogeneous curriculum, identical to that of French schools in France. After they passed the *baccalauréat* at the end of secondary school, the *lycée*, many of these students were then able to study at universities in France. Jewish students attended either the AIU, schools originally associated with the international organization of the same name headquartered in

Paris and financed by private sources, or the *écoles franco-israélites,* the primary schools created by colonial authorities for Jewish Moroccans to limit the influence of the AIU schools. Both of these kinds of schools shared very similar curricula, including rigorous instruction in modern, secular disciplines, with French as the language of instruction in addition to some Hebrew. Additionally, the *écoles berbères* and *collège d'Azrou* were created for non-Jewish Berber Moroccans and intended to disseminate a quality education in the French language so as to foster a more intimate relationship between Berber students, their communities, and the colonizer. In contrast, colonial schools for Arab Moroccans, or "Muslims" as they were labeled, sorted students on the basis of social origin. Moroccans of elite status, referring to a family's social and political influence more than economic wealth, were eligible to attend the *écoles de fils de notables,* whereas Moroccans of nonelite status were expected to attend the *écoles populaires.* At the *écoles populaires,* students were further differentiated according to rural or urban provenance in the *écoles rurales* and the *écoles urbaines,* respectively. Table 1 shows the various schools instituted by colonial officials that were intended for each of the different communities in Morocco as they defined them.

Table 1. *The Segregated School System Created for Each of the Different Communities in the French Protectorate*

Intended students	Primary level	Secondary level	Certificates, higher education
Europeans, boys and girls	-*école primaire* 1902 -*Alliance française* (1884) -Christian mission schools of various European origin (1890s)	-*lycée* led to *baccalauréat 1908*	-*Université* in France or Algeria -*École supérieure d'arabe et dialectes berbères* 1912 -*Institut des hautes études marocaines* 1920
Jews, boys and girls	-AIU 1862 boys and girls schools separate but coordinated -*écoles franco-israélites* 1916–1924	-*certificat d'études primaires élémentaires (CEPE)* 1909 -*cours complémentaires 1925* led to *brevet* and *bac* -*brevet élémentaire* -*brevet supérieur* at the *École normale israélite orientale*, Paris 1867 -*lycée* 1908	-University in France or Algeria
Arabs, boys from elite families	-*écoles des fils de notables* 1912	-*collège* 1914 -*certificat d'études secondaires musulmanes* 1921 -*diplôme d'études secondaires marocaines* 1921 -*baccalauréat* 1930 -*brevet* 1946	-*Institut des hautes études marocaines* -University abroad (France, Algeria, Egypt, Sryia, etc.)
Arabs, boys from the general population	-*écoles urbaines* 1920 -*écoles rurales* 1920	-*écoles professionnelles*, 1920	

Arabs, girls	-Girls workshop schools, 1913 *-certificat professionnel féminin* 1943 - primary schools 1943 led to *certificat d'études primaires des fillettes musulmanes* 1943	-Girls' secondary education after 1943	
Berbers	*-écoles* in Middle Atlas 1923	*-collège d'Azrou*, 1927 *-certificat d'études primaires* (CEPM) or *secondaires musulmanes* (CESM) *-baccalauréat* 1954	*-Dar El Beïda*, military school, Meknes 1918

Table 1 (cont.) *The Segregated School System Created for Each of the Different Communities in the French Protectorate*

4.2.1 Schools for Europeans

Before the arrival of the French protectorate, European settlers and consuls living in Morocco sought to educate their children in a manner similar to that of their country of origin. For this reason, several private schools sponsored by multiple European agencies continued to offer education similar to that offered in their country of origin. In all, schools for Europeans were attended by about 1,800 students in 1912 (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928), but they were deemed poorly organized. For the most part, they located in the coastal cities of Tangier and Casablanca (Merrouni, 1983). Similarly, there were also private French schools like those of the *Alliance française* or those belonging to various religious missions created by different Protestant or Catholic orders. Besides providing a general elementary education and Christian instruction, these private religious schools offered medical and social

welfare programs that attracted a small number of the general Moroccan population in addition to Europeans, especially students from more modest backgrounds.

Yet, from time to time, the Moroccan community accused the directors and staff at these academies of proselytizing Moroccan youth. For this reason, French private schools did not seek to recruit a large number of non-European students, particularly after the creation of the French protectorate colonial schools in 1912. Other concerns, such as required payment of the tuition, also limited the number of non-European students able to attend. The influence of these private schools was therefore limited, and the total number of students remained low. After the end of the protectorate in 1959, there were only 35 such private schools in Morocco (Benzakour et al. 2000), Christian and *Alliance* schools combined, offering both primary and secondary education, sometimes with as few as four students to a class (Knibiehler, Emmery, & Leguay, 1992).

In 1912, French officials established public colonial schools for European students based on the model in use in France at the time with the intention to assimilate those who were not already French-speaking. Prior to the protectorate, European students, of various faiths, regardless of country of origin, among the French, Spanish, English, German, Italian, Greek, and Maltese communities, attended diverse educational establishments (if they received formal education at all), spoke different foreign languages, and pledged different political as well as religious allegiances. After 1912, children of European origin attended primary schools sharing a unified curriculum taught in French by instructors from France. In turn, the

new regime could depend upon graduates of these schools to work in administrative and economic positions in service to the new government. A rigorous secular, modern education for all European children, which was inaccessible to other communities, ensured this system of patronage. At the primary school level, the diverse European elements were assimilated into a group of French speakers who saw the world through French eyes; secondary instruction created an elite population capable of working not only in Morocco but also in France or its other colonies (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).

The French prioritized construction of these schools, and children from European communities quickly filled them. The near-exclusive European student body in 1912–1913 included 1,688 students. In 1922–1923, the number of students increased sharply to 15,096, nearly 9 times the number of students 10 years prior. These are staggering statistics considering that education was not yet mandatory in Morocco and that this rate of attendance was higher than in the countryside of France, where attending primary school was mandatory at the time. Besides Europeans attending these schools, other social groups did seek and gain admission. As demonstrated by the total number of students in secondary education in 1925, out of 2,900 students, 409 were Jewish of North African origin (recall that European Jews were documented as "European"), and 40 were identified as Muslim (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928) of both Algerian and Moroccan origin. These numbers reflect a large disparity between Jewish and other Moroccan students that did not accurately reflect the proportion of their population in Moroccan society. For various reasons to

be explored in the following section, students from Jewish communities were more often admitted to European secondary schools, but the same opportunities were more limited among other non-Jewish Moroccan students.

After successful achievement on the *baccalauréat* exam at the end of their secondary studies, students either continued their education abroad or sought highly desirable administrative positions in Morocco. The fact that the overwhelming majority of students completing secondary institutions were French nationals made French students the candidates of choice for colonial administrative positions. Those of French origin would ideally provide the new leadership in Morocco, thereafter taking the dominant role in the administration and economy of the country. As the French saw things, these graduates were the intended leaders and directors for any and all operations in the country—representatives of France in Morocco who deserved to fill positions of power and, according to Hardy (1924), who should never be inferior to other elements of the population.

The protectorate authorities chose not to create new universities in Morocco, desiring instead that qualified students, chiefly French or European in origin, continue their education in universities in France or Algeria. Doing so required a very high mastery of French as well as the substantial economic resources necessary to afford life abroad. However, the French did create research institutions such as the *École supérieure d'arabe et dialectes berbères* (1912) and the *Institut des hautes études marocaines* (1920), which were intended to focus on issues specific to Morocco such as Arabic and Berber language and pedagogical training. Open principally to

Europeans, both institutions housed all research regarding Moroccan social, ethnographic, and archeological investigations so as to better understand those that the French sought to control, thereby advancing the colonial project. These institutions did not receive full university status but offered diplomas with less prestige than those offered at French and Algerian universities, since the function of these institutions first and foremost was to train translators and interpreters in high demand within the newly created French administration. In 1925, the *Institut des hautes études marocaines,* which had by then merged with the *École supérieure d'arabe et dialectes berbères,* had 524 students, most of whom were employed within the French public service sector or were women, likely unemployed spouses of French administrators (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928). Only 46 were Moroccans (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928). By the end of the protectorate in 1956, of 1,063 students, 290 were Moroccans (Benzakour et al., 2000).

4.2.2 Schools for Jewish Moroccans

Beginning in 1860, the AIU, headquartered in Paris, sought to improve the condition of Jews in the Muslim world through education and social welfare programs. The first school sponsored by this agency was constructed in 1862 in Tetouan, in northern Morocco, and offered French instruction along with Hebrew and religious courses taught by teachers educated in France (Merrouni, 1983). Many more schools soon followed in the central and southern zones so that, at the beginning of the French protectorate in 1912, there were 27 schools with over 2,000 students.

By 1956, the AIU had expanded to 83 schools geographically well dispersed throughout urban and rural Morocco, instructing over 33,000 students, both boys and girls (Laskier, 1983). These institutions, which required tuition, educated more Jewish students and built more schools throughout Morocco than had any of the AIU affiliates in other countries.

The education of Moroccan Jews was so significant to protectorate officials that, in 1916, the French authorities also created a handful of tuition-free *écoles franco-israélites* schools based on the same model but without religious or Hebrew courses. But by 1924, the *écoles franco-israélites* merged with the AIU schools, and the AIU Central Committee shared oversight of all Jewish education in French Morocco with French authorities who subsidized the joint endeavor. Apart from a small number of Jewish boys who sought a traditional religious education offered by local Rabbis, the overwhelming majority of Moroccan Jewish girls and boys received a modern and an increasingly secular French education at the French-sponsored AIU schools.

Though "the French administration discouraged all but the most affluent Muslims and Jews from attending its schools for European settlers" (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 489), Jewish students were more likely than other Moroccan students to gain admittance to the *lycées* created for Europeans because of the high-quality French instruction offered at the AIU (Benzakour et al., 2000). The high-quality primary and secondary study at the AIU permitted students to earn the *brevet élémentaire* after finishing elementary study and offered opportunities to pursue 4

years of secondary study in the *cours complémentaire*. Jewish students could then attend the *lycée* for Europeans or continue in the *cours complémentaire* at the AIU and earn the *baccalauréat* after 3 additional years. Both of these diplomas increased their employment opportunities in administrative positions (Laskier, 1983) and were required for entrance to university. The French-based education offered at the AIU and at schools for Europeans impacted Jewish communities to a greater degree than any other social group in Morocco, permitting them to shift their position in the social hierarchy in unprecedented ways. "Jews managed to undergo social mobility to a greater degree than the Muslims owing to their avidity for educational progress, … the most privileged among them succeeded in enrolling in *écoles européenes*" (Laskier, 1994, p. 30). In 1954, nearly all Moroccan Jewish children achieved a primary education, around 25,000 students, and nearly all attended school in the French language (Benzakour et al., 2000).

Since nearly all Jewish children were being educated in French-based curricula and the French language (Benzakour et al., 2000), significant social transformations followed suit. First, urban Jewish communities underwent language shift, with French replacing other languages as the language of daily life. Initially, this language could serve as a practical language of communication between different Jewish groups who, having migrated from different regions of Morocco to the cities, spoke different Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish varieties. "By sitting together in the same classroom, the diverse elements developed the habit of speaking French, and it was this language that united them and helped eliminate linguistic and

communication barriers" (Laskier, 1983, p. 126). Later, this utility in speaking French surfaced outside the classroom as a vernacular preference. "French became the dominant spoken language among the Jews of the major towns. … By 1939 Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Spanish and Spanish had gradually receded in favor of French in French Morocco" (Laskier, 1983, p. 280). Being educated in French and speaking French encouraged Gallicization of names and Westernization of attire, infiltrating even the countryside, or the *bled* (Laskier, 1983). These linguistic and cultural transformations paralleled similar evolutions in the sphere of public space. Prior to having received a French education, most Moroccan Jews lived in the *mellah*, or Jewish ghetto, where Jews had once been forced to live, segregated from other speech communities. As a result of their French education and new avenues towards social progress, many were able to move to highly sought after housing in the European districts, the *villes européenes*. By doing so, they would not only leave the ghetto for more luxurious accommodations, but also "strengthen their ties with the Europeans through integration into their communities" (Laskier, 1983, p. 278).

4.2.3 Schools for Non-Jewish Moroccans: Elite and Non-elite, Arab and Berber

Whereas Jewish students were to be lifted from their misery through education and Europeans were to direct the new economy, the French authorities envisioned that non-Jewish, Arab Moroccan students, labeled as "Muslim" by protectorate officials, were to receive a practical education necessary to operate in a modern economy without uprooting them from their social origins (Hardy, 1924) in

schools labeled broadly as *écoles franco-musulmanes*. In order to encourage attachments with the new regime, instruction in the French language was necessary, but only as a means to inculcating French ways among these Moroccans. The French believed that introducing these Moroccan students to French education would encourage them to think in French ways, assimilating French ideas and improving their technique (Merrouni, 1983). On a moral level, the colonial authorities believed this French instruction would achieve the goal of pacifying the country while tactically enabling commercial transactions and provide public servants for the newly created French administration, which lacked low-level translators and auxiliaries.

The French administration devised separate schools for Arab Moroccans disseminating secular instruction on the basis of traditional social hierarchies and social origin, as established by the dahir of August 20, 1920 (Merrouni, 1983). By respecting social hierarchies, local languages, mores, and religion as much as possible and by prioritizing mutual cultural respect and safeguarding traditional institutions, the French hoped that their presence would not radically transform society (Merrouni, 1983). This slow evolution towards modernity was accelerated for the higher social classes because this group, who attended the more rigorous schools, needed such an education in order to perform a larger function in the developing economy. The primary schools, the *écoles de fils de notables*, and the secondary schools, the *collèges musulmans*, were created for the elite Arab Moroccans. For the less affluent Arabs, the primary schools were divided among urban communities, or the *écoles urbaines,* and the rural communities, the *écoles rurales.* At the secondary level for

the general public, the *écoles professionelles* were created in order to encourage the professionalism of various trades necessary for the emerging economy (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928; Marty, 1925; Merrouni, 1983).

4.2.3.1 Schools for the Moroccan elite

The French *écoles des fils des notables* primary schools, designed exclusively for Arab students of higher social status as the sons of Muslim nobles, were developed to cultivate the sons of the Moroccan aristocracy in areas of administration, commerce, and the traditional professions of Moroccan nobles. The students at the *écoles de fils de notables*, which in 1928 included 575 total primary students at five schools throughout French Morocco (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928), were selected by the authorities based on their parents' status and loyalty to the regime with the intent that these bourgeois youth would form an elite who would later serve the protectorate government faithfully (Benzakour et al., 2000). At the very least, these schools' "purpose was to bind the fathers more closely to the French system" (Pennell, 2000, p. 177). Although the families had to pay tuition, these Francophiles would "be fluent in French" (Pennell, 2000, p. 177) and would have the option to continue their secondary studies at the *collèges franco-musulmans* located in Rabat, Fez, or Marrakesh. Afterwards, they could seek careers in commerce or the administration (Hardy, 1924). French was taught, not as a foreign language, but as a second native language (Benzakour et al., 2000; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928). The incorporation of a moderate amount of Arabic language and religious instruction

at these schools was intended to ensure that these students remained attached to social traditions of their own culture at the same time that they were introduced to secular, modern notions belonging to the French regime (Benzakour et al., 2000).

After success at the *collèges*, students with the *diplôme d'études secondaires marocaines* and, after 1930, the *baccalauréat*, were theoretically employable in the new administration as civil servants. Not until 1938 did the French authorities deem the *diplôme d'études sécondaires marocaines* as equivalent to the French *baccalauréat,* which granted access to jobs in the protectorate administration; however, such access remained highly competitive (Merrouni, 1983). These jobs as translators, assistants, and low-ranking bureaucrats in the French administration were the measure of success for these graduates because there were few opportunities to attend university, and the most respected professions, like medicine, pharmacy, and law, were primarily available to students who intended the schools for French nationals (Merrouni, 1983). Initially these *collèges* were reserved for the families from the Makhzen, or the governing elite of Morocco, but by the end of the protectorate, students from other categories of the population filled these schools. Over time, students of the privileged classes chose, instead, to seek other kinds of educational opportunities at the schools for Europeans at the same time that Moroccans from the less privileged classes came to view the schools for the Moroccan elite as a means towards greater social and economic opportunity.

4.2.3.2 Schools for the non-elite

For the general Moroccan public, the French administration created primary schools, *écoles populaires*, but varied the curricula according to rural or urban locale, *écoles urbaines* and *écoles rurales*. In the cities, students were directed towards manual labor, especially construction, and the traditional indigenous arts. In the country, they were encouraged to work in areas like agriculture, tree farming, and animal husbandry. On the coast, they were expected to work in the fishing and shipping industries. Children—almost always male children—were expected to continue in their traditional familial occupations, but with an emphasis on perfecting their manual skills (Hardy, 1924).

These schools for the general public maintained optional attendance and taught French, although limited in quality, to create a group of Moroccan foremen and agricultural workers able to communicate with French supervisors. French was intended to be taught in a practical or useful way to correspond with students' likely employment after their studies. For example, oral skills were emphasized over written skills at some schools, whereas "practical" French at the elite *école des fils des notables* referred to the ability to write commercial transactions or reports. Even so, French instruction at both the *écoles urbaines* and *écoles rurales* occupied a prominent place in the program. Whereas Arabic and religious courses were taught for 3 hours a week, French was in use 27 hours a week (Benzakour et al., 2000; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928; Merrouni, 1983). The bulk of courses—math, geography, art, and ethics (*la morale*)—was conducted in French. This instruction

did not lead to any diploma or certificate; thus, as Merrouni (1983) stated, these students could not seek employment in administration. In 1927, there were 43 urban schools with 4,284 students; in the rural zones, where nearly 80% of Moroccan Arabs lived, there were only 17 rural schools with 768 students (Benzakour et al., 2000).

4.2.3.3 Vocational schools and schools for Arab girls

In a similar vein, professional and apprenticeship programs were founded to furnish the skilled labor needed for industry. These apprenticeship programs included 4 hours of instruction a week with the goal of not only providing a practical education but also developing the manual dexterity of the children and orienting them toward the professional or vocational schools, where they would become future workers for European employers (Merrouni, 1983). French was used as a language of instruction, as in the *écoles urbaines* and *rurales*, whereas Arabic was nearly absent from the curriculum as a language of instruction (Benzakour et al., 2000). In 1927, there were 15 such schools with 520 students (Benzakour et al., 2000). By the 1950s, 7,500 students attended French professional schools (Zouggari, 2005).

The creation of professional apprenticeship programs in Morocco represented the first serious endeavor to educate female, non-Jewish Moroccans. At the beginning of the protectorate, the only opportunity for these Moroccans to attend school was to enroll in the schools offered by Christian missions or, for a very few among the elite, to study with a private tutor. Though schools that girls could attend were rarely located in the interior, a few Catholic schools operated in Meknes and

Midelt, one of which offered training in embroidery and carpet weaving. Likewise, Protestant missions also created schools, such as those offered by the Scottish missions in Marrakesh and Mogador (the present-day coastal city of Essaouira), where English, not French, was the language of the curriculum. Though initial experience in Algeria and in the Protestant missions in Morocco demonstrated that vocational schools tended to attract only the poorest students seeking commissions for their handiwork (Paye, 1957), over time, education for girls in the vocational schools appealed increasingly to a variety of Arab Moroccan families.

Unlike the considerable percentage of girls attending Jewish or European schools, few girls of Moroccan Arab or of Berber origin attended school unless it was to learn a trade. In 1913, the first French-funded workshop school where the girls learned carpet weaving and needlework, opened in Salé with the assistance of a female scholar of Arabic from the Paris Oriental Language School, Louise Bouillot (Irbouh, 2005). According to Irbouh (2005), Mme. Bouillot successfully befriended a *ma'alma*, a female teacher of crafts, who taught embroidery, lace-work, and weaving in her home in Salé to an average of 30 girls. After a year of assisting the direction and the production of these crafts with financing from the French protectorate, Mme. Bouillot's workshop became the most successful in all of Morocco with the support of the *ma'alma*, her students, and the community. Besides reporting on the closed female sector of the society, Bouillot's largest accomplishment was the trust and positive influence that she was able to build between herself, a French *roumiya*, or Christian outsider, and the local population. By 1917, such increasing support let to

requests by students and their families to include oral French lessons, in addition to more general subjects.

A year after Mme Bouillot's success at the Salé school, existing workshops "with efficient teaching methods and well-controlled labour" (Irbouh, 2005 p. 119), like the Rabat workshop of Ben Gnaoui in 1914, were updated by implementing general education courses as well as courses in French and Arabic. Then, workshops similar to the Salé model were initiated in Fez in 1915 and elsewhere soon after. Incentives for girls to attend these schools varied from the attraction of school cafeterias to offering clothing as gifts and commissions for their handiwork. The success of most of these schools was, at first, largely due to the representation of the poorer students who sought the promise of lucrative careers in order to improve their chances in the marriage market (Knibeihler et al., 1992). By teaching subjects pertaining to household management, these schools ultimately altered the marriage prospects of most students, poor or affluent, and increased the likely sum of the dowry (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).

After 1921, the arrival of the *fqiha*, a female Qur'anic instructor, attracted affluent families to send their daughters, because the *fqiha*'s presence guaranteed an Islamic education alongside a vocational one (Paye, 1957). In 1928, there were 1,000 students enrolled in these workshops, most of whom by then originated from among the highest social classes of the population. Of the eight such schools in operation in 1928, six offered elective French lessons on the condition that the parents requested it; however, the language of instruction remained overwhelmingly Arabic. By the

mid-1930s, the presence of the *fqiha* became less critical in attracting students; 12 of 20 schools did not employ one (Paye, 1957). The lack of qualified female Moroccans, both *fqihas* and Moroccan female teachers of other subjects, reinforced the necessity for French administrators to recruit female French nationals as instructors, who, as a consequence, taught increasingly more French in these schools in addition to modern general studies (Paye, 1957). These schools with the greatest French instruction recruited the highest number of students, particularly those from the elite classes, and had the most regular attendance by 1934 (Paye, 1957).

As early as 1925, Moroccans began to seek more formal education for this population of non-Jewish girls. The Arab, Moroccan, male elite who had been educated in the French-language *collèges* and *écoles de fils de notables* had asked that Moroccan girls be educated so that their sons could find wives with similar modern and Western ideals (Knibiehler et al., 1992). Increasingly, parents requested greater study of the French language in the curriculum for girls as they began to value a modern general education similar to the opportunities that offered to their sons. Not until 1938, however, did girls have the opportunity to select a modern education in lieu of a vocational or handicraft education. Then, in 1942, the *certificat d'études primaires des fillettes musulmanes* was instituted, which finally permitted girls to attend secondary school and thus find job opportunities other than as domestic servants.

After the war, the rate of non-Jewish Moroccan girls attending any of the colonial schools increased more than that of any other section of the population, but

their presence was still below the rates of European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber boys. In 1944, there were 7,000 girls, compared to a combined 34,000 Arab and Berber boys in modern French education out of a total 1 million eligible students (Knibiehler et al., 1992). Less than 10 years later in 1953, approximately 35,000 girls were attending colonial schools in contrast to 225,000 Arab and Berber Moroccan boys (Knibiehler et al., 1992). By the end of the protectorate, whereas 18% of boys from Muslim communities attended school, only 6% of girls did likewise.

4.2.3.4 Schools for Berbers

As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the French believed that the Berbers were a special people who deserved to be French speaking and de-Islamicized. In this vein, schools for Berbers followed educational initiatives that favored their assimilation as part of the *mission civilisatrice* strategy. Therefore, schools were created among Berber communities as a part of a larger French mission to pacify the countryside, gain the sympathies of Berber communities after years of hostility, and privilege communities that were thought to be ethnically similar to the French.

Instead of "favoring the spread of the Arabic language and of Islamic law" (Burke, 1973, p. 196) as the French had done in Algeria, the French government in Morocco ensured that "there were Berber-speaking officers attached to each post in Berber country, so that the spread of the Arabic language would not be unwittingly encouraged" (Burke, 1973, p. 196) and would never come to serve as a language of broader communication. The recruitment of Berber-speaking officers to serve in

Berber-speaking areas lessened the need for Arabic translators or interpreters, it was believed, as all oral interactions and written reports were eventually to be completed in French (Burke, 1973). The fact that Berber languages were not written or codified only encouraged the belief among the French that language shift to French was likely (Paye, 1957).

Schools were considered the perfect mechanism to assimilate Berbers into French culture and language and to discourage Arabization or Islamicization. The French indigenous affairs officers, the regional superiors tasked with oversight of all local activities, were instrumental in this process because they served as teachers or directors of these schools, often bridging intimate relationships with the local populations (Burke, 1973). In other cases, French-speaking teachers were recruited only among those of French or Berber origin (Benhlal, 2005). French-Berber schools were to employ only the French language (Benhlal, 2005; Benzakour et al., 2000), and Arabic was forbidden even as an intermediary language between teacher and students. The creation of Berber schools began in 1923 with six schools in the Middle Atlas; each had fewer than 20 students (Merrouni, 1983) and was established in a region that was home to a military administration office, indigenous infirmary, and a market (Benhlal, 2005). The first Berber schools were set up in the villages of Imouzzer, Ain Cheggag, Azrou, Ain Leuh, Khenifra, and El Qbab. These schools welcomed fewer than 120 students in 1923; by 1928, only 5 years later, there were 18 schools with 742 students (Benzakour et al., 2000; Merrouni, 1983). These schools had only mediocre success and many dissolved soon after their opening. Despite

varied efforts at recruitment through medical, nutritional, and financial incentives, the schools' fixed locations did not appeal to families who often moved around as migratory herders or farmers. In the end, these schools failed as a result of irregular student attendance; the neglect to include Qur'anic education in the curriculum; and the failure of French officials to recognize the social importance of the *fiqh*, or the religious instructor, within Berber communities.

At the secondary level, the *collège d'Azrou* expanded in 1930 from the primary school offering artisanal, agricultural, and teaching courses to offering advanced studies that prepared students to attend the prestigious military school, *Dar Beïda* in Meknes. The *collège*, like the *collège de Fès* or the *collège de Marrakesh*, was intended to educate the Berber elite who, as French speakers, would fill necessary administrative jobs in Berber-speaking regions. These graduates were to provide a counterweight to the Moroccan French-speaking elite employed in administrative jobs in the cities. The *collège d'Azrou* was only slightly more successful at recruiting students than the various primary schools created for Berbers were because it offered the *certificat d'études secondaires musulmanes* and eventual, although limited, access to professional opportunities.

Like the *collèges musulmans*, this school attempted to attract the elite and higher social classes among Berbers. However, mostly transient and low-income Berber families from afar were drawn to this school, encouraged by the presence of a dormitory, which assured the material well-being of their sons. Attempts at recruiting the intended population, the elite and higher socioeconomic classes, were evidently

not successful, as 80% of all students were from modest or poor socioeconomic origins, as indicated by statistics from 1929–1958 (Benhlal, 2005). Furthermore, the majority of those who attended this school never successfully completed their education; only 8.8% of the entire student body at the *collège d'Azrou* received the *certificat d'études primaires musulmanes*. Only 5.7% received the highest diploma, the *certificat d'études secondaires musulmanes*, compared to the results of the *collège musulman de Fès*, where 28% received the *certificat d'études secondaires musulmanes* (Benhlal, 2005).

Besides the especially low number of Berber students attending or finishing French protectorate schools, the recruitment of Algerian teachers in the Berber classroom undermined the French goals of educating Berbers. Protectorate officials, in particular school officials like Paul Marty, reported as early as 1923 that some of the Algerian Kabyle teachers who had been recruited to teach in the Berber schools because of their mastery of French and the assumed linguistic and cultural similarity between Berber communities were teaching Arabic and Islam or encouraging their students to attend neighboring Qur'anic schools (Merrouni, 1983). Arabic-speaking students were more attracted to the schools for Berbers than were Berber speakers. As a result, some schools had to close "because [the schools for Berbers] had too high a proportion of Arab boys" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 250), whose presence altered the nature of the intended curriculum. "If the school was in a town, it was difficult to keep Arab children away: if it was in the deepest *bled* no one came" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 250). In order to recruit students and to meet the demands from parents and communities, the

French authorities finally introduced Arabic into the academic program at the primary schools and the *collège d'Azrou* in 1931, although minimally at only 1–2 hours weekly, while the Berber language was taught only as an elective (Rivet, 2005).

Despite efforts to create a French-speaking Berber milieu through French schools, Berbers rejected speaking French in favor of speaking Arabic, even if this language was unknown to most Berbers before the involvement of the French in Morocco. In 1923, a French officer noted that a Tamazight speaker who was only able to speak a few words of Arabic became more motivated to master this language as the French pacification campaign progressed. When a French officer spoke to Berbers in their native language, they would often respond in Arabic as an indication of their opposition to French policies (Merrouni, 1983). At the *collège d'Azrou*, "attempts to resist Arabic influences were carried to the length of rebuking boys who called themselves 'ben' Foulan [a common naming pattern in Arabic] instead of using the Berber 'ou' [Foulan]" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 251).

The primary and secondary French-Berber schools, in particular the Berber *collège d'Azrou*, never achieved the goal of creating French-speaking Berbers to any serious degree. Even if students learned French during their 2 years of study, they quickly forgot it, especially given the lack of other French speakers who inhabited the mountainous zones (Paye, 1957). Native Affairs officers found the graduates of Berber schools to be no use for their purposes since "knowledge of Arabic was needed in every bureau" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 251). Given that students at Berber schools were only taught minimal Arabic, their skills remained inferior to those of

their *collège musulman* compatriots. As a result, Berber students were unable to perform the jobs for which they had supposedly been trained, specifically as interpreters or secretaries to customary tribal courts, where Arabic was often necessary (Paye 1957). Beginning in 1939, French authorities were thereby forced to reinstate and increase the number of hours of instruction of Arabic in Berber schools (Benhlal, 2005).

These linguistic trends toward a preference for Arabic among former students had parallels within the community at large. In 1942, a Native Affairs officer reported that after 24 years of Berber schools, 16,000 of the population of 21,000 spoke Arabic and 20 spoke French (Bidwell, 1973; Paye, 1957). In spite of regional, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, there was tremendous uniformity among Berbers in language preference, as Arabization became widespread geographically and chronologically. "During the protectorate there was a constant movement into a more advanced stage of Arabization" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 49), and "at the end of the protectorate, the Berbers were better [more observant] Muslims than they had ever been" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 55). Attempts at educating Berbers failed because "whatever the French tried to do, to educate was to Arabize" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 55). Despite the efforts to co-opt Berbers through the education system, the French found that the Berbers "did not reject the idea of assimilation, but it was assimilation to the Arabs and not to the French that they sought" (Bidwell, 1973, p. 56).

The first generation of students to enter the *collège d'Azrou* included proportionately more students from the higher social classes than those from the

lower social classes; however, after 1940, the French instruction and culture taught in this school became a prerequisite for social advancement among all social classes (Benhlal, 2005). Of the 2,090 students registered at the *collège d'Azrou* between 1927 and 1959, only 10–20% was considered to have come from the elite class, despite the intent to serve the upper class. The economic and status disparity of social groups attending this institution further influenced the eventual perceived value of the institution. After 1945, the elite no longer sought enrollment at the *collège d'Azrou* because it did not provide them increased social prestige; on the contrary, the less fortunate, making up 80% of students there, saw this institution as an opportunity for social mobility (Benhlal, 2005), an opportunity that was otherwise unavailable to them.

Over time, the schools designed for Berbers lost prestige in favor of the schools created for Arab Moroccans. In fact, Berber students came to view their milieu and the schools created for them as inferior to any of these school's urban counterparts, the *collèges musulmans* in Fez, Rabat, and Marrakesh (Paye, 1957). Success at the *collège d'Azrou* did not offer opportunities to further academic advancement at any of the other colonial schools. There were no *baccalauréat* equivalents with European schools or at the schools for Arabs and, therefore, no path to access higher education. No enhanced professional opportunities were available to graduates, as the quantity and quality of professional opportunities offered Berber students were purposely limited to serving colonial interests within Berber territories. For these reasons, many Berbers, especially those of the higher social and economic

classes, viewed education at the *collèges musulmans* intended for Arab Moroccans as superior to that of the *collège d'Azrou,* which was seen as a dead end (Rivet, 2005). Berber Moroccans, especially the elite who continued to seek a quality education and social distinction, ultimately sought to enroll their sons in institutions where *baccalauréat* preparation was possible, where courses in Arabic and Islamic studies were included, and where overall instruction was considered more prestigious (Benhlal, 2005; Paye, 1957), such as that offered at the *collège musulmans*.

4.3 Educational Alternatives: European, Traditional, and Free Schools

Many Moroccan students did not enjoy the same access to modern education as that available to European or Jewish students, so many Arabs and Berbers sought an education outside institutions sponsored by the colonial power. Three years before independence, in 1953, only 10% of the Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans (137,170 students out of a possible 1.360 million) were educated in French schools (Cerych, 1964; Laskier, 1994). Comparatively, in 1952, after 40 years of French rule, 90% of the European population was enrolled in school (67,722 total students), and 60–70% of the Moroccan Jewish population (32,967 total students) was enrolled in French schools (Laskier, 1994). The French rationalized these low attendance rates by proposing that educating fewer Moroccans was a way to avoid upsetting traditional society and creating social unrest; in that way, disseminating a high-quality education for a few Moroccans was more important than focusing on the total quantity of students educated (Merrouni, 1983).

Of the 10% of non-Jewish Moroccan in French schools, 97.5% attended primary schools, only 2.2% attended classes the secondary level, and barely 0.3% pursued a higher education (Merrouni, 1983). Bidwell (1973) calculated that only 1,500 Moroccans had finished secondary school, and only 42,000 had a primary school education by 1958. The underrepresentation of Moroccan students at the secondary levels of education was largely due to the 90% dropout rate at the primary level (Cerych, 1964). When non-Jewish Moroccan students were offered opportunities to attend classes leading to the *baccalauréat* after 1930, all students able to do so at *collège Moulay–Idriss* in Fez chose this option, even if it meant certain failure. The *baccalauréat* had gained so much prestige in opening doors to better schools and higher education that nearly all Arab and Berber students chose this option over the less prestigious courses of study that did not lead to advanced study, even though they almost never succeeded in passing the *baccalauréat* exam.

After completing their studies, Arab and Berber Moroccan students, even those educated at the better colonial *écoles* and *collèges*, encountered challenges of many sorts. To begin with, their education was generally deemed inferior to that received at Jewish schools or those catering primarily to European students, an assumption made by both Europeans and Moroccans. In fact, such a perception was likely long justified because the diplomas granted to Arab and non-Jewish Berber secondary students, the *diplôme d'études secondaires musulmanes*, the only terminal degree for non-Jewish students until 1930, were not granted equivalency in terms of access to higher education and administrative jobs to the diplomas of institutions

serving Jews or Europeans until 1938 (Merrouni, 1983). Though Arab and Berber students were finally granted the opportunity to prepare for and take the *baccalauréat* exam at the *collège musulman* in 1930, this achievement was judged to be only theoretically equivalent to the *bac* from one of the *lycées* designed to serve European students—although this exam, only offered initially in Latin, was considered one of the most difficult of the *baccalauréat* exams (Merrouni, 1983).

In lieu of attending schools created for Arab and Berber Moroccans, a number sought to enroll in French schools created for Europeans. They and their families recognized that these schools disseminated the most valuable and necessary credentials to access secondary and tertiary educational institutions and the elite positions that came with such an education. Yet, at the primary level, Moroccans were forbidden to enroll in these schools when a school created especially for the Arab or Berber community was available to them. At the secondary level, dissuasion was protocol. Parents were advised that by attending a school not designed to meet the Arabic language and Islamic needs of their child, he would be permanently uprooted from his cultural milieu; however, in some cases, permission was granted to certain elite Moroccans or children, particularly sons, of civil servants (Benzakour et al., 2000). Moroccans from humble social backgrounds found their opportunities even more restricted. Pennell (2000) recounted the story of Mehdi ben Ahmed Ben Barka, a future leader of the nationalist campaign in Morocco, "the son of a small shopkeeper in Rabat, who, [extremely bright], sat at the front door of a French school for three months until the headmaster's wife intervened and got him admitted" (p.

228). Because of his success at French schools set up for Europeans, he was eventually able to alter his career opportunities as a tutor to Mohammed V's son, the future King Hassan II, and become an influential member of the *Istiqlal* Nationalist Party.

Although primary schools designed for European children remained off limits, after the dahirs of October 28, 1944, and November 28, 1944, select Muslim students were awarded the legal privilege of attending European *lycées* (Merrouni, 1983) with evidence of great aptitude and sufficient knowledge of French. Similarly, in regards to access at the AIU schools, "from time to time Muslim youths, too, were represented at the AIU notably in the coastal towns. Most of them, however, despite an open-door policy, chose not to attend, and only a handful of youths coming from affluent families welcomed the schools" (Laskier, 1983, p. 116). Eventually, however, the restrictive policies of attending the European schools were relaxed in response to demands by nationalists. By 1955, there were 1,599 non-Jewish Moroccan students in secondary European schools, compared to 4,600 in the secondary schools created for them. Shortly before independence, Arab and Berber students were finally granted admission in European primary schools, although they were still largely underrepresented (Cerych, 1964).

Alternatively, some Moroccan students chose not to attend French schools because they or their families either were suspicious of being proselytized or maintained a general distrust of education based on Western curricula, which could not at the time be divorced from Christianity (Pennell, 2000). Some parents

mistrusted the segregated French system of education on the grounds that it clearly offered Moroccan students fewer and more limited opportunities. Therefore, some Moroccans preferred sending their children to traditional Islamic schools that continued to teach Arabic and the Islamic sciences during the French protectorate. These schools included the primary *msid*s schools, the *medersa*s or *zaouia*s secondary schools, and the Islamic universities of *Qarawiyin* and *Ben Yusuf*. The material conditions in these schools were dismal: students of different ages and levels were seated on the ground in a single dark and dingy room. These schools did not lead to any certificate or diploma; they taught the Qur'an as it had always been taught: through rote memorization (Knibiehler et al., 1992). In 1920, 100,000 students out of a possible 800,000 attended Qur'anic schools, but only 10,000 learned to read and write; 2,000 attended courses in mosques and *zaouias* (Knibiehler et al., 1992). At independence in 1956, 120,000–150,000 students out of a total population of less than 8 million school-aged children studied at the *msids*, and at the secondary level, there were 2,000 students. In comparison to the enrollment in French schools, the primary *msid* in Casablanca in 1949 accepted 9,462 students as compared to 6,685 students enrolled in French schools for Arab Moroccans in Casablanca (Benzakour et al., 2000). As these numbers indicate, more non-Jewish Moroccan students attended traditional institutions than attended modern French institutions—if they went to school at all, of course.

In response to the limited opportunities for Arab and Berber students to learn the modern subjects—specifically, Western philosophy, mathematics, and the social

and physical sciences—Moroccans devised two different types of alternative schools to the French colonial schools. First, many Moroccans felt traditional education at the traditional *msid* school was inadequate in pedagogy and content because of the reliance on memorization of the Qur'an and a complete focus on the Islamic sciences. In response, a movement arose to renovate the traditional primary school, the *msid renové*, and the curriculum of many of the existing traditional Qur'anic schools was modernized by adding more modern subjects like science to the existing curricula. Because these renovated schools continued to prioritize the Arab-Islamic character of the former *msid*, a second type of school, the free schools, or the *écoles libres* and *écoles privées*, were created in 1919 as an alternative to traditional education at the *msid.* These schools offered a modern education nearly identical to that offered at the French protectorate schools but with more emphasis on the Arabic language, Moroccan history, and Arabo-Islamic culture. Influential Muslim community members who believed that instruction in the Arabic language, the Islamic faith, and moral education was lacking in the French protectorate schools assisted in the development of these schools by investing great sums of money, often staffing the schools as teachers and administrators. Similar to free schools in content, bilingual free schools emphasized a French-language education alongside the instruction of CA and MSA.

Arabic was the intended language of instruction for almost all subjects in these alternative schools, including the introduction of modern topics not previously taught in religious schools. By the mid-1930s, the free schools had become more

popular. Some free schools contested French authority by promoting nationalistic discourse; not surprisingly, they hired teachers who were members of the budding nationalist political party, the *Istiqlal*. These schools taught subjects like national literature, Moroccan history, and local geography, subjects not offered in French schools because they were deemed controversial or destabilizing. Furthermore, they taught these subjects from very different perspectives than the French one.

The initial success of free schools was remarkable given that these institutions depended on limited financial backing of community members and lacked a centralized authority to oversee their creation, curricula, and daily functioning. In 1925, there were 30 such schools in many cities throughout Morocco, with 1,500–2,000 students, although only eight free schools endured throughout the term of the protectorate (Damis, 1970). By 1944, there were 6,000–8,000 students, compared to 35,000 in protectorate public schools (Damis, 1970). Despite repressive French efforts to counter these institutions, by 1947–1948, the apogee of their success, there were nearly 25,000 students in free schools, with twice that number still in protectorate schools.

Bilingual free schools with instruction in both Arabic and French were deemed the most prestigious institutions among the free schools. The first of these was the *M'hammed Guessous* school created in 1934 in Rabat by Ahmed Balafrej, a former student at the *collège musulman* and the free school *Wazzahra.* He had earned a *baccalauréat* from *Henri IV* in Paris as well as a *licence* and a *diplôme d'études supérieures* from the *Sorbonne* and was also one of the founders of the *Istiqlal*

(Damis, 1970). Although tuition was high at 200–250 francs a month, there were 500 students in 1943, and by 1946, one third of the students were girls (Damis, 1970), indicating the degree of social acceptance and influence these institutions came to acquire. The higher than average percentage of female students attending these schools also offers insight into the evolving attitudes of non-Jewish Moroccans toward the education of girls, as long as this education was at least partially in Arabic and included culturally relevant topics for the Moroccans. The high-quality instruction at the bilingual free schools was granted equivalency to that of the *écoles des fils de notables*, and their students were able to earn the certificate of Muslim primary studies, the *certificat d'études primaires musulmane,* granted by the French colonial government, giving them access to the protectorate secondary schools (Damis, 1970).

French officials recognized the education at the bilingual free schools as high quality since the only difference between the French public school and bilingual free school was "a greater emphasis on the Arabic language and Islam" (Damis, 1970, p. 138). By contrast, students at the other free schools, that is, those that did not emphasize instruction in both languages, did not receive such recognition or similar diplomas despite a rigorous, 5-year elementary program. By 1951, there were nine bilingual free schools with larger enrollments than the other types of free schools, with 600–700 students housed in new modern buildings and boasting directors who "were often graduates of the [French] public schools, distinguished personalities in their own right, and important members of the nationalist parties" (Damis, 1970, pp.

137–138). A number of directors and teachers in these schools had received their education in French schools early in the protectorate. Thus, an education with instruction in French or French and Arabic at the few bilingual free schools offered opportunities that the traditional or renovated religious schools, which focused on instruction in CA alone, could not. Thus, the growing influence of these schools and the diplomas offered at each led Moroccans to associate a French education at any of the colonial schools and bilingual free schools with greater prestige and success.

In 1945, protectorate officials endorsed the creation of the elementary Arabic certificate, offering the first opportunity for the standardization of curricula and access to secondary or higher education for graduates of all free schools, an obstacle that had previously impeded student recruitment. Most who obtained this certificate, who before this date were eligible only to attend secondary studies at the *Qarawiyin* or *Ben Yusuf* Moroccan Islamic universities, now had access to secondary education, though not in the French schools in Morocco or France. After 4 years and the *brevet* obtained at the end of the secondary level, they were eligible to continue their studies in universities of the Middle East, a great step forward since "none of them went on to the *Qarawiyin*, which [they saw as representing] a step backward after the modern orientation of the elementary and secondary curricula in the free schools" (Damis, 1970, p. 190). The students at all of the combined free schools, numbering substantially fewer than those who attended colonial schools, clearly demonstrated a preference for a modern education, a preference similar to the graduates of French colonial schools, even if most of them were instructed in Arabic and not French.

After completing their education, the large majority of these Arabic-trained graduates worked as apprentices or teachers in the free schools, however, since they were not competitive in the new economy, which favored French-trained students from the protectorate schools or the bilingual free schools.

4.4 Selection of Students

As Bourdieu and Passeron's (1970/2000) social reproduction theory would predict, the colonial government's selection of students from the most important social classes to attend the most esteemed institutions ensured that French cultural knowledge came to be perceived as prestigious and legitimate in protectorate Morocco. Graduates of these institutions, in turn, legitimized colonial power and domination by becoming employees in the protectorate administration and future leaders of the protectorate. Graduates who became community and business leaders perpetuated this system of gatekeeping since they had come to believe in the institution and in the validity of the system in which they were successful. Recruiting students from influential socioeconomic origins, already predisposed to accessing influential social roles and those more easily indoctrinated to believe in the legitimacy of authority, reproduced similarly inclined graduates and further legitimized the educational initiatives of the colonial government.

> Recruitment procedures are so obviously designed to guarantee [educational institutions] students already endowed, through their background, with the dispositions they require that we have to wonder whether, as the Romans used to say, they aren't merely "teaching fish to swim." (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 73)

The most predisposed to excel in French schools and the most likely role models to perpetuate the dominance of the regime were students from the European communities, especially those who shared a common primary *habitus* with that of the secondary one taught at school, in addition to the elite Arab and Berber Moroccans, for whom a French education guaranteed their distinction and legitimacy. Co-opting those already privileged, deemed deserving because of their high social standing, in addition to the few who succeeded in the competitive system, effectively maintained the status quo and guaranteed the reproduction of authority by like-minded agents.

The schools for Europeans, the *écoles de fils de notables,* and the *collèges* openly restricted enrollment on the basis of social background. In other cases, students were instead selected to advance to higher grade levels based on the results of *concours*, or competitive examinations, like those employed at the AIU. The use of highly competitive exams served an alternative gatekeeping function that ensured the prestige of the system with the appearance of minimizing discriminatory enrollment practices. However, by encouraging meritocracy, such a system still largely favored those from more privileged social backgrounds. Often, students who succeeded in these prestigious schools already possessed or were quickly coming to possess a *habitus* that was generally similar to that taught at the schools because of their increased contact with French officials, the reliance of their families upon colonial policy, and thus their increased motivation or need to acquire the French language.

A few highly motivated Moroccan students were occasionally granted admittance to this system but often at tremendous odds due to greater differences between their primary *habitus* and the educational environment. These students from less privileged backgrounds were selected occasionally to attend the best schools or invited to participate in this reproductive process as long as they mastered, and came to value, the cultural knowledge belonging to the dominant class, often simultaneously enforcing the devaluation of their primary *habitus*. "Inculcation at school … works to exclude the children of the working classes. What is inculcated at school is not so much knowledge that can be useful to the child but the value of the legitimacy of the dominant culture" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 49).

These students succeeded against tremendous odds, which only increased the likelihood that they became legendary figures like Mehdi Ben Barka, mentioned earlier. Mastery at French schools rendered these graduates more dedicated proponents of the educational system, by virtue of their investment in the system, and reinforced the legitimacy of the curriculum for onlookers when unlikely candidates overcame obstacles. For example, not only did Ben Barka succeed at the school for Europeans once he was accepted into the *lycée*, but he later bolstered the importance of this French education for others when he became a tutor to the future king of Morocco, Hassan II, and as an influential member of the nationalist party. The rags-to-palace tutor story of individuals like Ben Barka illustrated that exceptional individuals could overcome adversity through mastering a French education. Further, an education worthy of a king that also emphasized meritocracy over social origins

further strengthened the perception of French education as important, dominant, and legitimate.

When the French authorities restricted who was eligible to study at the prestigious schools, the number and backgrounds of Moroccan students who sought enrollment at these schools shifted over time, displaying a clear preference for the schools for Europeans. As the *école de fils de notables* or the *collèges* became progressively more populated by students from the lower socioeconomic classes, many socially and economically prosperous Moroccans sought exclusivity by circumventing restrictions to attend European schools. The European schools were increasingly becoming the schools of choice for sons of the elite because of their competitive admission requirements, the access they offered to advanced diplomas, and the prospect of becoming members of the most influential group of people living in the country (Paye, 1957). In all, Arab, Berber, and Jewish students combined comprised only 12% of all students attending schools for Europeans at independence (Benzakour et al., 2000). The fact that only a few Moroccans had been able to attend these prestigious schools, which were intended to provide professional opportunities for a small French-educated minority, nearly all of European and especially French origin, increased the profit of distinction these students received in the marketplace.

Because of the merit-based selection criteria employed at the AIU, some Jewish students from the middle and lower middle class were able to enroll in schools for Europeans and alter their lot in life as members of the new elite (Laskier, 1983). Additionally, the sorting of Arab and non-Jewish Berber students from "relatively

affluent families" (Laskier, 1983, p. 305) to attend the prestigious *collèges* and *lycées* ensured that these graduates would receive the profit of distinction necessary to access better employment and positions of power upon completion of their studies. Among them, Ahmad Balafrej, Muhammad al Kholti, and Muhammad al-Wazani continued in their families' pursuit of distinction by embodying this esteemed French education and accessed important positions within the nationalist parties. Because of the selection criteria to enroll in the best institutions, either due to highly competitive merit-based criteria or as a result of a families' prominence, graduates were assured social prestige and socioeconomic opportunity. In some cases, they ascended to important positions of power after independence.

4.5 The Diversity of the Teaching Staff

No less important than the selection of students to attend the most prestigious institutions like the schools for Europeans, the quality of the teaching staff at those schools played a large role in certifying that institution as prestigious as well as predicting the future success of individual students. By restricting the number of students who could access the subsequent levels of study, the teacher upheld the prestigious reputation of the school. More importantly, however, the teacher, the gatekeeper to dominant cultural knowledge in Morocco, determined which students would succeed at each of those institutions and, thus, determined eligibility to access French dominant cultural knowledge. Teachers in Morocco, themselves invested in

and by the school system, were the most prominent proponents and leaders of the reproductive system.

> [The school] only fully succeeds when it preaches to the converted: teachers' children and those students who are like oblates, being devoted from a very early age to a school they cannot criticize since they owe it everything and expect everything from it in return, the "miracle children" from the dominated regions of the social world. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 104)

Motivated by their own personal experience and dedication to formal instruction, the best teachers having been educated in France, these masters of cultural knowledge became representatives of the French educational system and the power it represented; as gatekeepers, they rewarded students who embodied French educational ideals but not others. As Reed-Danahay (2005) noted,

> [Bourdieu] termed [the educational] community a "magical prison" of which the teachers were "ostensibly the guards," even though they were themselves prisoners/products of the same system. The teachers exert their influence through the "charisma of office" and "consecrate" the students by awarding prizes, titles, and certificates. (p. 51)

This direct influence over the success of their students, their embodiment of cultural knowledge, and their belief in the necessity of such knowledge, in addition to their esteemed position in the community, gave teachers tremendous authority over the future of their students. Thanks to their extensive experience in the French educational system and the great symbolic capital they derived from it, teachers in the most prestigious schools in Morocco were the most prominent advocates of French as dominant cultural knowledge. In turn, the French school system in Morocco legitimized the status of teachers as distinguished products of these institutions and valuable producers of future leaders at the same time that it relied on their dedication

and authority as artifacts, products, and perpetuators of this system. Bourdieu (1996) described the relationship between teachers and the institution as

> possessed individuals who perform the institution's every wish because they are the institution-made man (or woman), and who, whether dominated or dominant, can submit to it or fully exercise its necessity only because they have incorporated it, they are of one body with it, they give body to it. (p. 3)

More significant than student selection alone, the teacher determined the sustainability of the French colonial educational system (and hence the social order) by having spread a collective belief in the system, then having inculcated dominant cultural knowledge, and ultimately having selected which students would succeed via the granting of diplomas that, at least in theory, permitted graduates to advance to higher levels of socioeconomic prestige.

Consistent with the diversity of educational programs and hierarchy of schools in Morocco, the teaching staff at each of the various institutions was neither uniformly trained nor followed a consistent methodology. The AIU schools were the most efficient at recruiting highly trained teachers and those most committed to the ideology of an educating mission in eliminating Jewish poverty and misery. "With their skills … [these teachers at the AIU] could have easily found more lucrative positions, [but they found] … a devotion to their jobs, an ideological and moral commitment to their work" (Rodrigue, 1993, p. 62).

Not only were AIU teachers similar ideologically and in their dedication to the cause, but they also were hard working and displayed a thirst for knowledge that assisted them in overcoming difficulties they commonly experienced in adapting to

life when they studied and lived in France (Chouraqui, 1965). After having experienced oppression of various sorts in a Muslim society, such commitment among these teachers to improving the lot of fellow Jews was often stronger than that of the French to their civilizing mission.

Frequently chosen from among former students even at the young age of 14, these future teachers of the AIU were sent to prepare their careers for 2–3 years at the *École normale israélite orientale* in Paris. Here, they were indoctrinated far away from their families while surrounded by like-minded students in the Europeanized Jewish community of Paris, the capital of the Francophone world and the cultural center from which, they were taught, modern culture emanated. Their alienation from their home communities and new socialization only increased their zeal to realize a common educational objective through the inculcation of French culture and language. As a practical necessity, French became the language of instruction for all subjects except religious ones and a necessity to communicate between internationally recruited students and teachers. With French as the classroom language and the influence of similarly ideologically minded Francophile teachers, approaches to education for Jewish children taught at AIU schools were modeled on and became similar to those of French-born Jews who had assimilated French culture in contrast to those found among the Orthodox Jews in France.

Teachers at the AIU, thanks to their mastery of the French language and culture, became the "first systematically westernizing Jewish elite" of the Middle East (Rodrigue, 1993, p. 71). As a result of such fervor and careful indoctrination,

students attending AIU schools abroad inherited this zeal for French culture, language, modern disciplines, and education. Through their evolved secondary *habitus*, these teachers embodied, participated in, and advocated for social change based on the Western model and "became the Western Jew in terms of self-representation and self-identity" (Rodrigue, 1993, p. 71). The Jewish AIU teachers became role models for students by exemplifying newly enhanced social prestige and cultural power through assimilation to the Occident.

These teachers as role models who embodied French culture and enhanced social prestige within Jewish communities increased the desire among their students to succeed in school and assimilate French culture and language as a means to improve their own dominated social status in Muslim Morocco. The French colonial system appeared to offer Jewish communities options that Muslim-dominated Morocco likely would not, so Moroccan Jews were highly motivated to gain whatever knowledge or skills from these highly influential teachers. Because of an ideologically unified, Westernized, French-speaking teacher corps in Jewish classrooms, Jewish students began to study more modern subjects, finished higher levels of education than ever before, performed better on French *concours*, and acquired skills for better employment in the French protectorate to a much higher degree than Muslim students (Laskier, 1983). With valuable linguistic and technical skills taught by highly trained Francophile teachers at the AIU, Jews were able to advance to professions or jobs that often granted them social status within the Jewish

and the larger communities or to escape the social and economic conditions that had characterized Jewish life in Morocco by emigrating abroad, beginning in 1948.

Similar to teachers at the AIU, the best, the most educated, the most ideologically unified, and the most experienced teachers among all teachers in French colonial schools in Morocco were recruited preferentially for European institutions. In contrast to the teachers at the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans, in 1917, more than 75% of teachers in European schools were qualified—that is, they were *titulaire*, meaning they held a degree—in comparison to only 45% of the personnel at all of the other schools for Moroccans. Instead, there was a higher incidence of interns, monitors, vocational instructors, and additional auxiliaries at the schools for both Jewish and non-Jewish Moroccans (Belhaj Saif, 1994). Belhaj Saif (1994) found that of all teachers in European school, three quarters had obtained the *brevet supérieur*, whereas in schools for Moroccans, only 38% had achieved the level of *brevet supérieur*, with proportionately more, 47%, having obtained only the *brevet élémentaire*. The teachers with the highest professional credentials, graduates from teaching schools and *lauréats*, or distinguished faculty, represented more than half of the recruits for European institutions but only a quarter of those in the schools for non-Jewish Moroccan students (Belhaj Saif, 1994). Furthermore, teachers at these schools for Muslim Moroccans, as compared to European and Jewish teachers, often had the least amount of teaching experience and were overwhelmingly interns, recent graduates from teaching schools, or 1st-year teachers teaching the highest classes. More than 80% of teachers sent to teach in schools for Arab and non-Jewish Berber

Moroccans arrived as interns newly graduated from teaching school or teachers with less than 3 years of experience, though they were tasked with instructing the most advanced courses (Belhaj Saif, 1994).

The teachers recruited for European schools were more culturally homogeneous, which facilitated the instruction of standard French and French culture, whereas teachers at the schools for Arab and Berber Moroccans were, as a group, more often heterogeneous in origin. These teachers at the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans came largely from French regions, departments, and austere areas, where standard French was less likely to be their native dialect than for teachers recruited for the European schools. At that time in France, the use of regionalisms and nonstandard dialectal forms was not uncommon among persons from those territories, and such teachers would certainly have been unable to embody and disseminate elite French culture. Moreover, up to 20% of the teachers in Arab and Berber schools originated from territories belonging to the French colonial empire where French was likely a second language (Belhaj Saif, 1994). The teachers in Arab and Berber schools, then, could not have reproduced the dominant and elite French culture that was taught and lived in the European schools, where teachers embodying standard French culture more effectively reproduced like-minded, privileged graduates through more uniform instruction of legitimate language and cultural knowledge.

Likewise, Arab and non-Jewish Berber students attending colonial schools did not have the same kind of teaching staff to increase the likelihood of their social mobility as the teaching staff employed at the schools for Europeans and Jews. Some

teachers of French origin instructing at the schools for Arabs Moroccans had studied Arabic, whether at the *Écoles des langues orientales* in Paris or the *Institut des hautes études du Maroc* in Rabat, but other teachers at schools for Arab Moroccans had no Arabic language skills whatsoever. Some teachers, whether of Moroccan or French origin, such as those employed in the girls' art schools, where the goal was to merely create camaraderie among the students and families in order to gain cultural and political trust within the community, had only foreign language training with no other pedagogical skills. Teachers at the Berber *collège d'Azrou* did not include any *professeurs agrégés*, or teachers who had passed the highest level of certification, the *aggrégation*, and some of the teachers did not have university degrees, including at least one vocational teacher who was unable to read or write in any language (Benhlal, 2005). In an effort to quickly set up many of the schools located in the rural outposts, many military officers were recruited to oversee daily routines at the Berber schools, and the untrained wives of military officers or colonists often volunteered to staff some of these rural schools.

As evidenced by such a range of teacher experiences, backgrounds, and language abilities, the colonial government enforced several methodologies at the schools for Arab or non-Jewish Berber students, a situation that stood in contrast to teacher preparation and practice at European or Jewish AIU schools. Though colonial officials aspired to standardize the curricula at each of the schools of the same category, the fact remains that no uniform curricula existed for the teachers at the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans. This explains, in part, why Arab and non-

Jewish Berber students, unlike Jewish or European students, displayed a preference for attending the *école de fils de notables* over regional schools, for example, as well as a preference for attending the *collège de Rabat* over the *collège d'Azrou* for Berbers, the *collège de Fès*, or the *collège de Marrakesh*. The quality and nature of the teaching staff and curriculum at Arab and Berber schools, therefore, had real consequences for the motivation of their students to pursue a French education and, thus, the degree and nature of their mastery of French.

Whereas European teachers and Jewish AIU teachers were effective in disseminating cultural knowledge in a fairly homogeneous way, teachers at the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans largely reproduced a class of underprivileged students with only limited and variable access to this knowledge. By disseminating cultural knowledge associated with the culture of the colonizer inequitably to the majority of Moroccans, the protectorate government ensured that the social hierarchy it had set up—built largely on the preexisting social hierarchies in Morocco—was largely maintained for the majority, while a small minority was able to advance to new social and economic significance. Through access to the highest quality French education disseminated uniformly by the most qualified teaching staff, the elite maintained their positions of dominance and social distinction. For a number of Moroccan Jews able to take advantage of educational opportunities led by teachers with the highest commitment to advancing the social and material condition of their students, French became an important and, for some, a primary language as their communities underwent a language shift across only a few generations. Lastly, after

having circumventing the rigorous enrollment criteria at the schools for Europeans and elite, Muslim Moroccans and having benefited from the quality instruction and teaching staff there, relatively small numbers of non-elite Moroccans with French as a second language were also able to alter their socioeconomic conditions, in some cases at the highest levels, through great aptitude and ability.

With a prestigious French education at the schools for Europeans; Jews; and elite, non-Jewish Moroccans, the lives of former students from non-elite backgrounds were profoundly altered as they moved, often against great odds, from impoverished backgrounds into social positions where they held great cultural and symbolic capital, including mastery of French and all the rights and privileges that accompanied such mastery for Moroccans. These French speakers gained sufficient cultural and symbolic power to be accepted into the colonizer's community—even though they were not accepted fully into that community. Speaking French afforded social advantages and new ways of life such that a number of Jews as well as a number of elite, non-Jewish Moroccans were able to move to neighborhoods among the Europeans, assume European customs, and in some cases emigrate abroad. Not surprisingly, then, the nature of the colonial education system had real consequences for social mobility, economic potential, and symbolic capital among Moroccans. Furthermore, the existence of Moroccan students, both Jewish and non-elite Muslim, who altered their socioeconomic conditions after a French education provided evidence that the system of modern education the protectorate government instituted in Morocco was a meritocracy rather than merely a replication of some preexisting

social order. Their success at these schools and often their more prosperous employment within the new evolving economy validated the importance of the French colonial school system and justified the selective enrollment criteria and the differences in teacher qualifications.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the *mission civilisatrice* philosophy and the various schools created for different communities as well as the influence of student selection and differences in teacher qualifications in disseminating the French language inequitably in protectorate Morocco. In order to maintain the delicate social equilibrium required for the colonial project's viability, the French constructed separate educational institutions and curricula for what they saw as the various Moroccan communities, an action that guaranteed religious, social, and linguistic divisions throughout Morocco while simultaneously furthering the colonial government's divide-and-rule strategy. More importantly, this hierarchical system with strict enforcement of student selection and inadequate teacher qualifications at the less prestigious schools also minimized access to French, the language of social and economic power, for the less fortunate Moroccans and likewise limited these students' job opportunities, since prestigious jobs required French. Thus, while reproducing a preexisting social inequality, this system also created a new kind of social inequality by exaggerating the differences among the differently trained "products" of the various educational institutions.

The French provided educational opportunities for Moroccan students based on their background as Arab or Berber, Muslim or Jewish, from rural or urban areas, or from elite or non-elite backgrounds. Thus, this chapter reviewed the various kinds of access to the French language for Moroccans through schools based on social origin (schools for Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers); those based on class (*écoles de fils de notables* and *collèges musulmans*); the schools based on geography (*écoles rurales* and *écoles urbaines*); the schools based on learning trades and those intended for girls; the free schools, the bilingual free schools, and the traditional schools (*msid*, *zaouias*, etc.); as well as the schools based on religious background and private schools (the schools set up by the various Christian and Jewish missions, the schools set up by the other European powers, and the *Alliance française*). Despite the variety of schools that existed during the protectorate, the rise of the French economy secured the importance of the most prestigious French schools, the schools for Europeans and the AIU, since only these granted credentials that gave access to secondary and tertiary education and jobs. Ultimately, the French language became a necessary tool in order to earn any *certificat, baccalauréat*, or diploma instrumental to employment and thus socioeconomic advancement during the French protectorate.

As a result of the competitive selection process and highly qualified teaching staff whereby the most prestigious schools offered the highest quality and degree of instruction in French, graduates of these schools came to value and, once in the job market, reinforced the cultural knowledge they learned at those institutions as legitimate and dominant. Though the majority of these graduates were European,

some were Jewish or elite, non-Jewish Moroccans. Only a very small number of Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers from non-elite backgrounds received a high-quality French education at the schools for Europeans or the elite *collèges* that opened doors to jobs as future administrators of the protectorate. The exclusion of the majority of Moroccans from attending the prestigious schools increased the profit of distinction for students from less privileged groups who had been able to attend the prestigious schools, a fact that, in turn, strengthened their devotion to the French, the French language, and the educational system put in place by the protectorate.

The creation of hierarchical, segregated French schools in line with the philosophical mission had long-term consequences for generating new representations of power, authenticity, and prestige in Morocco enduring well into independence. Since students were sorted into various kinds of schools, each with its place in the social hierarchy, and were taught by teachers with varying degrees of experience and training, the French these students mastered varied, ranging from the French of the Metropole, taught at the schools for the Europeans, to something much closer to what is today termed "North African French" at schools in rural areas. Thus, level of mastery of French—and the kind of French they mastered—came to index employability. Chapter 5, therefore, demonstrates how the creation of the disparate educational institutions discussed in this chapter reproduced socioeconomic inequality within each community and how each community responded to such socioeconomic differentiation.

CHAPTER 5: THE LINGUISTIC MARKET AND BOURDIEU

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the *mission civilisatrice* philosophy influenced the creation of separate schools for different communities in Morocco, each offering differing levels of French instruction. This chapter will show not only how French schools linked to employment in the more profitable modern sector of the economy gave rise to French as a dominant language but also how Arabic, both CA and MSA, simultaneously gained great cultural capital, in contrast to what Bourdieu's linguistic market might predict.

While French earned a profit of distinction for those with great proficiency due to their studies at the prestigious schools, for others this language was responsible for their symbolic domination. In response, some countered this domination by supporting the various alternative schools that taught CA and by doing so restored significance to this language as a language of solidarity and cultural authenticity. In this chapter, I examine how French, the language granting economic capital, became a legitimate, dominant, and powerful language in Morocco, acquiring symbolic capital in the process. Next, I demonstrate the consequences for those who did not acquire this resource and the symbolic domination these communities faced in the job market. For this group of Moroccans, I then show how local communities and the role of teachers as insufficient role models within those communities influenced students' educational and linguistic choices to support alternative institutions over French ones and thus how both French and CA became dominant languages, though

with very different values, in contrast to Bourdieu's linguistic market theory. Finally, I explain how a growing resurgence of CA as a symbolic language with greater prestige than ever in Morocco resulted in a new kind of symbolic domination after independence, with both French and CA becoming dominant, legitimate languages.

5.1 French as a Legitimate Language in Morocco

In a short period of time after the arrival of the French protectorate, "the Moroccan economy … shift[ed] from the subsistence agriculture of pre-Protectorate days to an evolving wage economy" (Pennell, 2003, pp. 148–149). Increasingly, the Moroccan economy became divided into two different sectors: a modern sector represented by European agriculture, industry, administration, transportation, and intellectual professions and that of a traditional economy corresponding to Moroccan agriculture and artisanal trades. The modern sector was the higher income-producing section of the economy and the more numerically significant part of the economy. By the early 1950s, 70% of the economy depended on income from the modern sectors, compared to 30% of traditional sectors (Cerych, 1964). Whereas 100% of Europeans participated in the modern economy, only 26% of Moroccans did the same as late as 1955. However, between 1938 and 1952, Moroccans accelerated their representation in the modern sectors of the economy at a rate of 140% (Cerych, 1964), demonstrating their preference for jobs within the better income-producing sectors of the economy.

The growing predominance of the modern sector within the Moroccan economy reinforced the legitimacy of the French education system. French degrees and certificates, especially the *baccalauréat*, but also the *certificat d'études primaires,* and the *brevet élémentaire,* became the ultimate credentials for accessing better employment in this higher paying sector of the economy. Students chose educational paths, not because of their interest of a particular subject, but because the school offered access to the most prestigious degrees, certificates, and occupations. The careers with the greatest prestige, such as those in the protectorate administration, required mastery of French and success on the most prestigious exams, like the *baccalauréat* in philosophy, verified this linguistic competency and the cultural knowledge associated with this language. In turn, these diplomas allowed students to seek highly sought-after positions in service to the state, professions offering higher income and increased social advantages like job security, higher salaries, and contractual benefits that did not exist in local professions as small merchants, artists, and laborers (Paye, 1957).

As a result of French schools, a clear shift occurred between the professions of the parents and those of the students who attended these schools. Many former students were able to take midlevel civil servant posts and coveted liberal and technical professions or, at a minimum, escape the agricultural professions of the family. Fewer former students returned to work on the land of their fathers after they had attended French schools; instead, students advanced to administrative or industrial employment **(**Paye, 1957). Likewise, those who had completed more

schooling distinguished themselves from their parents in terms of higher income and job stability and were able to improve their overall quality of life, as noted in a report[8] by Camille Mathieu, director of vocational schools for Moroccans in Casablanca:

> Ceux qui n'ont fait à l'école qu'un bref séjour n'ont pas amélioré leur condition sociale, ils ont bien vite oublié ce qu'ils avaient appris et ce sont aujourd'hui de petits manoeuvres comme leurs parents. … De ceux qui ont fait des études un peu plus poussées … le niveau de vie s'est nettement amélioré. Ils ont une profession fixe. (as cited in Paye, 1957, p. 627)

Although the distribution of the French language and education varied by social group, Moroccans from every community engaged in behaviors that recognized French as a legitimate and dominant language. Parents of Jewish students from all socioeconomic classes desired to send both their daughters and sons to French schools, especially to the European schools (Bensimon-Donath, 1968). A similar desire, though to a lesser degree, to attend French schools was prevalent among Arab and non-Jewish Berber students. Enrollment in French colonial schools among lower income, non-Jewish Moroccans increased between 1938 and 1952 at the same time that the percentage of landowners, rich merchants, and civil servants remained largely stable (Paye, 1957). The increasing prestige of the professions requiring a university-level education, and thus French, attracted so many students that enrollment in these programs increased substantially among Muslim Moroccans after 1940 (Paye, 1957). There was so much more interest in French schools that many French schools for

[8] No year was given for this citation in Paye's (1957) work. However, in his conclusion to that section, he alluded to 1938 when he stated how much had changed since 1938, "Sans doute, comme il a été noté à plusieurs reprises par les directeurs d'écoles, la situation des familles s'est-elle ameliorée depuis 1938" (Paye, 1957, p. 628).

Moroccans, especially schools for non-Jewish Moroccans for whom the least amount of schools were constructed, had to turn students away or face classes with more than 40 students (Paye, 1957). Attempts to enroll in French schools had considerably multiplied among all communities and the high demand but limited availability reinforced the growing legitimacy of French as a dominant language throughout Morocco.

Because of the profit of distinction one earned from having a French education, in addition to the economic advantages directly resulting from speaking it, many Moroccans came to believe that this language held a kind of inherent symbolic value, or symbolic capital. This perspective was evident in the many ways former students devoted their careers in teaching French to other Moroccans and in the many commentaries documenting the legitimacy of French authority. For instance, many former students of the military school *Dar el Beïda* fought alongside French soldiers throughout pacification wars and both World Wars with the firm belief in the ultimate validity and legitimacy of French culture and ideas. Many former students of the French schools for Jewish and non-Jewish Moroccans upheld the value of French instruction by becoming teachers, directors, and donors of the AIU and bilingual free schools, often basing instruction on the French model through which they themselves were educated. Numerous other former students remained attached to their French education and perpetuated the significance of this education to their community through various community-wide education projects, such as the student alumni organization programs from the *collège de Fès* or *collège de Rabat*, where they

sponsored activities such as evening French courses for adults, performed plays for local communities, and assisted other students financially in their attempts to attend schools in France (Paye, 1957).

Because of the enhanced symbolic capital associated with speaking French and a French education, Moroccans also sought acquisition of cultural forms associated with French culture and language. Like many Jews who, after having completed French instruction at the AIU, took French first names, dressed in European clothes, furnished their homes in French style, moved to the city, or immigrated abroad, Muslim Moroccans also found French to be a language offering access to modern ideas, the sciences, and a means by which to transgress social taboos. New language ideologies, such as the preference of French over CA by students at the *collège de Fès* (Merrouni, 1983), displayed the extent to which French had acquired more than mere economic capital but social, cultural, and symbolic influence as well. Similar to many Moroccan Jews who replaced their native language with French, a few of the most French-educated Muslim Moroccans also replaced their native language with French (Bensimon-Donath, 1968). French cinema, radio, and newspapers became increasingly popular among a small percentage of Arab and non-Jewish Berber youth, as it had among Jewish youth. For the few who were able to acquire it, French became a language of entertainment, intellectualism, social prestige, and real distinction.

The economic capital derived from a French education also enhanced symbolic capital in the form of marriage opportunities. As early as the 1930s, the

boys at the *écoles des fils de notables* began insisting that more Moroccan girls have access to a French education in order to create a class of potential spouses with similar interests and tastes. Among some girls who attended French schools, a French education became a dowry in finding a more economically prosperous spouse. Moroccan girls living in French orphanages who were normally unable to marry because of their impoverishment and orphaned status, found husbands and unconventional domestic freedoms. A French education also permitted a few Moroccans to marry outside of their traditional social networks to French women, as had occurred among a very small number of former Berber military students at *Dar El Beïda.*

A French education also provided symbolic capital in the form of social advancement of women in the workforce. The rate of French-educated Jewish women entering the workforce demonstrated a kind of emancipation from former social restrictions that a French education facilitated. At an employment rate of 15%, Jewish women were more prevalent in the workforce than either European women (12.5%) or Muslim women (6.4%) by 1947 (Laskier, 1983). Among administrative white-collar professions and office work in 1960, or *employés de bureau* jobs, as many as 23.8% of employed Moroccan Jewish women were represented in this important sector (Laskier, 1983). With educational and professional pursuits came social change in that, through French cultural knowledge, Jewish women became "important members of the elite. … Owing to her education at the AIU and other European schools, the Jewish woman … continued working to help her family pursue

the path of social and economic advancement" (Laskier, 1983, p. 294). The employment of Jewish and European women in higher income-producing sectors of the economy and the contrast between Jewish and European women in the workforce compared to non-Jewish Moroccan women illustrated not only the social divide that access to French instruction precipitated between communities but also how the symbolic capital associated with acquiring French redefined gender roles in Morocco.

Although French was never directly legalized or rendered official and the linguistic markets never achieved complete unification or standardization for the duration of the protectorate, French became the most widely spoken foreign language in 20th-century Morocco. The growth in French institutions and the value of services these foreign institutions provided catapulted the esteem granted its speakers. Access to modern health care techniques and improved technologies such as transportation and communication led by various French organizations, opportunities for social advancement through French administrative careers, certified degrees and liberal professions, and employment in banking and industrial jobs with increased earnings reinforced the dominance of the French language in Morocco. Later, increased contact between various speech communities after migration to urban centers necessitated some degree of French. The greater the frequency of contact between interlocutors and these institutions necessitating French, along with the increasing authority exerted by these institutions, the greater the need one had to acquire French.

5.2 Symbolic Domination: Inequity in the Workforce

As a result of the advanced curricula at the schools for Europeans, more than half of the European population was employed in French administrative jobs and received salaries in excess of 590,000 francs a year by 1953, whereas the average annual income among all inhabitants in Morocco was only 63,000 francs (Boutata, 1986). In comparison, French nationals working in France at this time received on average 295,000 francs, almost half the salary of Europeans in Morocco (Boutata, 1986). Europeans working in Morocco filled the majority of administrative positions as high-level industrial leaders, land owners, merchants, high- or midlevel civil servants, high-level army officers, business owners, and the liberal professions, jobs that comprised one fifth of the total workforce (Merrouni, 1983) and required a modern French education.

Moroccan Jews, because of their modern French education, entered white-collar professions as "journalists, teachers, pharmacists, lawyers, ... physicians, … [or] lower-middle and middle strata of administrators of diverse ranks … [and comprised an] important elite of nontraditional or even modernized employees" (Laskier, 1983, p. 293).

This social group was prominent in higher paying sectors of employment, such as within the civil service, private agencies, or banks, and in the industrial sector as administrators and clerks, thanks to their advanced language skills and educational achievements.

> The Jews had employment priorities in administration and white-collar professions because Jews represented the only educated indigenous element capable of fulfilling colonial needs. … Only high-level posts were given to Europeans [and] middle- and lower-level positions were granted to Jews. … Next to the French, the Jews were relatively well represented. (Laskier, 1983, p. 286)

Throughout the term of the protectorate, because of advanced educational opportunities and language acquisition available through a high-quality French education at the AIU, Jews remained better represented in the higher income-producing sectors of the economy than other Moroccans. They "still dominated the commercial arena in different sectors as late as 1940" (Laskier, 1983, p. 285). As a result, they "were still better represented in their employed population than the Muslims were in theirs" (Laskier, 1983, pp. 287).

In contrast to the prevalence of Europeans in high-level administrative jobs and Jews in administration, banking, and financial industries, Muslim students occupied the lowest positions in the French civil service as translators, secretaries, and auxiliaries if they indeed were able to find employment at all. Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans occupied 34% of subordinate civil servant jobs at the lowest levels of the administration, jobs that comprised only 5.7% of all professional administrative jobs in Morocco (Boutata, 1986). On average, they earned only 31,000 francs a year by 1953 in comparison to the average income of 590,000 francs that Europeans earned in Morocco (Boutata, 1986). These Moroccans rarely assumed positions in the advanced levels of administration and modern sectors of the economy (Paye, 1957). After 1930, Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans began to take

more positions with the French government and industry following a sufficient French education, but they competed for these jobs with the increasingly numerous highly skilled Europeans arriving in Morocco. However, the majority of non-Jewish Moroccans who were able to find work remained laborers or employed within the traditional and rural professions because many never completed their education, whether in French schools or otherwise. While the linking of a French education to the job market permitted French-educated individuals—Europeans, a number of Jews, and elite Arab and Berber Moroccans—to distinguish themselves in obtaining better employment and a better lot in life, the lack of a French education simultaneously disenfranchised a majority of Moroccans from such opportunities.

While other communities recognized French education and language as legitimate and valuable by seeking and successfully terminating their education in French schools, many Arab and non-Jewish Berber communities displayed a more ambiguous position regarding French dominant culture, language, and institutions. First, few non-Jewish Moroccans attained the *baccalauréat* or other diplomas such as the *certificat d'etudes primaires* or *secondaires*. Paye (1957) observed that, in 1945, there were only 44 Muslim Moroccans who had passed the *baccalauréat* examination and only 128 in 1950. Second, the student dropout rate in French schools, although declining after 1938 (Paye, 1957), remained highest among Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers than any other social group, more than two thirds in many cases. The example of students at the Kasbah of Marrakesh elementary school, where fewer than 6% completed their primary education and fewer than 3% successfully obtained the

certificat d'études primaires musulmanes (Paye, 1957), is representative of these education failures. Additionally, only a fraction of Muslim girls attended school compared with the population of Muslim boys or that of Jewish girls in school, and attendance at the highest level of classes contained the fewest students from the poorest families (Paye, 1957). At the same time, the alternative schools and the traditional schools continued to compete for students. While respect for French as legitimate and necessary had grown considerably, not all were complicit or participants in acquiring it.

5.3 Dual Legitimacy: Arabic and French as Cultural Capital

Unlike European communities and a number of Jewish and elite, non-Jewish Moroccan communities who replaced their maternal languages with French, CA, MSA, and French assumed new significance among Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans because of the rising influence of two different kinds of educational institutions. The increasing role of French colonial schools meant that Moroccans required some knowledge of French when seeking employment in the modern economy, higher education, and thus socio-economic opportunity. At the same time, CA, the language of instruction at most of the traditional schools, and MSA, the language at many of the alternative schools, were also becoming important legitimates languages with great cultural significance among Muslim communities after the growth of educational alternative institutions. In fact, CA and MSA gained greater status during the protectorate as the language of cultural and religious

authenticity uniting Muslim Moroccan, Arab, and non-Jewish Berber communities as a symbol of Moroccan identity and as a result of the rising nationalist movement.

By the end of the protectorate, as CA and MSA acquired greater significance than ever before, speakers of these languages acquired some of the greatest forms of symbolic capital within their local communities and competed with the symbolic capital that speaking French conferred. The embodiment of Islamic cultural knowledge granted access to a traditional aristocracy with great influence in all important social and political events (Merrouni, 1983). Yet, employment opportunities for speakers of CA or MSA remained low during the protectorate, and power and prestige associated with these positions became all the more tenuous after the introduction of the modern economy.

At the beginning of the protectorate, very few students completed their studies at Qur'anic schools, few obtained any certification or qualification, and only a limited number sought higher education at secondary training in mosques and *zaouias* or at postsecondary institutes like the *Qarawiyin* or other Islamic universities. The employment opportunities for the most successful were largely limited to a few prestigious, local positions as religious and legal scholars authorized to interpret *Sha'ria* law, lead religious services, teach or provide notary services. Many of these positions included being an *adel* (notary), *khatib* (preacher), *imam* (prayer director, or Qur'anic teacher), *muazzen* (person responsible for the call to prayer), *hazzab* (person who recites the Qur'an) or *fquih* (instructor). After postsecondary study, students of traditional learning could become *alim* (doctor or teacher of high level of Qur'anic

instruction), *qadi* (judge of religious nature), and *qaid* (local representative). These positions within the traditional job market required mastery of CA, which was the most rare of linguistic resources given the general high rate of illiteracy, the relative lack of graduates from traditional Qur'anic schools, and the dismal instruction in Arabic at the French schools for Arabs and Berbers. Therefore, those perceived to have mastered CA were granted one of the highest profits of distinction within their local communities. By the end of the protectorate, MSA also gained greater distinction than before with the association of the nationalist movement and Arabization of schools campaign.

While nearly all Jewish and European students were attending secular schools, many Arab and Berber Muslim Moroccans continued to attend traditional religious schools throughout the term of the protectorate. Although French schools appealed to most students from all speech communities precisely for the modern curricula, pedagogy, and enhanced economic potential, traditional schools among Muslim communities represented a form of cultural authenticity lacking in French schools. Furthermore, because French schools were unavailable to the majority of non-Jewish Moroccan students, traditional schools welcomed proportionately more Muslim Moroccan students than French schools did.

At traditional institutions, students received the most revered forms of cultural knowledge, rendering these institutions an important rite of passage into political and social life long before the arrival of the French protectorate. The Islamic subjects and role of the teacher, *fquih*, were viewed as essential to indoctrinating Moroccan

identity and deemed of great social and cultural importance. In fact, inculcating conventional cultural and religious knowledge was prioritized at Islamic traditional schools over any technical or practical instruction (Merrouni, 1983). This curriculum was so important to local identity that the traditional *msid* was deemed "an important process of socialization for young boys" (Damis, 1970, p. 22), and those who finished the primary level at the *msid* distinguished themselves through social advancement.

> Boys who finished the *msid* gained a certain element of prestige from having learned the Koran, even if they went no further in their studies. They could usually read and write a little, they dressed differently, and were subsequently able to marry a girl from higher up on the social scale. In short, their life style was clearly distinguishable from that of others who had left the *msid* at an early age … or who had never attended a *msid*. (Damis, 1970, p. 22)

However, success at traditional schools was rare, and the "severe elimination process" (Damis 1970, p. 23) due to extremely difficult memorization requirements of the Qur'an reiterated the belief that only God determined in whose heart scripture would be instilled (Merrouni, 1983). For the few who completed a traditional higher education, the highest form of social prestige, or symbolic capital, awaited them, at least until the introduction of the French colonial education system.

> A higher [Islamic] education provided the practical means for gaining prestige, patrons, and clients, and ultimately access to government service (excluding the protectorate administration, of course). … Most scholars, capitalizing on their great prestige, pursued government careers which provided the necessary means of advancement in Moroccan urban life and used their knowledge to enjoy the highest social … status. (Damis, 1970, p. 27)

Customary notions of what constituted a quality education persisted in both city and village, among both Berber and Muslim communities, even after the arrival of French

schools. Although French schools managed to recruit students through linking educational attainment to professional opportunities, if an Arab or non-Jewish Berber student lacked Arabic and Islamic instruction, his education was considered incomplete (Paye, 1957).

Over time, competition for higher paying jobs in French industry and administration undermined the superiority of traditional education and professions. As a result, traditional schools witnessed a decline in the number of graduates, with fewer and more privileged students succeeding in the traditional educational system.

> The traditional Moroccan professionals during the colonial period found their institutions economically and culturally undermined and effectively prevented from evolution. Their attempts to improve their situation, including religious and educational reforms, did not go very far and were limited in their influence to a small number of urban upper-class families. (Paul, 1975, p. 65)

Not surprisingly, these few privileged but non-French-speaking students who completed an arduous, traditional Islamic education were granted great prestige within their local communities. Yet, their power and prestige became limited to their local and regional communities as they competed against graduates from French institutions for social recognition and employment.

Whereas previous generations who had been educated in traditional schools accessed cultural success, social prestige, and all the advantages that accompanied such success, those generations educated after 1912 in modern French schools "possessed or were on the way to acquiring through their studies the potentiality for upward mobility which had previously been reserved to the traditional scholar" (Brown, 1976, p. 83), thereby shifting the balance of power away from the

traditionally educated. By the end of the protectorate, the esteem granted graduates from French language institutions over traditional institutions became more apparent in all but religious contexts. Between 1948 and 1950, enrollment at French schools for Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers increased at the same time that enrollment at the free schools and many of the traditional schools declined. French instruction began to attract more Muslim Moroccans and, for the first time, girls. A French language education offered new possibilities to groups of Moroccans who were otherwise ineligible to improve their social positions based on social origin and gender.

At the same time, however, a very small number of students who chose to study exclusively in traditional schools, at the *Qarawiyin*, *Medersa Ben Youssef* in Marrakesh, or in universities in the Middle East were able to display marked CA competence and gain considerable prestige among their local communities. True mastery of CA earned one of the highest profits of distinction among Muslim Moroccans because of the increasingly restricted access to this language; the limited opportunities to acquire it; and the fewer, but culturally authentic, job opportunities to use this language. This helps explain why one of the of the top nationalist leaders highly educated in CA, Allal al-Fassi, an Arabic and Islamic scholar who had studied at *Qarawiyin*, received great recognition and authority in Morocco. His powerful position as a nationalist leader and prominent political activist before and after independence exemplifies how proficiency in CA bestowed some of the highest prestige in terms of cultural and symbolic capital, despite the rising economic capital granted to French speakers.

In addition to CA speakers who because of their competence in CA earned great distinction, Arab and non-Jewish Berber French speakers were also able to access the highest ranks and prestige in the campaign for independence. A greater number of Moroccan nationalists who had completed their education at prestigious French schools became powerful representatives of the National Istiqlal Party, including Mohammed Hassan el-Ouessani, Ahmed Belafrej, Mohammed Lyazidi, Mehdi Ben Barka, and Omar Abdeljalil. Whereas al-Fassi was an Arabic-trained scholar from *Qarawiyin* who did not receive any French language training, more than half of the top echelon of the Nationalist Party leadership included highly French-educated individuals.

So great was the influence of both traditional schools and French schools that many students were often conflicted over the choice of schools. To avoid this dilemma, many chose to attend both traditional and French institutions (Brown, 1976; Merrouni, 1983). In Azrou, for example, the director of the *collège berbère* estimated that even among this community of Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers who perceived an Islamic education to be more influential than a colonial one, many students still chose to attend both traditional schools and the French *collège* in order to receive both forms of cultural knowledge (Benhlal, 2005). After the Berber Decree of 1930 alienated Berber and Arab students and families alike, many found greater ideological justifications for attending traditional schools over French schools. For many others, however, economic opportunities that French schools offered students often trumped the cultural or symbolic capital granted by traditional schools.

5.4 Community Involvement and Resistance to French Dominance

The rise of two legitimate languages among Arab and non-Jewish Berber communities, as opposed to the unification of a single language as had occurred among Europeans, Jews, and a few Moroccan elites, reflected the growing influence of two opposing education systems and the role of communities in promoting those institutions. The perseverance of the traditional schools despite the low economic potential associated with that education, in addition to the lack of adequate funding to ensure their survival, demonstrated that local communities were able to maintain a certain level of agency in determining their own academic and linguistic alternatives.

Traditional Bourdieusian theory accounts for the successful products of reproduction in French protectorate schools among Europeans and a number of Jewish and elite Muslim Moroccans, but unexplained by this theory are the coordinated efforts demonstrated by the Moroccan communities who rejected colonial schools and complete mastery of French. Many Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans did not participate in the linguistic game by acquiring French and attending French schools. Instead, they preferred what they saw as a culturally authentic education, and some among them refused to send their children to French schools, even when access was available to them.

Local or regional community influence, largely discounted in a pure Bourdieusian approach, plays a significant role in illuminating the discrepancies observed between those who attended French schools and acquired French, on the one hand, and those who rejected this education and language, on the other. Analysis

at the level of the community clarifies how some in Morocco employed "everyday forms of resistance" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 60) through variables of identity, religion, and gender in their complete or partial rejection of colonial education and language. In her investigation, *Education and Rural Identity in Rural France: The Politics of Schooling*, Reed-Danahay (1996) found that features of group identity belonging to members of a rural community in France were important in determining the degree of successful student achievement at institutions promoting a national curriculum. "Schooling plays a role in the reproduction of social stratification, but … at the local level [scholastic reproduction] is nuanced by factors such as regional identity, religion, gender, and peer culture" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 59).

Identity, ethnicity, gender, and religion, the variables initially employed to segregate school children in Morocco, remained the same variables that distinguished successful reception of French education among French-speaking European, Jewish, and elite Moroccan communities from the mixed reaction to attend these schools among the majority of non-French-speaking Muslim Moroccans. In short, the community constituted another field of power with differing levels of agency that, at times, conflicted with and undermined the power of the French educational institution.

The community's perception of French schools and teachers as community leaders played a tremendous role in the success of that school in addition to the individual success of each student. While the credentials of the teacher at each of the different schools correlated positively with the successful inculcation of French

cultural knowledge among students, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the role of the teacher within the community had even larger consequences for the reception of that instruction. Since teachers at both the European schools and the Jewish AIU schools were members of the community in which they taught, attended the same religious services, and originated from ideologically similar backgrounds, these teachers were generally admired by their community. As a result, few saw the school as a site of religious conversion or as having a dubious agenda, a conclusion substantiated by Laskier (1983), who noted that a key difference at the schools for Jewish and non-Jewish Moroccans was the foreign teaching staff of different religious affiliation. "The European school networks … failed to attract Muslims [because they] were reluctant to send their youths to schools taught and directed by Christians" (Laskier, 1983, pp. 130–131).

The teachers in Jewish schools became ideal role models for their students by indoctrinating more than factual or cultural knowledge. Through the support of their communities, they were able to instill respect for community solidarity and social reform. By focusing "its attention on the promotion of unity among heterogeneous Jewish elements, and by preaching the need for Jewish solidarity, the AIU helped integrate the youths of the migrants with local youths" (Laskier, 1983, pp. 124–125).

Furthermore, given their dependency on the Jewish community partnership, AIU teachers were protective of their students outside the classroom in a manner similar to that of religious missionaries. "The teachers' devotion to the communities … compared with the efforts of the Christian missionaries of the Middle East and

Africa" (Laskier, 1983, p. 118). Because of their highly influential role within their communities, "they developed the reputation of physicians and healers" (Laskier, 1983, p. 118). Numerous Jewish community members praised the arrival of French schools as an advantageous opportunity to the degree that a number of Jewish Moroccans aspired for French cultural and linguistic assimilation that these schools facilitated.

Likewise, the European communities admired the near-homogenous French teaching staff at the French schools for Europeans. Their high academic qualifications and their embodiment of Parisian-standard French cultural knowledge distinguished them as authorities within the communities they shared with their students. They were revered as the incarnation of Lyautey's philosophy, a mythic Morocco, and of the *mission civilisatrice*, as described in the narrative of a former student, Bernard Guetta (as cited in Tselikas & Hayoun, 2004). As the French language gained prominence and became increasingly linked to success in the job market, schools for Europeans offering rigorous French instruction both gained great notoriety (Laskier, 1983) and found additional support due to the esteem the community had for their teachers.

On the contrary, the lack of community support among the Arab and non-Jewish Berber population and the lack of teachers with mutual devotion to the community in which they taught hindered French education initiatives among these groups. In addition to the few enrollment opportunities for Muslims at French schools, the teachers recruited to staff the schools within these communities were not

perceived as community leaders. In every colonial school intended for non-Jewish Moroccans, the overwhelming majority of teachers were foreign, French or Kabyle, and preferably non-Muslim so as to restrict the possible promulgation of Arabic and Islam. Their status as foreigner re-emphasized social differences between French authorities and Moroccans. As a result, the teachers and the schools where they taught remained segregated from the community they sought to instruct. The teachers' status as outsider in Muslim communities kept them detached from this milieu. In the *bled*, or the countryside, this relationship was more overtly one of conqueror and conquered, as often the Native Affairs army officer was in charge of the functioning of the school. In the city, the division between community and teacher was magnified by the fact that the teachers were often Christian from France, teaching subjects such as "*nos ancestres, les Gaulois*," ("our ancestors, the Gauls"). Moreover, the faculty at most of the schools for Moroccan Muslims almost always lived in detached conditions from their students. In the city where most French schools were located, teachers lived in European quarters with access to running water or telephones, daily conveniences that were very different from those of their students and most other Moroccans.

On the occasion when subjects were taught by native Moroccans, such as Arabic courses by the *fquih*, instead of the traditionally preferred *uluma*, whose power had been usurped (Damis, 1970), all efforts were made to ensure that the pedagogy remained uninspiring. Contact hours were kept minimal, reference to religion was prohibited, and inadequate materials thwarted teachers from enticing students.

Accordingly, Arabic classes, the subject that most exemplified Moroccan cultural identity in nationalists' claims, became the least preferred classes among Moroccan students in French schools (Adam, 1962; Merrouni, 1983). As a result, Moroccan students were not motivated to seek teaching positions, including positions as *fquih*, Arabic instructor, or monitor in French schools. The lack of Moroccan teachers in French schools reduced the likelihood of reproducing future leaders like the teacher role models at the AIU and French schools for Europeans. Instead, the minority of Muslim students who did successfully finish their education in French schools preferred pursuing careers in the liberal professions and subsequently abandoned geographically, economically, and culturally that original sociocultural milieu that rejected foreign instruction. More often, those who did chose to become schoolteachers and directors chose instead to staff alternative schools and advance the renovated and free-school movement. As few Muslim students attained French diplomas or a higher education, too few were inculcated to propagate the value of a French education. The lack of French-educated Muslim graduates who became future teachers in French schools had a negative impact on the success rates of other Arab or non-Jewish Berber Moroccans in French schools. Consequently, the lack of teachers as role models within the local community and the lack of Muslim Moroccans as teachers within the schools created for them rendered French education largely unfamiliar and exotic.

Until the 1940s, traditional and alternative institutions remained culturally more relevant than French schools for many Muslim communities precisely because

these institutions were administered by highly respected community leaders. Such preference for the local and authentic explains how, for a time, some alternative schools became successful. In the same way the AIU teachers attracted Jewish students and Berber schools taught by a foreign Kabyle and French staff were largely unsuccessful, teachers at the traditional and free schools who were respected within their communities were more successful at attracting students and instilling a belief in the curriculum. Although the total number of students in free schools remained less than that at the French schools, the rate of growth of these schools was remarkable. With community support, a common ideology, and indigenous teaching staff, teachers at the free schools were able to influence the success of schools, so much so that they successfully incorporated similar modern curricula of that of the French schools, including geography, science, and foreign language.

What differentiated the free schools from French schools was not necessarily the extent of French language instruction or the instruction of nontraditional, exotic disciplines, but the mission by Moroccans to educate Moroccans in the familiar Moroccan milieu. For these reasons, French or Algerian Kabyle teachers recruited to teach in Berber schools were destined to fail; they were unable to gain community support due to the perception that they lacked cultural authenticity. On the contrary, through disseminating a shared ideology of Moroccan culture and then distributing it by means of highly influential community members, free schools were able to assemble great community support and obstruct, if even for a short time, significant growth of the French schools for Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans.

5.5 From Solidarity and Resistance to New Forms of Symbolic Domination

The rejection of French schools and the French language by some Muslim Moroccans reflected a preference for a kind of cultural and linguistic solidarity among community members who valued local forms of cultural knowledge. Such solidarity is often observed among minority groups when upholding regionalisms or accents as a means to reinforce bonds between group members (Labov, 1972; Reed-Danahay, 1996). However, in many cases, solidarity may simultaneously operate as a form of resistance, where groups seek to alter their dominated status by disengaging from the milieu belonging to the dominant culture.

For Bourdieu, the notion of resistance is problematic because the *habitus*, which operates at the level of the unconscious, does not allow for contemplation. "The habitus operates primarily at the level of the preconscious, in a take-for-granted disposition toward the world of which the social agent is not explicitly aware" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, pp. 53–54). Thus, dominated groups are unable to consciously recognize their domination. According to this view, evidence of resistance is part of a group's "commonsense culture, and not a true challenge to the structures that dominated them—of which they could not be aware" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 55). Such a perspective assumes that resistance, when observed, reflects only apolitical group solidarity; thus, Moroccan proponents of Arabic were not simultaneously opposing French as dominant culture.

On the contrary, other researchers have advocated that resistance emerges when the dominated consciously "come to see what is in store for them and therefore

resist the forces of class domination" (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 54). Linguistic solidarity among some Arabic speakers and proponents in Morocco became, at least in part, an alternate form of social dominance, reproduction, and a means by which to intentionally resist French authority and French as the only dominant language in Morocco. A kind of national and political consciousness among discontented Moroccans grew by the 1930s as a result of educational inequities and economic uncertainty. The Berber Decree of 1930, the Great Depression, the Second World War, and a growing nationalist movement forced many Moroccan Muslims to value local Arab and Islamic cultural representations in unprecedented ways. While European communities and a number of Jewish and elite Muslim communities acquired French and attended French schools, many more Moroccans who were denied access to French schools or diplomas demonstrated solidarity and community level resistance in choosing to study at schools where CA or MSA was the language of instruction.

The rejection to learn French was not total, however, since these speakers found that French, CA, and MSA were required for a range of different social functions, each securing very different kinds of capital in the process. CA and MSA reinforced group solidarity as Muslim and Moroccan and were used to overtly resist French colonial power, such as the cases when interlocutors chose to reply in CA or MSA when spoken to in French (see Chapter 4). However, choosing to speak Arabic did not suggest that the French language was completely insignificant among Moroccans. French remained a language of power and prestige in obtaining jobs or

acquiring social prestige that CA or MSA was unable to displace. In fact, many Moroccans continued to pursue French language and education alongside that of CA or MSA because French cultural knowledge continued to offer speakers greater economic value. The value of French was so great that Moroccans without high levels of French education did not ultimately return to traditional employment or the outdated traditional schools during the protectorate. They increasingly sought a French education in other kinds of institutions; moved to the cities and searched for new kinds of higher paying jobs; or sought opportunities to alter their dominated status in other ways, even advancing the nationalist cause. This is why so many more Moroccans sought enrollment in French schools, why many alternative or free schools instructed students in the French language alongside CA or MSA, and in part why leaders of the Nationalist Party continued to use French in their proposals for reform.

French and Arabic grew in their utility throughout the term of the protectorate, even among the most dominated groups, those with limited French education and professional opportunities. During the protectorate, while many Arab and non-Berber Jewish students demanded an increase in the hours of CA or MSA instruction, these demands emphasized broader instruction in CA or MSA alongside that in French, not to diminish French instruction. As debates regarding the utility of French and Arabic in Morocco circulated between Arabic as promoting local solidarity and authenticity and French as necessary for economic viability and access to modernity, all of these languages became necessary pedagogical tools for decades under the Arabization

policy after independence. French remained influential because the successors to the French regime, the elite Arab and Berber students at the French schools, intentionally selected from among the noble classes, the "people of leisure or wealth of the cities, … functionaries or merchants" (Damis, 1970, p. 29), continued in the familial tradition of pursuing social and economic distinction through proximity to the French regime.

In order to preserve or improve their social position during the protectorate, these higher social classes were often the most cooperative with French policy, even if in conflict with local authentic culture and tradition. This was especially true of the administrative employees whose income depended on successful French authority and those with investment in the new modern economy, such as the urban elites. These groups sought social mobility through French instruction, whether in the French schools for Europeans, the *écoles de fils de notables*, or the *collèges*. This explains why French secondary schools for Europeans came to attract first, the children of the local aristocracy; then, the children of the bourgeoisie; and finally, the children of the middle class (Tselikas & Hayoun, 2004). French schools were, over time, able to gain considerable popularity among local populations by having persuaded the most important local clientele. Even though there were Muslim elites who, like the majority of the general masses, rejected French-sponsored schools, many more from this class were propelled to pursue French instruction, even if such instruction was perceived as in conflict with traditional culture.

Eventually, the dominant cultural knowledge acquired by the elite French-educated Moroccans distinguished them as natural successors to the ousted French regime, enabling them to seamlessly access high levels of government after independence. Those who succeeded in the highest levels of French education at the schools for Europeans, the schools for elite Arabs or Berbers, or even at some of the free schools were granted the greatest privileges after 1962.

> The great majority of Moroccans who managed to get a European university education during the colonial era … [and] joining with the traditional ulama, … dominated the leadership and top ministerial posts of the post-colonial regime. … This small cadre of Moroccan [Western-educated] professionals, more European even than the settlers in their belief in Western science and culture, were now installed in the new monarchical government with metropolitan blessings … [and] quickly co-opted into high office. (Paul, 1975, pp. 60–66)

These prominent communities were best positioned for, and most invested in, the socioeconomic opportunity and influence gained by acquiring a French education. They, in turn, assisted in the reproduction of that knowledge as legitimate and dominant.

> All those who have the privilege of investing in the game … accept the tacit contract, implied in the fact of participating in the game, of recognizing thereby that it is indeed worth playing. This contract unites them to all the other participants by a sort of initial collusion, one far more powerful than all open or secret agreements. This solidarity between all the initiates, linked together by the same fundamental commitment to the game and its stakes, by the same respect … for the game itself and the unwritten laws which define it, by the same fundamental investment in the game of which they have a monopoly and which they have to perpetuate in order that their own investments are profitable, is never demonstrated so clearly as when the game itself is threatened. (Bourdieu, 1991/2001, p. 180)

Because of the investment of having acquiring French and French diplomas, French education remained the educational standard for years after independence. In turn, French remained a legitimate language for decades after independence and guaranteed the future legitimacy and dominance of a new French-speaking governing body.

While Arabic never supplanted French despite Arabization of the curricula in Moroccan schools after independence, CA and MSA assumed new social functions alongside French, which continued to fill diverse social roles. As a result, French and Arabic were taught but for different uses. French became the language of instruction in the technical disciplines like science and math, whereas Arabic, increasingly MSA, was reserved for the humanities, especially those linked to Arabic and Islamic disciplines. Bilingualism in French and Arabic became more widespread, and a new form of symbolic domination was imposed by those nationalist leaders who now occupied the vacated seats in the administration. In contrast to the broader public, they had completed the highest levels of French or Arabic instruction and had mastered these languages. Of nine nationalist leaders, five had completed a high-level French education and the other four were fluent in Arabic (Pennell, 2003). This new bilingual standard explains why, paradoxically, the nationalists employed French to bring attention to their political cause in the newspaper, *L'Action du peuple*, and in their manifesto, *Plan de réformes*, at the same time that in those documents they advocated for the inclusion of CA or MSA in the new government and school programs.

Just as most Moroccans were excluded from acquiring French as dominant knowledge under colonial rule, for many this continued after independence. The bilingual school system inadequately taught both languages according to subject matter and thus the majority of Moroccan students lacked sufficient proficiency in either language. Those who assumed influential positions in the new government, many having completed a French education first because it had been more firmly established at an earlier date, were the most likely proponents of maintaining French as dominant cultural knowledge and, thus, continued to legitimize French cultural knowledge in the postcolonial scholastic institutions. The ascension of the Moroccan French-speaking elite to positions of power maintained the *status quo* with French as the dominant language and reinforced the reproduction of like-minded graduates (Grandguillaume, 1983). Under the new bilingual education system after independence, symbolic domination and the need to acquire French as a dominant language did not disappear. From the 1960s and for a period lasting over 30 years, Moroccans progressively required new kinds of language proficiency in at least two languages, French and MSA. The insertion of MSA in some cycles of the new school system alongside the maintenance of French subsequently served as new markers of exclusion and dominance, reproducing new kinds of legitimate cultural knowledge for the next generation of Moroccans.

5.6 Conclusion

French became a dominant and legitimate language in protectorate Morocco after French schools and the diplomas certified by these institutions granted access to the higher paying job market, as predicted by the linguistic market theory by Bourdieu. Increasingly, Moroccans from all social groups came to believe in the validity of French and of the social progress and economic opportunity this language offered, as demonstrated by the accelerated representation in French schools, even among those who at first had rejected them. Such acceptance ensured French as a dominant and legitimate language in Morocco. However, since most non-Jewish Moroccans from non-elite social origin were less likely to succeed in French schools, if indeed they were admitted in these institutions at all, these Moroccans rarely acquired satisfactory proficiency in French and were less likely to find employment in the modern sector of the economy or access positions of authority, resulting in their symbolic domination.

The symbolic domination endured by these Moroccans produced different reactions to French schools among local community members, from renewed support for local traditional institutions alongside the cooperation of French schools to complete rejection of French institutions. One of the most significant factors influencing the schools' success was the role of the teacher as community leader within the local environment. Since the teachers at the schools for Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers remained foreigners to their local communities, like the curriculum

they were supposed to teach, these potential leaders negatively influenced the success of these schools. As a result, many Muslim Moroccans preferred enrollment at many of the alternative schools disseminating a more culturally relevant, traditional education in CA or MSA. Such a move to attend alternative schools, both traditional and free schools, displayed both solidarity to local ideology and resistance to foreign dominance. However, Bourdieu's *habitus* does not allow individuals to contemplate resistance in their physical act of solidarity, in this case, seeking a traditional education, speaking CA or MSA, or acquiring CA or MSA as a result of both the political discontent with French domination and the heightened awareness of group identity. Therefore, the Moroccan example, at least in terms of the rejection of French schools among Arabs and Berbers, does not support the predictions of the linguistic market theory.

This chapter examined how Bourdieu's theory on social reproduction and the language market is unable to explain how both Arabic and French came to dominance in protectorate and independent Morocco and how a number of Moroccans sought alternative educational trajectories to the French colonial schools. While European communities and many Jewish and elite Muslim communities sought French assimilation, many Muslim Moroccan communities, whether Berber or Arab, opposed or resisted French education and French cultural knowledge. These Moroccans displayed not only coordinated group solidarity but also resistance to the symbolic domination that only French as the dominant language ensured by attending alternative schools disseminating CA or MSA as additional cultural knowledge.

Since French schools continued to offer all Moroccans greater socioeconomic advantages, both French and Arabic instruction became important for a number of these Moroccans, with the consequence that at least two languages became legitimate in Morocco, especially after independence. With the expansion of bilingual instruction and the ascension of former French-speaking students in the new positions in the government after 1956, both French and Arabic became required to access the new positions of power and prestige vacated by French authorities as a new form of symbolic domination in Morocco.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This dissertation demonstrated how the French language spread at different rates and in different ways among European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber communities in protectorate Morocco as a result of inequitable indoctrination at colonial schools. As predicted by Bourdieu's language market theory, those who received the highest quality French instruction at the best colonial schools advanced socially and economically under the new French authority, because these students acquired the skills necessary for the emerging economy and advanced to administrative and commercial positions requiring proficient French-speaking professionals. Students from the mostly European, Jewish, and elite non-Jewish Arab and Berber communities were most often the few selected to attend these prestigious institutions with the best teachers and highest quality French instruction, because colonial officials sought their participation as civil servants, in turn, bolstering the relationship between French officials and these French-speaking graduates. On the contrary, those without a quality French education, the predominately Muslim Arab and Berber Moroccans from lower socioeconomic origin who had been segregated into schools with less quality French instruction, were unable to acquire economic capital or prestige in the evolving job market. They maintained professions within the traditional economy, excluded from economic, social, and political participation in the new government.

6.1 Overview of the Dissertation

To begin this dissertation, Chapter 1 demonstrated how French remains, even today, long after independence from France, an important language in Morocco as a means towards accessing professional careers and higher education. The rise of French speakers after 1956 despite the efforts to Arabize the national curriculum begs the research question: How did the French colonial school system and French language become and remain dominant in Morocco? Moreover, given the statistics illustrating inequities in French acquisition between different social groups in Morocco, how did French become more widespread among certain speech communities more than others?

In order to lay the groundwork for this sociohistorical and linguistic study, Chapter 2 reviewed the major sociolinguistic notions important to this discussion by presenting the definitions of diglossia by both Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967), differentiating the notion of diglossia from bilingualism. Further, I introduced the sociohistorical presence of each speech community in protectorate Morocco to include their geographical, religious, and linguistic diversity as well as their historical significance. This discussion demonstrated how French officials came to view Moroccan communities as heterogeneous, laying the groundwork for Chapter 3 and the discussion of creation of a segregated educational system. Finally, I outlined the major points of Bourdieu's language market theory in order to show how the implementation of a hierarchical school system led to the broadening of linguistic and socioeconomic disparities between students and communities. This review of

Bourdieu's theories highlighted the process by which a dominant class, in this case the French authorities, creates and reproduces dominant status through mandating what, how, when, and to whom the culture is distributed and how schools inculcate dominant culture, especially language, as symbolic, economic, and cultural capital. Bourdieu's linguistic market theory applied in the context of Morocco shows how the French-speaking graduates of the best French schools in Morocco came to earn a greater profit of distinction and socioeconomic prosperity and how their prestige lasted for decades after independence, while those without such education underwent symbolic domination.

From the presentation of sociolinguistic definitions, Moroccan speech communities, and the theoretical discussion of language as capital and the social reproduction of that capital, Chapter 3 showed how social divisions and ideologies about social divisions in protectorate Morocco became institutionalized through differences of legal status, laying the groundwork for the segregated colonial school system. Important to this discussion were the previous colonial experiences in Algeria and Tunisia and the role of religious organizations in emphasizing religious and ethnic divisions between Moroccans as Jewish, Christian, or Muslim as well as in emphasizing Moroccan ethnic divisions as either Berber or Arab. Further, I showed in this chapter how French officials encouraged policies that segregated Moroccan communities on the basis of these divisions through the implementation of the divide-and-rule strategy and *Resident Général* Lyautey's doctrine, which reinforced the maintenance of the preexisting social order to the benefit of the elite and Moroccans

from noble families. As a result of these ideologies and the institutionalization of legal differences, Moroccan students were sorted into different schools, with only a minority receiving preferential access to the highest quality French instruction and, in turn, other kinds of socioeconomic privilege.

Chapter 4 described how the French colonial *mission civilisatrice* ideology justified the effort to "civilize" by educating and investigated the variety of educational opportunities that existed for different communities in Morocco. According to the principles of this mission, those necessary to the colonial venture, the European, Jewish, and elite Arab and Berber communities, were provided rigorous educational opportunities in the highest quality metropolitan curricula. Nonelite Arab and Berber communities received various kinds of instruction at the rural or urban colonial schools for the general populous and at the free or Islamic traditional schools. Then, this chapter showed how differences among teacher qualifications and student selection at each of the schools further hindered the expansion of French education to the majority of Moroccans and reinforced the inequitable distribution of the French language. Segregated schools and selection of students played the largest role in excluding the majority of Moroccans from accessing French schools; however, the diminished social role of the foreign teacher within local Arab and Berber Moroccan communities and the fear of religious or colonial intent contributed to the resistance in acquiring French as dominant cultural knowledge among the majority of Arab and non-Jewish Berber communities in discrete ways. As a result, students and families from many of these communities,

excluded from the best schools, did not have access to French instruction and instead sought multiple educational alternatives in the form of renovated traditional schools and free schools, resulting in the diversification of educational curricula for the least empowered members of Moroccan society.

Chapter 5 demonstrated how French became a legitimate language in Morocco during the protectorate as a result of the link between colonial schools and the job market and how all communities came to accept and seek a French education, though at different rates. The most desirable *habitus*, or set of learned behaviors, in protectorate Morocco was that granted by the highest levels of the French educational system, behavior ensured by one's having gained the *baccalauréat*, diplomas granted by the *lycées*, and the degrees from French universities, since these most closely resembled those belonging to the privileged classes. After linking a French education with the job market and the prosperity that French education secured, certain behaviors such as speaking French came to be associated with certain social conditions, such as educational attainment and economic prosperity, and therefore granted prestige in terms of acquired cultural skills, or cultural capital. With a French *baccalauréat*, graduates not only were able to advance to careers in the administration but also altered their clothes, took French names, tuned into the French media sources, and sought professional opportunities abroad.

As Bourdieu's linguistic market correctly predicted, proper, standard French taught at the prestigious institutions in Morocco became the most distinguished variety in the marketplace, granting economic capital as the education system became

increasingly linked with the employment market. In this way, graduates without *certificats, diplômes, baccalauréats,* or other paper documents from the prestigious French schools that verified such linguistic competence were disenfranchised from the economic opportunities and upward mobility that French offered. Yet, despite socioeconomic exclusion and the symbolic domination that followed from lacking French cultural knowledge, all Moroccans came to believe in the legitimacy of the educational institution and the French language as dominant cultural knowledge, as demonstrated by enrollment trends by the end of the protectorate. Because this language was the best means by which to alter their dominated status, French grew in demand and popularity, even among communities with the least access to French instruction during the protectorate. By indoctrinating the near-uniform belief in the necessity of this cultural knowledge and in the power of the institution, beliefs shared by both dominant and dominated populations, both the power of the dominant class and the domination of the dominated class was maintained, reproducing symbolic domination for future generations, in accordance with Bourdieu's theory.

I also showed in Chapter 5 how, at the same time that nearly all Jewish, European, and elite Moroccan communities sought French language and education, some Arab and non-Jewish Moroccans denied enrollment at the prestigious French schools resisted their symbolic domination, contrary to the predictions of Bourdieu's theory. Instead, many Moroccans pursued more culturally authentic education at the alternative schools, the Islamic traditional schools and the free schools, thereby resisting French dominance and socioeconomic disparity. Many of these alternative

schools, through the modernized Arabized curriculum, promoted Moroccan tradition, identity, and nationalism and in the process reaffirmed a link between this language and the Moroccan Independence Movement. Through the instruction of CA and MSA at alternative schools and the new forms of symbolic and cultural capital that their graduates received, Moroccans asserted a sense of solidarity, of national identity, and of cultural specificity, effectively challenging the dominance of French as the only legitimate cultural knowledge in Morocco. The reproduction of power as predicted by Bourdieu's linguistic market theory, whereby a single language becomes a dominant language granting economic, symbolic, and cultural capital and whereby the symbolically dominated are unable to resist, was undermined by the development of alternative schools and the elevation of CA instruction in protectorate Morocco.

6.2 The Maintenance of French After Independence

Though French, MSA, and CA became dominant languages in independent Morocco, neither CA nor MSA was unable to completely supplant French as a dominant language in Morocco. French remained economically beneficial for all communities and enhanced one's social prestige along with such economic prosperity. Moreover, CA or MSA instruction did not advance one professionally in the modern economy and did not offer socioeconomic opportunity because curricula at these schools remained for the most part unstandardized and did not lead to any diploma or certification. In response, many students continued to value a French education and seek opportunities to learn French by attending any school available to

them, sometimes in addition to attending a traditional school, in effect reinforcing the legitimacy of French as a dominant language in Morocco. As a result, CA, MSA, and French became dominant languages in Morocco but each for very different circumstances and each granting very different kinds of capital.

After independence, language and education remained linked to employment conditions in Morocco in unprecedented ways. Scholastic, administrative, and commercial institutions inherited from the protectorate continued to necessitate French-trained professionals. Therefore, these graduates were the most qualified candidates to fill positions vacated after French protectorate officials left Morocco. Grandguillaume (1983) confirmed the importance of the French language during and after the Moroccan protectorate as it continued to be the language and culture among the elite, and it was by virtue of acquiring this language that the elite and the children of the elite came to embody power and social stature. As competency in French became more difficult to acquire, French-speaking Moroccans accessed positions of power and socioeconomic opportunity over non-French-speaking candidates. Then, as the new government implemented CA and MSA as the official languages within national institutions, Moroccans found the number and quality of opportunities to study French increasingly restricted and, therefore, the profit of distinction that came with French mastery even greater.

This research demonstrated how historical factors in Morocco encouraged four speech communities, European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab, to speak French differentially under the French regime and, moreover, the way languages more

broadly come to reflect social hierarchies and power structure. The formation of a contemporary nation-state under the French protectorate induced substantial transformations throughout Moroccan society. The demise of tribal leadership, Islamic court's authority in legislative matters, and segregated communities, coupled with urbanization, modern education, the rise of a new economy based on technical advances, and financial prosperity through new kinds of employment, was accomplished through the medium of the French language. The speech communities able to exploit this language, while simultaneously embodying enhanced social status, were also the ones able to maximize cultural, economic, and symbolic profit from speaking this language. This language secured profitable advantages and economic potential for all communities in Morocco and remained a language of preference for those seeking to better their lot in life for decades after independence. The differing levels of access to French among the various speech communities combined with the socioeconomic incentives to attain it produced motivation to acquire French as more than a purely linguistic preference. Instead, for many speakers, French mastery translated into both imagined wealth as well as real material wealth. Yet, unlike the standardization of one dominant language embodying economic, cultural, and symbolic capital as that witnessed in modern-day France and in contrast to the predictions of Bourdieu's linguistic market, many found alternative methods to resist French dominance and acquire alternate forms of linguistic capital. While French remained the language of economic capital and symbolic for greater social advancement, proficiency in CA or MSA was rewarded with great cultural and

symbolic capital within local communities. Thus, the segregated education system through which CA, MSA, and French were inculcated differently came to reflect not only differences in social origin, social class, and power in Morocco but also how some communities actively choose to resist dominant authority and act as agents in their own linguistic production.

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VITA

Elizabeth Burnett-Henderson completed her undergraduate degree in French at The University of Texas at Austin in 1994 and became an *au pair* in Lille, France. Afterwards, she taught middle and high school French in Texas, until 1998. She earned a Master of Arts degree in French Linguistics at The University of Texas in May 2000. In preparation for her work in the Maghreb, she studied Arabic in Tangier, Morocco, during the summer of 2000, funded by a grant from American Institute of Maghreb Studies. From 2000–2001, she studied Arabic and Middle Eastern studies at the *Institut d'études politiques* in Aix-en-Provence. In 2004, she married Michael Henderson and has since followed his army assignments to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Hood, Texas; Washington, DC; and Fort Riley, Kansas. She received a Fulbright grant in 2005–2006 and an American Institute of Maghreb Studies Scholarship in 2006 to research the colonial archives in Fez; Casablanca; and Rabat, Morocco. She taught French at Baylor University from 2006–2008, to include the Baylor in Paris Summer Program. She continued research for this dissertation at the *Archives diplomatiques* in Nantes in 2008 to complement the research previously undertaken in Morocco. In May 2010, her husband assumed battalion command and they moved with their 4-week-old twin infants to Fort Riley, Kansas.

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